ARMS CONTROL POLICY, PLANNING AND NEGOTIATING

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 21, 24; DECEMBER 1, 1981

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
12-218 O WASHINGTON : 1982

S201-4

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN TOWER, Texas, *Chairman*

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hampshire
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
ROGER W. JEPSEN, Iowa
DAN QUAYLE, Indiana
JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
SAM NUNN, Georgia
GARY HART, Colorado
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska
CARL LEVIN, Michigan

RHETT B. DAWSON, *Staff Director and Chief Counsel*
JAMES F. McGOVERN, *General Counsel*
CHRISTINE E. COWART, *Chief Clerk*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

NEGOTIATING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS

JULY 21, 1981

Page

Rowny, Gen. Edward L., Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations-Designate and Chief Negotiator for Arms Control Negotiations-Designate ---- 3

ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND PLANNING

JULY 24, 1981

Rostow, Hon. Eugene V., Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ---- 53

ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

DECEMBER 1, 1981

Perle, Hon. Richard N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy ---- 92

ARMS CONTROL POLICY, PLANNING AND NEGOTIATING

TUESDAY, JULY 21, 1981

U.S. Senate,
Armed Services Committee,
Washington, D.C.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 10.14 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Stennis, Jackson, Hart, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine E. Cowart, assistant chief clerk; Louis W. Arny III, Michael B. Donley, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Ronald F. Lehman, James R. Locher III, E. George Riedel, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, and Brenda K. Hudson, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Chris Lehman. assistant to Senator Warner; George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Paul Schreiber, assistant to Senator Denton; Hermann Pirchner, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hal Sisson, assistant to Senator Denton; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; Greg Pallas, Assistant to Sentor Exon; Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; Dorothy Fosdick, assistant to Senator Jackson; and Larry K. Smith, assistant to Senator Hart.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Tower. The committee will come to order.

It is a pleasure today to welcome Gen. Edward L. Rowny to testify before this committee again. Ed Rowny has had a career in public service that in my view is a model of dedication and integrity. In the area of arms control, which is the subject of our hearing this morning, Ed Rowny has worked on mutual and balanced force reduction talks, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and he spent 6 years as the representative of the Joint Chiefs at the SALT II talks in Geneva.

He is one negotiator who spent the time necessary to learn how the arms control process works and how the Soviets negotiate. I do not know of anyone who more clearly understands how the Soviets negotiate than Ed Rowny. In the field of arms control, he is a true practitioner. We hope to draw upon his extensive experience, as in the past, to help this committee in its oversight responsibilities.

Arms control has played an important role in America's national security and foreign policy and will continue to do so. As the great debate over SALT II has shown, the Senate recognizes the importance of arms control but knows that agreements cannot simply be rubberstamped even when motivated by good intent. Rather, arms control negotiations are better or worse depending on how well we negotiate and how strong our negotiating positions are.

Clearly, no arms control agreement is able to establish a military balance independent of our own will and capacity to maintain that military balance unilaterally. However when negotiated with determination, in a spirit of confidence and strength, agreements useful to both the United States and the Soviet Union can be achieved.

As the United States rebuilds its military forces in the next few years, it will regain confidence and strength which will permit the negotiation of useful arms control agreements. These will be equitable and verifiable agreements, agreements of which we can all be proud. They will not be agreements merely for the sake of reaching agreement. They will result from a recognition by the Soviet Union that the United States and the West will not crawl to the negotiating table weak and divided.

If real progress is to be made in arms control, it will be made by those who are committed to strengthening America's defenses, not by those who would delay Western defense programs pending the results of negotiations. Arms control talks need not be delayed. When the world climate is right, we can proceed as soon as we are prepared. Rearmament must not be delayed at all.

General Rowny, as of today you have not been confirmed in your new position as chief SALT negotiator. This is not a nomination hearing. As a matter of fact it would have been perfectly acceptable to me to have General Rowny here after he was confirmed. He has been reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee. We do not have jurisdiction over General Rowny's confirmation.

I want to make that point clear. This is not a confirmation hearing. It is an oversight hearing in which we hope to clarify the nature of the arms control process and the means by which it can be most useful for the peace and security of Western democracies.

General Rowny, we are delighted to have you. You may proceed to make any statement that you wish to make. I note that you do have a prepared statement. You may submit that in full for inclusion in the record and you can summarize it if you would like to do so. You may proceed in any way you see fit.

General Rowny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. Conditions only partially under my control have prohibited me from being here on time. I would appreciate being able to summarize my statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN. EDWARD L. ROWNY, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS-DESIGNATE AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS-DESIGNATE

General Rowny. It is an honor to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I would like to submit my entire statement for the record if I may and hit a few high points in it, sir.

I would like to say that my commitment to genuine arms control derives from my past experience in a number of high-level military policy planning and command positions. Throughout the SALT II negotiations I enjoyed the confidence and support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as we saw the treaty which was equal, verifiable, and which did not pose unacceptable risks to our national security.

It was only at the very end that the Chiefs and I reached different conclusions as to the value of the treaty as it finally emerged and the resulting risks we could accept.

I wholeheartedly agree with President Reagan that it is imperative that we redress the growing strategic imbalance and restore our margin of safety with the Soviet Union. The Soviet approach to arms control has been: First, to establish their foreign policy objectives; second, to develop and deploy forces to support those objectives; and third, to use arms control to accomplish those first two goals.

For most of the SALT experience the United States, in contrast, has stood this pyramid on its head. Having made arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy, we too often allowed the process unilaterally to inhibit the development and deployment of defense forces necessary to carry out our foreign policy objectives.

I think that there are a number of points that I could make. But simply to skip through, I would say that I would like to assure this committee and all concerned that I shall dedicate my best efforts to the negotiating task, seeking to apply every possible lesson from what has gone before and to be alert to new ideas and changing circumstances.

The negotiating process should be based on a realistic approach to the Soviet Union. It should be directed to achieving arms control agreements which establish fair, balanced, and stabilizing limits, limits which are verifiable. Moreover we need to negotiate arms control agreements which call for equal overall limits in nuclear capability at substantially lower levels than allowed by the SALT II Treaty. At the same time these agreements must allow for the provision of secure, survivable deterrent forces.

I wish to stress the importance of nuclear capabilities. Unfortunately all too often in the past we erroneously sought to reduce simply the number of strategic launchers, without placing corresponding constraints on such salient characteristics as throw-weight. Measuring throw-weight, or counting the number of warheads, provide more meaningful yardsticks of true strategic capabilities than the mere number of launchers.

As a result of my own experience in negotiating with the Soviets, I believe that there are certain guidelines that I should follow in the future, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to go through those very rapidly.

I think that first both we and the Soviets have an interest in agreeing on limiting strategic arms. Moreover I am convinced that the Soviets want and need an agreement.

Second, the Soviets do not want to bring about an open-ended arms competition in which our superior technology and industrial capabilities can be brought to bear.

Third, strengthening the United States' capabilities is the best way to enhance prospects for equitable arms control agreements.

Fourth, a good agreement should permit us to restore the credibility of our strategic deterrent, our capabilities to uphold our alliance commitments and support our own interests. There is no objective reason why the United States with twice the gross national product of the Soviet Union cannot assure its defense and redress the current strategic imbalance.

Fifth, equality in agreements does not mean equal numbers of launchers alone, a point I have made earlier and I want to stress again, sir. But it also means equality in the destructive potential of the weapons themselves.

Sixth, any agreement entered into must be verifiable. This will be increasingly difficult to achieve in the future solely through national technical means.

Seventh, well designed, balanced, equal, and verifiable agreements enhance deterrence and help restore stability in times of crisis.

Finally, deterrence and stability can be achieved and maintained at substantially lower levels of destructive potential. Therefore such reductions should be our goal.

Therefore once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure members of this committee that I am and will remain committed to the task of seeking equal and verifiable arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe there should and can be agreements at lower levels of strategic potential, for only in this way can we hope to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Such agreements would be in our interests, in the interests of our allies and in the long run in the interests of the Soviet Union as well.

Mr. Chairman, that completes the summary of my statement. I would welcome any questions that you or the committee members may have.

[The prepared statement of General Rowny follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. EDWARD L. ROWNY

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I have been and remain committed to an arms control process which supports the objective of providing for our security at lower levels of armaments. It is essential that we negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union that are balanced and equal and thus serve the national security needs of the United States and our Allies. Such agreements can and should make a positive contribution to our security objectives.

I believe I come to this post with two prime qualifications. First, I am committed to genuine arms control—that is, arms control consistent with our national security requirements; and second, I have devoted more than half of my 40 years of military service to gaining the requisite knowledge to perform my duties. Specifically, I have studied Soviet military doctrine, policies, weapons capabilities and negotiating techniques. For most of the last decade I have participated in the negotiation of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and have seen first hand the contrasting approaches towards negotiations.

I come to this job with the educational preparation of two masters degrees, one in engineering and one in international relations and a Ph. D. in international relations. I have also studied and speak Russian.

My experience in strategic planning began in 1945 as a strategic planner for General George Marshall. I served at NATO headquarters in the mid-1950's and the 1960's, and early 1970's. In addition I held command and staff jobs in Europe during the 1960's. In 1972 I helped develop the United States and NATO positions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and was the Chief of NATO's MBFR Working Group. I was in Moscow as a member of the U.S. team on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1973. And I was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative at the SALT II negotiations for over six years—from its beginning in 1973 until its completion in 1979. As the individual with the longest tenure on the U.S. SALT II delegation. I believe I have the experience and the necessary perspective to be the Chief negotiator.

Thus my commitment to genuine arms control derives from my past experiences in a number of high-level military policy planning and command positions. Throughout the SALT II negotiations I enjoyed the confidence and support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as we sought a treaty which was equal, verifiable, and which did not pose unacceptable risks to our national security. It was only at the very end that the Chiefs and I reached different conclusions as to the value of the treaty as it finally emerged and the resulting risks we could accept.

I wholeheartedly agree with President Reagan; it is imperative that we redress the growing strategic imbalance and restore our margin of safety with the Soviet Union. The Soviet approach to arms control has been: first, to establish their foreign policy objectives, second, to develop and deploy forces to support those objectives, and third, to use arms control to accomplish these goals. For most of the SALT experience the United States, in contrast, has stood this pyramid on its head. Having made arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy, we too often allowed the process unilaterally to inhibit the development and deployment of defense forces necessary to carry out our foreign policy objectives.

Now, while restoring the margin of safety, we have every reason to hope for genuine arms reductions. President Reagan repeatedly stated this during his campaign and has now charged the Washington community to prudently and carefully implement his pledge as a matter of high priority. Redressing the strategic imbalance is essential for our security and as a base from which to negotiate sound arms control agreements. There is a strong consensus in America today that only by improving our defenses can we maintain a credible deterrence. The American people also understand that credible deterrence and sound arms control policies go hand in hand. In short, only with the enhanced defense program upon which we are embarked and with a realistic understanding of arms control can we negotiate and hope to reach sound agreements with the Soviet Union.

In order to gain some idea of how I believe we must reconcile U.S. foreign, defense and arms control policies we must understand how previously well-intentioned (but unfortunately misguided) approaches went awry. My experience during SALT II parallels that of many Americans who hoped for genuine arms control, only to be disappointed by the results. I experienced three cycles in my pursuit of a meaningful and beneficial SALT II agreement. The first cycle was one of great expectations, the second, of considerable frustration, and the third, of keen disappointment that the U.S. possessed neither the leverage nor the negotiating skill to arrive at an acceptable SALT treaty.

After SALT II was signed in June 1979 I retired from the U.S. Army so that I could testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and this Committee against ratification of the SALT II treaty in its current form. Having stayed with the treaty until the very end in the abiding hope that SALT II could be made equal and verifiable, certain important provisions of the treaty, in my judgment, posed unacceptable risks to our national security. The principal inequality was the overwhelming advantage in nuclear destructive potential allowed the Soviets by a putatively equal agreement which permitted the Soviets to deploy strategic forces superior to ours.

The net result of the SALT II process was that it weakened our strategic power in relation to that of the Soviet Union and made the danger of war much more acute.

The main fault of the process as it was carried out during SALT II, especially in its final stages, was that it concealed and even legitimized the unrelenting expansion of Soviet military power over the last decade. While a number of other factors were involved, the SALT process, as it evolved, helped make us deaf and blind to the perilous accumulation of Soviet military might.

A second fault of the previous SALT process, again especially in its final stages, had to do with unrealistic expectations on our part. The SALT process was expected to bring about a doctrinal meeting of the minds, wherein the Soviets would embrace the U.S. concept of strategic stability and proceed with restructuring their forces in our image. This hope was naive and unfounded What we hoped for did not occur.

The Senate Armed Services Committee by a 10 to 0 vote (seven members voting present) reported that "after extensive examination of the military implications of the treaty, the Committee concludes that the SALT II treaty as it now stands is not in the national security interest of the United States of America." Additionally, although the Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the SALT II treaty, some members of that Committee showed that they had strong reservations concerning the SALT II treaty as evidenced by the 20 substantial changes to the treaty they recommended. Regrettably, even though the record demonstrates that the Soviets failed to abide by the spirit of their international obligations, the United States showed in SALT II that it did not understand this Soviet attitude. Thus we failed in SALT II to achieve our objective of closing important loopholes of the treaty before signing it. An example was the issue of verification—a crucial matter. One of the main hindrances to effective verification was United States aquiescence that the Soviets could encrypt some of the telemetry from their missile tests—indeed the very telemetry needed to verify the provisions permitting only one new type of ICBM.

Given this understanding of the past, the path we must pursue becomes clear. I assure you that I shall dedicate my best efforts to the negotiating task, seeking to apply every possible lesson from what has gone before and to be alert to new ideas and changing circumstances. The negotiating process should be based on a realistic approach to the Soviet Union. It should be directed to achieving arms control agreements which establish fair, balanced and stabilizing limits—limits which are verifiable. Moreover, we need to negotiate arms control agreements which call for equal overall limits in nuclear capability at a substantially lower level than allowed by the SALT II treaty. At the same time, these agreements must allow for the provision of secure, survivable, deterrent forces. I wish to stress the importance of nuclear *capabilities*. Unfortunately, all too often in the past we erroneously sought to reduce just the number of strategic launchers, without corresponding constraints on such salient characteristics as throw-weight. Throw-weight or number of warheads provide more meaningful yardsticks of true strategic capabilities than the mere number of launchers.

We should get back to basics and recall that as we began the SALT process the essential linkage between offensive and defensive agreement was well understood. We should strive to achieve an agreement on offensive arms comparable to the currently existing ABM agreement in scope and effect. Such an agreement should reduce the threat which the Soviets present to the survivability of our strategic forces.

No agreement we sign should ever again sanction a Soviet buildup in strategic capabilities. The broad objective of our negotiations is to safeguard the world against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. My experience in SALT II leads me to believe that the guidelines I should follow as I negotiate for the United States are:

(1) Both we and the Soviets have an interest in agreements limiting strategic arms; moreover, I am convinced that the Soviets want and need an agreement,

(2) The Soviets do *not* want to bring about an open-ended arms competition in which our superior technology and industrial capabilities can be brought to bear,

(3) Strengthening United States capabilities is the best way to enhance prospects for equitable arms control agreements,

(4) A good agreement should permit us to restore the credibility of our strategic deterrent, our capability to uphold our alliance commitments, and support our own interests. There is no objective reason why the United States, with twice the GNP of the USSR, cannot assure its defense and redress the current strategic imbalance,

(5) Equality in agreements does not mean equal numbers of launchers alone, but also means equality in the destructive potential of the weapons themselves,

(6) Any agreement entered into must be verifiable. This will be increasingly difficult to achieve in the future solely through national technical means,

(7) Well-designed balanced, equal and verifiable agreements enhance deterrence and help restore stability in times of crisis. Finally,

(8) Deterrence and stability can be achieved and maintained at substantially lower levels of destructive potential; therefore such reductions should be our goal.

In closing, it is necessary to point out that there are critical intangible factors involved as well. My long experience at negotiating with the Soviet has taught me that ideology, contrary to what some would have us believe, is not dead in the Soviet Union. I found Soviet negotiators to be ideologically motivated, determined to seek agreements favorable to the Soviet Union. The late Alistair Buchan, in "The End of the Postwar Era" wrote "The Soviet Union has become the equal of the United States in long-range strategic forces and consequently more confident of her position, while America has become more uncertain of her interests. The question is whether our western societies possess the internal coherence and faith in their own ideals 'to confront those societies that are led from the top downwards.'" The Soviet negotiators appear to negotiate from the premise that the United States does not have the will to defend its interests and our principles of democracy and way of life. National will is the glue which holds together all our other efforts. It is to politics what esprit de corps is to the military: it exerts a multiplier effect. As Sir Robert Thompson put it, "national power is manpower plus applied resources times will."

Once again, I wish to assure the members of this Committee that I am and will remain committed to the task of seeking equal and verifiable arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe there should, and can, be agreements at lower levels of strategic potential, for only in this way can we hope to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Such agreements would be in our interest, in the interest of our Allies, and in the long run in the interest of the Soviet Union as well.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Rowny.

I might note that we are in open session now. Should any of the responses to the questions asked involve going into classified areas, we will go into closed session and clear the room. I want that understood at the outset. If the committee wants to pursue matters that are classified, we will certainly do that. I hope members of the committee will not feel inhibited.

General Rowny, let me ask your opinion of the plan recently proposed—it sounds very attractive—by George Kennan calling for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to immediately reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles by 50 percent. Do you have any comment on that kind of proposal?

General ROWNY. My comment, Mr. Chairman, is that it is an interesting proposal. I think that the proposal should be studied carefully. I think that any proposal of that type should not be dismissed out of hand.

However, I must say that the Soviet Union has not shown any interest in this proposal nor has it shown interest in reductions per se during the whole time I negotiated with them. Therefore, I am not very optimistic that any such drastic actions or what would appear to be drastic actions, no matter how desirable they may be from our point of view, have any prospect of immediate success.

So while I would study the proposal, and while I would hope that the Soviets study the proposal, my own view is that more measured steps to reducing the level of strategic potential by degrees has better prospects of success.

Chairman TOWER. General Rowny, once during the course of the negotiations in Geneva, I visited there to monitor the negotiations. You were privy to a conversation I had with Alexander Shchukin who was the principal scientific adviser to Semenov, the chief negotiator for the Soviet Union. I asked Mr. Shchukin what the Soviets were prepared to do in return for our unilateral cancellation of the B-1. Do you remember what his response was?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I remember that Academician Shchukin said, "Senator, I would have you know that we are neither pacifists nor philanthropists." That was the expression he used, which I thought quite correctly expressed how he viewed it.

Chairman TOWER. Do you think that is revealing of the Soviet mentality as far as arms negotiations are concerned?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, I do think so. I think that Academician Shchukin, who is certainly the most Western of the negotiators, and who prided himself on thinking the way we did, is still a died-in-the wool Communist and believed in the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and he is neither a pacifist nor a philanthropist.

Chairman TOWER. General Rowny, do you believe that there is inherent linkage between arms control negotiations and the world military-political situation?

General ROWNY. I might start out to answer that question by saying that I think that the avoidance of any notion in the past that there is linkage was wrong. I think that to bury our heads in the sand and say that there is no such thing as linkage is not correct.

I do think that there is a linkage between what happens in the rest of the world and what the Soviets do. This goes back to my fundamental approach to dealing with the Soviets. That is, their goals and objectives are not our goals and objectives. I think we have to recognize that and recognize that we have to get an arms control agreement within those parameters, that their goals and objectives are in many ways and most important ways diametrically opposed to ours.

Chairman TOWER. If arms control is to be a part of a coherent national security and foreign policy, how should the arms control decisionmaking process be organized in your view?

General ROWNY. Sir, I think the process should be organized along the lines which we are now pursuing. It is first of all an interagency process; no one agency has the right to dominate the entire policy of the United States. Certainly the Defense Department has to look after the security of the United States. The Arms Control Agency by charter is there to champion arms control.

Therefore I think these various inputs into a process which the President then can weigh and decide upon is the proper one, and I have confidence that that is the type of procedure on which we are now moving along.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Rowny.

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have known General Rowny for some 25 years and I have watched a lot of people come and go in the business of international arms control negotiations. I must say I know of no one who is better qualified to serve in this capacity. He has had a long and distinguished military career in both World War II as combat officer, highly decorated in Korea and in Vietnam. He has been involved in strategic military planning.

If you look in his statement, he is very modest. He left out the fact that he first graduated from Johns Hopkins. How old were you, General?

General ROWNY. I was 20, sir.

Senator JACKSON. He graduated from Johns Hopkins, with his B.S. degree and then graduated from West Point Academy and then earned a double masters at Yale, one in engineering, the other in international relations, and then his doctorate of philosophy.

In the process of negotiating, even with State Department people, he was the only one on our side speaking Russian. People have the idea that because you are a general officer you cannot be a scholar. I think General Rowny, Mr. Chairman, brings all of these disciplines together with an enormous experience in the real world and with a truly scholarly input.

I want to make that point because it is casual talk, if they are military, they do not know a thing about diplomacy or the scholarly input. I want to salute General Rowny for the expertise that he brings to the negotiating table and above all else just down-to-earth commonsense.

Having said that, I have one question, General Rowny. I feel quite strongly that even though it is very, very difficult to achieve, America should make its position known to all that there are more strategic weapons in the world than are needed, and that we place great emphasis on mutual reduction of strategic arms to equal levels, letting the people of the world know that we are prepared to use those savings for the benefit of mankind and to help people everywhere.

Challenge the Russians to it. Find out who is really for a less dangerous world, who is really for peace, and make clear our position. As you know, General, this has been my position through the years. I regret that the previous administration in their first SALT go-around came in for reductions and then blew it, took a powder, because the Russians were initially difficult.

I am not suggesting numbers or amounts, but I want to ask you do you feel that reduction should be a part of any kind of proposal that we work out? It must be mutual, it must be verifiable, it must be governed by the principle of equality, so you end up in roughly a balance?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir, I certainly subscribe to that. I think that a treaty which simply limits arms but does not reduce the capability of the destructive potential of those arms is of little value in the long run. I recall that in public Law 92-448 the acronym SART was first used, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks for the future.

I think that there should be in any treaties we enter into a degree of measured but steady substantial reductions of destructive potential within the terms of those treaties. Otherwise I think we simply sanction what each side would want to do and particularly sanction what the Soviet side would want to do—and I think that that leads us nowhere.

To put it in another way, Senator, the real objective of any agreement we entered into should be to get the Soviets to spend less for defenses or for their strategic and conventional forces, and we are now talking about the strategic forces. Had the SALT II Treaty as was then negotiated turned down the resource curve of the Soviets, I think we would have had some degree for optimism that this would be a good treaty.

Since it did not prevent them from spending more nor does it prevent them from spending more, I think we do not have a good treaty until we get such restraints and constraints on the Soviets to limit them both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I likewise have great respect and admiration for General Rowny and welcome you to this post.

General ROWNY. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. You pointed out in your opening statement that the goals of the United States and the goals of the Soviet Union are quite different. Then on page 6 you point out the need to achieve arms control agreements which establish fair, balanced, and stabilizing limits.

It has always been my feeling that one of the goals of the Soviet Union was to maintain instability. Can you conceive of a means by which we can achieve—and I agree with you that this should be our objective—a stabilizing type of an agreement that would not be inconsistent with the goals that they have espoused for generations?

General ROWNY. Sir, I certainly do subscribe to the notion that any treaty we enter into should aim for stability and a good treaty will move in this direction. I think that the SALT II Treaty as it was signed had destabilizing elements in it, and those elements need to be corrected in any future treaty.

Having said that, I do think that the Soviets will enter into an agreement which permits a degree of stability, because I think that in the end they do not want to supr us into an arms race. They feel that they could not win such a race in the long run. They feel it would not allow them to carry out their other objectives of being able to further aggrandize and move their forces about with impunity.

Therefore I think that they would enter into agreements at lower levels of destructive potential which then translates into greater stability in times of crisis.

Senator WARNER. In my judgment, before the Senate will provide its advice and consent on behalf of a future SALT agreement, we will have to be convinced either that the Soviets have abided in spirit with SALT I or that we have built into a subsequent SALT agreement those protections to guard against any departure, or should we say in simple lay language, breaking of the terms of SALT I.

My first question is do you think they have abided by the terms of SALT? Second, do you think a subsequent SALT agreement would likewise be written in such way as to require them to live up to it?

General ROWNY. Senator, I think the Soviets did not abide by the spirit of the interm agreement. Had they done so, I believe we could have reached a satisfactory agreement in SALT II. The major effort on our part in the interim agreement was to get a freeze on the Soviet buildup. You will recall, sir, that we were ahead in ABMs and we acceded to an ABM treaty with the agreement that they would freeze their offensive launchers, which were then about 50 percent ahead of ours in terms of launchers.

The Soviets then increased the size of the missiles within those launchers—our Minuteman was the size of their SS–11 at the time. They then modernized and replaced their SS–11's with SS–17's and SS–19's which were three times as powerful as our Minuteman. Worse, their super heavy missiles, so-called "heavy" missiles, were six times as powerful as our Minuteman. It is this great asymmetry which has caused the difficulties, which has undermined deterrence and has made crisis stability so hard to achieve.

As for a future SALT agreement, I certainly think that we should negotiate a treaty to close loopholes such as that. By negotiating a good treaty so that the letter of the law is clear which will require some degree of cooperation on their part, I think that then we have a possibility of having a verifiable agreement.

Senator WARNER. Let me turn to Item 6 on page 7 and the use of the word "solely." The sentence reads: This will be increasingly difficult—that is verification—to achieve in the future solely through national technical means.

Would you expand on the word "solely" and what you mean as either alternatives or additional means for verification? Or do you wish to wait to go into executive session?

General ROWNY. I think I can explain it in general terms in open session. If we want to get into more detail, I think we can do that in closed session.

What I have in mind are two general types of things. First is the matter of encryption of telemetry. As you know, Senator, we do not encrypt the telemetry of our ICBM missile tests. The Soviets do. The fact that they insisted that they encrypt their testing signals on their new type of ICBM means that they can test two to three, maybe four different systems under the provisions of the treaty and be perfectly legal under the treaty the way it is written. That is one type of measure that goes beyond national technical means.

The other is what was done in SALT II and is known as FROD's or Functionally Related Observable Differences. In order to make sure that certain types of systems can be recognized as being different from others, that is strategic from nonstrategic, the Soviets did agree with us that there would be these functionally related observable differences placed on certain systems.

It is that type of cooperation I think that will be required as we go into more sophisticated, more complex systems, cruise missiles being one of them, in the future.

Senator WARNER. Did you by implication include any type of onsite inspection?

General ROWNY. I did not mention onsite inspection principally because I think that it is the utimate measure, it is the thing that the Soviets find so abhorrent. Therefore, I think that I would not rule it out and in the end we may need onsite inspection. If the Soviets agree to a number of cooperative measures, we may able to verify a treaty without the onsite inspection which they find so heinous.

Senator WARNER. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman.

Turning to the point raised by the Chair, that is linkage, there are a number of types of linkage. First is linkage as a precondition or a condition to any resumption of negotiation; the second: linkage as an integral part of the agreement. Namely if they pursue worldwide steps inconsistent with our philosophy, then the agreement is broken. There are others, perhaps, but I will not take the time to discuss them now.

Would you expand on your concept of linkage and what you would hope to see achieved as a U.S. policy in regard to linkage?

General Rowny. I would say, Senator, that the two points that were made, that is that there be a precondition or that there be an integral part of the treaty dealing with this subject are not the types of linkage that I have in mind. I have in mind a general climate of trust, not trust that they are going to suddenly be good boys, but trust that they will not continue to use their strategic superiority as a means of furthering their foreign policy objectives. Therefore, their conduct in one part of the world, or another forum other than arms control would be directly related to the climate of the whole attitude with which we approach negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Therefore, it is their willingness to behave in accordance with what we believe are acceptable norms in world behavior; that is what I mean by linkage.

Senator Warner. I share your thought that we are not going to convert them into being good guys, certainly not in the near term. I appreciate your thought that linkage should not be an integral part of the treaty; namely, that if they were to perform an action like Afghanistan it would breach any limitation agreement we might have between the two countries. That is your understanding?

General Rowny. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. Senator Hart?

Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have a brief opening statement that I would like to submit for the record. I will just take a couple of minutes to summarize it, if I may, without having that bear on my question time.

I think it is significant that the committee is holding this hearing. It follows a precedent we established 4 years ago with the nomination of Mr. Paul Warnke for at least part of the position which General Rowny will be occupying. This committee undertook at that time to conduct similar hearings as to Mr. Warnke's philosophy about arms control and defense generally. I thought that was a good idea at the time and I think this is a good idea also, and I thank the Chairman for his favorable response to the suggestion which I made in this regard.

[Prepared statement by Senator Hart follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Gary Hart

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your accommodation of my request for a separate hearing by the Armed Services Committee on the nomination of Edward Rowny to be the Chief U.S. SALT negotiator. I am pleased we were able to hold the hearing so soon after the favorable report of Mr. Rowny by the Foreign Relations Committee to the Senate, so he can begin as soon as possible on the establishment of a timetable for resumption of nuclear arms limitation negotiations.

My interest in this hearing today is simple: the Armed Services Committee members have a direct and vital need to understand fully the arms control policies Mr. Rowny plans to pursue, as well as their effects on our national security. Four years ago this Committee met to consider the nomination of General Rowny's predecessor, Mr. Paul Warnke. This hearing, like that one, is evidence of our Committee's increasing concern about the national security aspects of arms control. As Senator Stennis said when we held the hearing on Mr. Warnke, there is a clear overlap of interest in this nomination between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and this one. I believe we, on this Committee, would be forsaking some of our responsibility if we failed to pursue such a line of questioning with Mr. Rowny before voting on his nomination.

Too often in the past, both advocates and opponents of arms control treaties have viewed national security and arms control as mutually exclusive goals. This is a false distinction and one we cannot afford to make. In a nuclear age, the traditional understanding of national security—the ability to prosecute a war successfully—must be expanded. National security no longer can depend on raw military power alone. National security now also requires preventing a nuclear war from ever occurring.

There are two elements to this prevention: a stable and survivable nuclear deterrent and limitation of the threat through arms limitation treaties. Our security will remain in jeopardy as long as the Soviet nuclear threat remains unlimited. We must pursue an arms limitation treaty—to limit specific Soviet weapons and alter the way the Soviets shape their strategic forces.

So while we debate how much to spend on national defense—and the far more important question of what we spend it on—we must restore a sense of urgency to the other essential element of our national security policy—a legal limit on the Soviet nuclear threat.

There are many ways an arms limitation agreement would enhance our national security. Let me raise four.

LIMITS ON THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT

The Soviets have the technical capacity to more than double the number of silo-killing warheads SALT II would have permitted, deploy unlimited numbers of their heaviest missiles, and greatly increase their arsenal of MIRVed land-based missiles by 1985. Numbers are not the whole story. But limiting numbers is one way of limiting threat. Whether or not the limits negotiated two years ago were adequate, right now we are living without any legal limits whatsoever.

GREATER CERTAINTY FOR U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING

Under a treaty, the Soviets would be legally restricted to known test practices and known test ranges, which we have monitored for years with high confidence. We may seek more ambitious limitations or tighter safeguards. But the only way to achieve these limitations is by entering into negotiations. We gain no additional security by waiting.

GREATER ABILITY TO FOCUS RESOURCES ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES

If the Soviets embark on an uncontrolled arms build-up, pressures on us to do the same will be enormous. The dangers of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race are obvious. It would divert both our attention and our money from the conventional capabilities we may need to meet Soviet adventurism around the globe.

CONSENSUS ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

We need a stable majority on national security issues if we are to rebuild and maintain our military strength. This majority must include those who differed in the past because they say a strong defense and arms limits as mutually exclusive.

These are the issues I hope to raise with Mr. Rowny today.

Chairman TOWER. Would you yield, Senator Hart?

I would have to emphasize that this however is not a confirmation hearing, because we do not have that jurisdiction.

Senator HART. The chairman made that clear and there is no question about that.

It does reflect, I think, a growing awareness on everyone's part, including those who have been both advocates and opponents of various treaties in the past that national security, which is the job of this committee, and arms control are not mutually exclusive but in fact go hand in hand.

In the nuclear age it seems to me the traditional understanding of national security; namely, the ability to prosecute a war successfully, has to be expanded and national security no longer can depend on raw military power alone. It also requires preventing a nuclear war from ever occurring.

I think most of us would agree there are two elements to that prevention. One is a stable and survivable nuclear deterrent and limitation on the threat that is posed against us through arms limitations treaties. I think our security will remain in jeopardy as long as the Soviet nuclear threat remains unlimited as it presently is. And, therefore, I think we must pursue arms limitation treaties to limit specific Soviet weapons and alter the way the Soviets shape their strategic forces.

So I think this committee, given its responsibilities for the defense of the country and our national security overall, has an important role to play in restoring a sense of urgency to the other essential element of our national security policy, namely a legal limit on the Soviet nuclear threat. I think that is what we are here today to decide.

Now General, as to the posture in which we presently find ourselves, is the United States currently bound legally by the provisions of SALT II?

General ROWNY. No, sir, we are not bound legally by the provisions of SALT II.

Senator HART. Are the Soviets legally bound?

General ROWNY. No, sir.

Senator HART. Is it your view that the Soviets are presently abiding by or adhering to the provisions of that treaty voluntarily? Or if not, in what regard are they not?

General ROWNY. I think here, Senator, I have to choose my words very carefully. I do not think the word is abiding and I do not think the word is adhering. I think the Soviets so far are not taking actions which are inconsistent with certain limitations which would be put in the unratified treaty. However, I think there is a tremendous difference between these two approaches.

I would be glad to elaborate. But I think by choosing my words carefully I have made it clear that so far they have not taken actions which would be inconsistent with a SALT II Treaty had it been entered into.

Senator HART. I think from what I know that is an accurate assessment and that is exactly what I was after.

Do you think it is in our national security interests to have the Soviets continue to conduct themselves as they presently are in this regard or not?

General ROWNY. So long as they do not take actions which are inconsistent with the treaty, I think that we are better off, provided the Soviets also take steps to begin redressing the strategic imbalance which now exists. Of course that can occur in one of two ways. Either we can begin redressing the imbalance by increasing our own forces or they can reduce their forces. They have taken no steps to reduce their forces.

That is one of the reasons I eschewed the use of the word "abiding." Article III of the SALT II Treaty says that on January 1, 1981, the

Soviets would begin reducing their forces. They have not begun reducing their forces. Early in the article it says: "Upon entry into force of this treaty." It has not entered into force. So legally they are not required to reduce their forces. If they were adhering to the spirit of the treaty, they ought to be reducing their forces. They are not.

But at any rate, either they have to take steps which show that they will come down or we have to take steps which show that we are going to go up. We are now doing the latter to redress the imbalance which now exists.

Senator HART. General Rowny, you said the overall goal of nuclear arms limitation negotiations should be to get the Soviets to spend less. Do you think it is possible to get that goal achieved without us spending less or at the same time that we are spending more?

General ROWNY. I think it is a two-step process, sir. I think that we have to spend more in order to show our commitment and will, to demonstrate to the Soviets that we are not simply going to accede to inferiority or to a second-rate status. Once they understand, somewhere before the time that we complete all of the programs we are building, that they would be spurring us into trying to reach their levels they would begin coming down.

In other words I believe that Soviets do not want to spur us into the kind of an arms race which they have begun on their own behalf so far.

Senator HART. But you say they have already done that. They have spurred us into this.

General ROWNY. They have gotten us to begin to close the gap, the window of vulnerability. And I would temper that by saying not only that they have gotten us to do it, but that we have been forced to do it in order to restore our national security. Our national security, as you mentioned earlier, is the essence of what we are after. We are not entering into treaties for treaties' sake. We need to restore our national security posture.

Having begun to do so, it would also help give us some negotiating leverage toward getting an acceptable treaty.

Senator HART. Let me see if I track your logic here. You are suggesting that given the circumstances in which we find ourselves—and there is some debate about those, both where we are and how we got here—that we must build up, which takes the form of specific weapon systems, that the Soviets upon seeing that buildup will then be willing to enter into an agreement which causes them to reduce the size of their force but does not prevent us from continuing the buildiup.

General ROWNY. Generally what you have said is correct, sir. I would say that with regard to the last phrase, you said "which does not prevent us from continuing the build up," I think that once we reach a position of equality—and hopefully at lower levels than now set—there is no need for either side to build any further and we can both start saving money.

Senator HART. What I am trying to get to is the confluence of buildup and reduced levels. In other words how do you build up to get less? How does that logic work?

General ROWNY. The logic is, sir, is that we have tried everything else and nothing else has succeeded. We put a cap on our own strategic forces back in 1963 and said that we would stop at 1,000 ICBM launchers, and with small missiles in those launchers, in the belief that our example would be followed by the Soviets. The Soviets did not follow our example and did not stop until they had built 1,700 launchers which they then used to augment greatly their strategic destructive potential.

I am saying that other methods have been tried and have been found wanting. I find myself forced unfortunately into the only hypothesis that is left and, that is, one which I think the Soviets understand because they understand the value of strength. And therefore in order to come down, we must first build up.

Senator HART. How does that work? How do you do that? We are going to build B-1, MX, and Trident submarines. At what point do you in Geneva as the negotiator say here is a piece of paper; here is a treaty which has less of everything; we will sign it if you will sign it.

What is it that we are willing to have less of of the things we are building more of?

General ROWNY. When you start out with a large gap, and when there is this open window of vulnerability—and that window of vulnerability is caused mostly by the great asymmetry in ICBM warheads—that is the asymmetry which has to be redressed.

Once the Soviets have cut down in that potential, even though we may not be equal to them in that overall potential—once the risk is acceptable to us—I think then we can sign a treaty.

Senator HART. So the process is this. We build up, and I will get back to how long this takes. Once we have built up and the Soviets see this buildup and particularly see that we are not going to permit to exist what you term to be a gap, then they will sign an agreement which has everything being reduced. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think that is the way we get them to reduce their total resource commitment to strategic arms.

Senator HART. Are we going to have to reduce some things?

General ROWNY. Eventually, after they come down to our level we will be happy to come down to equal lower levels. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. We are going up to their level.

General ROWNY. We are starting to go up toward their level. We are faced with a big gap which exists now.

Senator HART. My question is, Do we have to get up to their level in your terms?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I think that we can stop at some stage short of getting up to their current level. Once they see that we have the will and are committed to accept the difficulties which they must realize we are acepting in our own society to pay for defensive forces when there are other demands on our gross national product, I think they will then realize that we have the will and the commitment to do whatever is necessary for our national security. I think at that point they will say: "all right, we will turn down." Then we can stop short and build only to their new, reduced level.

I think there are precedents for this, for example in the ABM Treaty. I think once the Soviets saw that we were committed to the ABM Treaty, they then came around to signing the ABM Treaty. Short of making that commitment to deploy ABM systems, it is my fixed opinion that they would not have acceded to the ABM Treaty.

Senator HART. Would you recommend a treaty for ratification that did not contain reductions in overall limits or capabilities?

General ROWNY. I would not, sir. I think that the principle of reducing overall limits is so fundamental to what strategic arms limitation is all about. Simply to put a cap and to legitimize the tremendous buildup that the Soviets have accomplished since our entering into the interim agreement would be a mistake.

I think you know, Senator, they have been engaged in an unrelenting buildup. The Soviets have spent twice as much for all forces and three times as much for strategic forces over a period of 15 years, with no sign of abatements. I think under those circumstances that SART, or strategic arms reduction talks, is a proper goal and one that we should adhere to.

Chairman TOWER. Your time is up.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I would suggest that we break now. The committee will stand in recess for about 5 to 8 minutes while members go to the floor and vote. The committee will reconvene subject to the call of the Chair. I urge all members to return.

Senator Hart, we will give you a second opportunity to ask questions after we have made the rounds.

[A recess was taken.]

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Good morning, General.

General ROWNY. Good morning, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. If the press reports are correct, you have indicated some concern about the verification of the future treaty, General Rowny, even stating that you doubt that the treaty can be verified by national technical means. Were those accurate reports?

General ROWNY. No, sir. Those are not accurate. What I was saying was that in the future any treaty we enter into most probably, and in my view will, require measures which go beyond national technical means. The agreement as entered into so far by and large can be verified by national technical means. The SALT II Treaty would limit launchers. Now that we are getting into other more complex and more sophisticated weaponry, we will need measures other than national technical means.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are you talking about a follow-on treaty or a treaty on which we will be focusing in these next negotiations?

General ROWNY. I am talking about any treaty we enter into, sir. I do not know which route is going to be taken.

Senator HUMPHREY. Then I do not understand your answer, because you seem to be answering both ways. Are we likely to be able to verify with national technical means whatever new treaty produces agreement?

General ROWNY. I guess the answer to that is it depends on the terms of the treaty we ratify, sir. For example to come back to the one point that is giving me some pause in the way I have been answering it, the terms of the treaty allow the Soviets to encrypt certain telemetry on their new types of ICBM's. That goes beyond national technical means. We need a treaty, we need an agreement which prohibits or proscribes the Soviets from being able to hide what they are doing in these tests.

Senator HUMPHREY. If we succeed in that, are there other areas in which you have concerns about our ability to verify through national technical means?

General ROWNY. That is one large area, the ICBM area and the number of warheads that a side can put on its missiles. Another will be the entire area of cruise missiles. The ability to tell whether or not a cruise missile has a conventional warhead or a strategic warhead almost defies verifiability through national technical means.

Since again we were only limiting launchers in the SALT II Treaty, we were able to work out some of these cooperative measures which I have mentioned, the FROD's, and then we also had EOD's, externally observable differences, on others. I am saying that these types of cooperative measure need to be entered into and undoubtedly to a greater extent than we have before.

Senator HUMPHREY. You keep referring to SALT II. Is SALT II going to be the point of departure? Is there a formal position on that?

General ROWNY. No, sir, I would say there is no formal position. I think there is a growing awareness throughout the administration that verification solely through national technical means may not be sufficient or an adequate basis for any treaty we enter into in the future.

Senator HUMPHREY. How then are we going to achieve a verifiable treaty? What are the options?

General ROWNY. I would say that the option is: "no tickee, no laundry." If you do not have a verifiable treaty there is no point in entering into that treaty. Therefore, I would say that we need to get the Soviets to agree to further cooperative measures, the means which go beyond those national technical means.

Senator HUMPHREY. So the ball is largely in their court as to whether we can achieve a verifiable treaty.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. It is in their court to the extent that they have to make certain agreements with us. It is in our court to the extent we agree or do not agree with what they are willing to agree to.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words if there is not some kind of cooperative agreement with the Soviets, if they are not willing to cooperate with some means beyond national technical means of verification, we are not likely to arrive at a treaty which the Senate could ratify or which you could recommend. I will put it that way.

General ROWNY. I think both points are correct. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

Senator HUMPHREY. On page 2 of your testimony you state that the Soviet approach to arms control has been: First, to establish their foreign policy objective; second, to develop and deploy forces to support those objectives; and third, and parenthetically, most important, to use arms control to accomplish those goals.

In that context, following on the question of Senator Hart about the Soviet compliance with the terms of SALT II, is it remarkable to you that they have been adhering—there is no treaty in effect, but I will use that word for lack of a better word—is it remarkable to you in that context they are adhering to this agreement?

My point is does not SALT II embody what they pretty much started out to achieve and, therefore, they pretty well got what they wanted and it is not remarkable that they are not deviating from what they wanted.

General Rowny. I think that is absolutely right, Senator. I think the fact that they got us to agree that the limits would be so high, virtually what they built up to, and that the limits were on launchers which are not a true measure of potential, shows that they lose nothing by not taking steps inconsistent with the treaty. I keep going back to using that legal language. Therefore, it is not remarkable at all that they would refrain from taking steps at this time which are inconsistent with the treaty.

Senator Humphrey. So their compliance, if you will, is not to be read as setting a good example or enlightened behavior but rather simply following the course that is in their best interests.

General Rowny. I think that is absolutely true, sir.

Senator Humphrey. On page 4 you state that the United States possessed neither the leverage nor the negotiating skill to arrive at an acceptable SALT Treaty.

What new leverage do we have at this point or are we likely to have at the beginning of new talks such that we will not find ourselves in the same position?

General Rowny. I think there has been a sea change, sir, in the attitude of this administration and the attitude of the country to a commitment to national defense. I think that the Senators on this committee had a lot to do with that. I think that commitment in itself shows movement to restore the growing imbalance. It is the thing which is: (A) getting our national security restored; and (B) going to provide us negotiating leverage with which to get a good treaty.

Senator Humphrey. You are referring to public support for a more realistic bargaining position.

General Rowny. Yes, sir. I am referring to public support for making the sacrifice to have increased expenditures for our national defense. I think there is no doubt that the public is behind the President and the administration in a willingness to make the sacrifices necessary to provide for our security.

Senator Humphrey. But in material terms, what new leverage do we have today or are we likely to have in the beginning of these talks?

General Rowny. The leverage we will have is one of the state of mind of the leaders of the Soviet Union when they see that we have a commitment to increasing expenditures and to redressing our security and that we have the will despite the many pressures on us and the difficulties in maintaining those expenditures to continue to do what is necessary for our national defense. I think it is that national will which makes the difference.

Senator Humphrey. You stated that the United States possessed neither the leverage nor the negotiating skill. Have we now the negotiating skill?

General Rowny. I hope so, sir. I would hope that the fact that I have been nominated for this job will put us in the position of having someone who brings stability and skills to the negotiations, someone who has learned something by sad experience and learned from the mistakes of the past. I can enumerate so many mistakes of the past that I hope other future negotiators and I certainly will not repeat. In sum, I think that we will negotiate better.

Senator HUMPHREY. I did not mean that personally, I assure you. Is the entire team put together?

General ROWNY. No, sir, the team is not put together.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are satisfied there will be negotiating skill in this session, this trip?

General ROWNY. I will do everything I can to see that it is, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you retire in June of 1979 so that you could be unfettered in your testimony? Or were there other reasons?

General ROWNY. No, sir, that was the reason.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exclusively?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on Senator Humphrey's line of questioning. You retired from the Army in 1979 in order to testify against SALT II on the ground that it was inconsistent or not in our national interests. Is that correct?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. Why do you feel that the United States should abide by SALT II's terms as long as, if what you said to Senator Humphrey is correct, they are simply a codification of SALT II or SALT II is a codification of Soviet superiority. Why do you now take the position that we should abide by SALT II as long as it is in the national interests? What do you mean by that?

General ROWNY. Because I do not see what we are doing as an open ended or an indefinite condition. I am saying that for the time being, so long as we do not have to take steps inconsistent with the SALT II Treaty, there is no reason why we should do so.

Senator COHEN. Let's look at that though. What does that mean? Under the terms of the treaty we are allowed to build MX. Assuming that we go forward with MX, that is still consistent with SALT II, is it not?

General ROWNY. It may be, sir; depending on the basing mode and depending on what happens.

Senator COHEN. But I assume that we are going to abide by the SALT II terms as long as the Soviets do and as long as it is in our national interests. So I assume we are going forward with the MX based on the notion that we are going to have a verifiable system which does not violate the terms of SALT II as it exists. Is that right?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator COHEN. Under SALT II the Soviets are going to go on with their follow-on system that they have been working on. There will be no restraints there. So what is it that is going to change, if what you said was true in 1979, that it is inconsistent with our national interests? Why are you recommending we abide by it now as long as the Soviets do, if in fact what you said to Senator Humphrey is correct that it simply codifies Soviet superiority?

General ROWNY. Simply that there is no need to do things inconsistent with the treaty and what it may restrain. I am not saying that it will, it may restrain the Soviets in some way from doing things which they might otherwise do. But at the moment that it becomes necessary in our national security interest to do things which are not consistent with the treaty, then I think that we should and will do those things.

Senator COHEN. I do not understand the logic behind the notion that if we both abide by the terms of SALT II and do nothing inconsistent with it that we can continue to follow SALT II. Why did you not just advocate ratification in the first place?

General ROWNY. Because the ratification of the treaty would have put its provisions in concrete. In other words, the policy of not doing things inconsistent with the treaty is a temporary one, is not of indefinite duration, and is not codified as an agreement with permanent status.

Senator COHEN. General Rowny, you indicated that we have focused on the wrong thing; namely, launchers. We should have focused on either throw weight or warheads. As I recall, we are the ones who insisted on launchers for two reasons: No. 1, we considered throw weight to be rather irrelevant at the time, that accuracy was a far more important factor for kill rate, hard-target kill-rate capability than throw weight. We were much more accurate at that time so therefore we talked about launchers for the second reason of verification.

In your testimony you indicate that this is wrong, that we made a mistake, that we should have focused on throw weight and not on launchers. Now I raise the question how do you go about verifying warheads?

General ROWNY. Do you simply want me to answer the verification of warheads or do you want me to address the first part of your question?

Senator COHEN. The first part of it was that basically we are the ones who insisted upon looking at launchers because throw weight was not that important. The Soviets had much more throw weight but they had much less accurate systems. We contributed to their accuracy by transferring some of our technology. Now their big missiles are just as accurate as their small missiles and we have decided that we focused upon the wrong thing.

The question I have is why are we not going to focus upon warheads? If we are, that is the ultimate conclusion. We do one of two things. We either build the equivalent of SS-18's to match their big heavy missiles or we build smaller single warhead missiles which are highly mobile, concealable and so forth. Which do we do?

General ROWNY. To answer the first part of the question first, sir, those people who studied the problem—and by "those people" I am speaking mostly of the military and people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—recognized the criticality of throw weight from the beginning. They tried to get throw weight limitations into SALT I and again tried to get throw weight limitations into SALT II.

We were then told not to do so, as the result of a political decision. In some people's opinion—and those people happened to be controlling the negotiating policy—throw weight was not all that important.

We did have a certain lead in accuracy at the time. But most people whose opinion I respect believed that in the end, and sooner rather than later, the Soviets would match our accuracy. Therefore, accuracy would become irrelevant and throw weight would become the guiding criterion. And throw weight is now the guiding criterion.

I am saying that now we should move to limit those things that kill—that is warheads—and limit the number of warheads, in particular the number of ICBM warheads. In this way we can restore our traditional goals of deterrence and crisis stability.

Senator COHEN. How do you verify warheads?

General ROWNY. We verify warheads, sir, by monitoring Soviet tests. We know from a number of tests that they now have many warheads that can be put on a particular missile.

Senator COHEN. That is not what I am asking. I am asking how do you verify the number, not their accuracy.

General ROWNY. You mean the number that they might store?

Senator COHEN. That is right.

General ROWNY. I think we would have to go into executive session on that, sir.

Senator COHEN. Perhaps we should go into executive session on that because it poses a grave difficulty.

I would like to ask you a question about this statement of George Kennan. You have indicated that a 50-percent reduction is interesting. The Soviets have no interest in such a cut. Would the Soviets be interested in a 50-percent reduction of their SS–18's?

General ROWNY. I think they might, yes, sir.

Senator COHEN. What leads you to believe that?

General ROWNY. Because I think they want a treaty and are interested in a treaty. I guess I refer back to the March 1977 proposal when such a proposition was put forward. We made a sufficient number of concessions on our side which made the proposal attractive for them I think that had we stuck to our proposal, which Secretary Brown testified was not unilaterally in our interest but also very much in the Soviet interests, that we could have gotten the Soviets to reduce he number of their SS–18's.

Senator COHEN. I have one other point. Mr. Colin Gray who is a defense strategist at the Hudson Institute has indicated or suggested there are four basic ingredients to winning, if we can use that term, a nuclear war: (A) counterforce weapons; (B) an air defense system; (C) a civil defense system; and (D) an ABM system.

I think you indicated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the ABM Treaty is not necessarily sacrosanct. If that is the case, in your judgment would repealing the ABM Treaty give the Soviets a fourth dimension since they do have counterforce weapons which we do not have at this point; they have defense systems which we do not have at this point; they have civil defense systems which we do not have at this point and the last factor would be giving them an ABM system?

General ROWNY. I think the answer to that, sir, is that we have to wait and see what MX basing mode is recommended and finally adopted by the President. If it is in our national interest to amend the ABM Treaty so as to provide LOAD's or a point site defense for whatever system is adopted, then I think we should make that a part of our review. We should not consider the ABM system as it now stands inviolate or sacrosanct for all time.

Senator COHEN. I am still not sure about adhering to or not taking actions inconsistent with SALT II. If SALT II was not in our interests and that is why you resigned—and it was very courageous of you to do so rather than hold on to your position—but if it was not in our interests 2 years ago in 1979, why is it in our interests today to not take action inconsistent with SALT II's provision?

If you start with the proposition that we go forward with MX, if we do all of the things that we plan to do now, why are we not in just as much jeopardy in formally adhering to or not taking actions inconsistent with SALT II as we were in 1979, 2 years ago?

General ROWNY. Because there is a lead time involved in developing new systems and we still do not have the decision on the basing mode for the MX.

Senator COHEN. Assume that we have that.

General ROWNY. If we have made that decision and if it is in our national security interest at that time not to stay within the terms of the SALT II Treaty, we should not stay within the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

At that point when it ceases to be our national security interest, the situation changes. I think that is the administration's position and I think that is a good one, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Cohen, your time is up.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield at this time if I might to some others who have been here for a while.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on Senator Cohen's questions about your position on SALT. You stated that it preserves a Russian superiority. What have you personally recommended as a means of closing the gap and overcoming the superiority that is not consistent with SALT?

General ROWNY. Let me see if I have your question straight. What is it that I would recommend or have recommended that is inconsistent? Nothing yet, sir. I am waiting to see what the decisions will be on the MX basing mode. If those decisions are inconsistent with the terms of the treaty as now written, then I think we should not stay within the terms of the treaty.

Senator LEVIN. But long before the President was elected you took the position that SALT was not in our interest and you also took the position that there was a gap, that the Russians were superior and that the SALT Treaty baked in our inferiority position.

I am wondering, at that time, before you knew there would be a President Reagan who might be making a decision on a basing mode, what did you recommend to close the gap in 1979, in 1980 that was inconsistent with SALT?

General ROWNY. My recommendations were then consistent with SALT. They were recommendations that we do a number of things which we could do and should have been doing and should do even now.

Senator LEVIN. But none of those are inconsistent with SALT?

General ROWNY. Not at that time, no, sir.

Senator LEVIN. And you have no recommendations you have made to this President which are inconsistent with SALT?

General ROWNY. No, sir.

Senator **Levin**. You have indicated that we should comply with the SALT Treaty as long as it is in our national interests and as long as the Russians do likewise?

General **Rowny**. We should take no steps inconsistent with the terms of the treaty so long as the Soviets take no similar steps and so long as our national security does not require that we take such other steps.

Senator **Levin**. Is that not the same position President Carter took?

General **Rowny**. No, sir.

Senator **Levin**. What was the difference?

General **Rowny**. His position was indefinite. He said we would take no steps inconsistent with the treaty. He did not qualify it and say, "unless our national security requires the contrary."

Senator **Levin**. But you do not know of any steps right now that we should take that are not consistent with SALT?

General **Rowny**. Not until I know the decisions that are going to be taken on MX basing.

Senator **Levin**. You have not recommended any such steps?

General **Rowny**. No, sir.

Senator **Levin**. Are we going to be able to negotiate a SALT Treaty as long as Russian troops are in Afghanistan?

General **Rowny**. We may, sir. We may. I think that our leaders will have to look at the overall political situation. It may be possible to negotiate a new SALT Treaty. It would certainly be easier if the Soviets were not in Afghanistan.

Senator **Levin**. Do you then not agree with the following statement that there would have to be some mutual understanding with respect to progress on the Afghanistan occupation before new SALT talks could begin?

General **Rowny**. I agree with that statement.

Senator **Levin**. How is that consistent with what you just said that there might not have to be a mutual understanding?

General **Rowny**. Your previous question, as I understood sir, was whether the Soviets would have to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. I think that is different from reaching an understanding.

Senator **Levin**. So then there would have to be some kind of a mutual understanding with the Soviets with respect to progress on their occupation of Afghanistan before new SALT talks could begin?

General **Rowny**. I think that their situation with respect to Afghanistan would have to be taken into account, and considered as part of the whole spectrum of our relationships with the Soviet Union.

Senator **Levin**. I understand that position but my question is a little different. My question is: Must there be some mutual understanding with respect to progress on a solution to their occupation of Afghanistan before new SALT talks could start? Must there be?

General **Rowny**. I would not say there must be, no. sir. I would say in clarifying my position. sir, that I would proceed, if confirmed, as a surrogate of the President to carry out whatever decisions he made. Whatever decisions he makes I certainly will abide by, and it is not up to me to say what must be or what must not be.

You have asked my opinion and I have given my opinion. I cannot lay down criteria nor will I attempt to.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that. But in your opinion there does not necesarily have to be such progress? It would be helpful, you would like to see it and all the rest, but you cannot say categorically that there would have to be such progress in your opinion?

General ROWNY. I cannot say categorically that there would have to be, no, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Is that consistent with Secretary Haig's statement on the NBC Today show where he said that there would have to be some mutual understanding with respect to progress before the SALT talks could begin?

General ROWNY. He is the Secretary of State. If he says so then I am sure he is going to adhere to his position. What finally is decided by the President is what I will have to take to the negotiating table.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that we should be pursuing arms control negotiations at this time?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Who do you believe would win an all-out arms race?

General ROWNY. I have to qualify that answer by saying that I do not believe in an all-out arms race. I do not like to put things in those terms because I think it is the Soviets and not we who have been racing. The Soviets are the ones who have been making these inordinate expenditures.

However, as I have said in my prepared statement today and other places, if the Soviets force us into a race that we do not want, then from an objective point of view we and our allies have four times the gross national product of the Soviet and their allies. So in objective terms there is no reason why we cannot match them.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying if they force us? Have you not said that they have already forced us into that?

General ROWNY. They have forced us to the degree that we have recognized that we have to begin to do things in our own national security interest. The Soviets, by their conduct and by the terms that they insisted on in this treaty, have awakened us to the realization that we were falling behind. To that extent you might say that they have forced us.

We have become aroused to the fact that we are in an untenable and increasingly difficult position.

Senator LEVIN. You have testified about Soviet superiority. You have indicated that we have to begin closing these gaps before we can successfully engage in arms control discussions. Can you tell us in terms of throw-weight what you believe to be perhaps the most significant indicator of how much closer we have to come to the Soviets before we have established a position of strength from which we can negotiate substantial reductions in our strategic forces?

General ROWNY. I cannot tell you precisely, sir, but I can say in general terms that if we cause the Soviets to reduce their ICBM throw-weight to the point where they no longer can take out a major portion of our ICBM force with a first strike, even though we are not equal in throw-weight and ICBM's, we then could take the risk of entering a treaty on those terms.

What I believe we are trying to do is preserve this leg of the Triad so that we do not have it taken away from us peremptorily. At that stage I think we will then be willing and could take risks on this treaty even though we were not equal to them in this very important measure.

Senator **Levin**. My question is a little different. The goal you would like to achieve is that kind of reduction. My question is how much closer do we have to come in terms of throw-weight before we have any chance of success? You have argued that we have to close these gaps or we are not going to be taken seriously and we are not going to be able to achieve substantial reductions.

I want to know how much closer must we come in throw-weight before we are going to be able to negotiate the substantial reduction that you have just described?

General **Rowny**. Let me go back for a second, sir, and say that the best way for this to happen would be for the Soviets to come down in their throw-weight. If they come down we may not have to build up substantially. At some point where the Soviets no longer have the ability to take out the major portion of our ICBM force, at that point the throw-weights, even though still asymmetrical, are tolerable from our point of view.

Senator **Levin**. Mr. Chairman, I will have to come back to that because I do not think it has been answered, my time is up.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Exon?

Senator **Exon**. General, I do not want to be dramatic on this but I happen to feel that you, indeed, have the background and experience to take on what I think is going to be one of the most challenging tasks that the President is going to have to undertake. I have a strong feeling that the success that you will have in the immediate and long-range future is going to go a long way to determine whether or not we really can do anything about arms control in general. Therefore, I am going to ask you some questions, that I hope you can respond to.

I would like to start by saying it seems to me that unless we can move quickly to arms limitation with the Soviet Union with the ultimate weapons, we are going to find ourselves in a very few years with almost every country in the world having at their disposal some type of the ultimate weapon.

If we allow that to happen, it seems to me in the interim by not getting together with the Soviet Union that it serves neither the interests of the Soviet Union nor the United States, as the two superpowers now, in creating through our inaction on arms control or the Soviet's inaction on arms control, this proliferation of nuclear weapons. Once they get started around this world, where do you see the end?

General **Rowny**. Sir, I certainly agree with you that our policy of pushing for nonproliferation should be continued, and continued with vigor. I do not subscribe to the precise linkage in which some people believe, that unless and until you have a SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union other countries will arm. I think that there is some validity to that belief in some people's minds, but I would be hard put to prove that there has to be a SALT Treaty in order to stop other people from developing nuclear weapons.

Having said that, I am fully in favor of proceeding apace and doing everything we can to keep other countries from acquiring nuclear capabilities.

Senator **Exon**. We agree, do we not, General, that if the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers today, cannot come to some type of an agreement, that indicates a climate for others to seek these kinds of weapons for their own protection, and there are number of countries that you and I could both name?

General Rowny. I see a certain logic to that, sir, but I would be hard put to prove it. Let's put it in reverse. If we had an agreement with the Soviet Union which was mutually acceptable to both of us. I am not sure that that would prevent other countries, if they wanted to from acquiring nuclear capabilities.

Senator Exon. What is your personal timetable, if you have one, for getting to the matter of negotiations, whether it is continuation of SALT II, SALT III, some other name? Do you have a personal timetable as to when and how you think we should begin?

General Rowny. Sir, my personal timetable is to get confirmed by the Senate and to start assembling a team with representatives from other agencies and to begin in earnest to study these problems as a team, which are all being studied within the Government. We would then be ready whenever administration is ready to begin talks, discussions, or even negotiations.

So my personal timetable is to move ahead with all deliberate speed.

Senator Exon. Assuming you were confirmed by the U.S. Senate tomorrow, how long do you think it would take you to assemble this team so that we would be in a position to start meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union?

General Rowny. If it is just a matter of assembling the team and putting it together, given that mandate I could have a team together in a month, sir.

Senator Exon. So you are saying, in roughly a month after you are confirmed, if the President is willing, we could at least make an offer to sit down at the table again?

General Rowny. From my point of view, yes sir.

Senator Exon. I want to ask your personal view on this because I think your personal view is critically important to the likely success of negotiations with the Soviets in the future. What is your personal opinion on the type of MX basing mode that would be most suitable and accommodate you as the individual who will be primarily responsible for carrying out an arms control agreement?

General Rowny. My personal view, sir, is not one that I can make public at this time. I have not been privy to the latest information, the various briefings that the Townes Committee has been subjected to. Therefore I do not know what evidence has been put before this committee. I have read in the papers and have heard talk about the various options. But I would say that I am in no position to make a personal choice of options when I do not know in detail what the options are.

Senator Exon. General, with your background and knowledge and you say here—and I agree with you in your statement—that you have the experience, the background and the training, I suspect that you probably have studied the possibilities for basing mode as much as anyone that was appointed to that committee.

Am I given to understand then that you have not been consulted by the administration with regard to what type of basing mode for the MX would be most suitable, in your opinion, from the standpoint of working out an arms agreement?

General ROWNY. No; that is another question, sir. Yes; I have given my opinion on what different basing modes would mean in terms of different parts of the treaty as now written. There are significant differences in what types of basing mode might be adopted and what this might do to arms control.

My opinions, even though I am not confirmed and am not officially a member of the administration, have been sought. I have made my views know on the various aspects of arms control measures, the present SALT II Treaty as now written and future agreements, and their impact on what decision we make.

Senator EXON. General, was the MX involved in those discussions?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Can you tell us what basing mode you think would be best from your knowledge?

General ROWNY. No, sir. I cannot, not being privy to the information that the various members of the Townes Committee have been given as to what the latest scientific estimates are and what the latest intelligence estimates are. All I can say is I know that certain types of basing modes would be more difficult to negotiate and certain provisions would be more difficult to find agreement on in a SALT Treaty.

Senator EXON. In your personal opinion what type of the basing mode would be the easiest around which to negotiate an arms control agreement?

Chairman TOWER. I am not sure that the response to that question is one that should be given in a public hearing.

General Rowny, do you want to respond to that?

General ROWNY. I would rather give any personal views I may have, based on my incomplete information, to this committee in an executive session. But I want to resist any notion that I can outguess the Townes Committee or their recommendations since I do not have access to their information. I am not privy to the deliberations they are undertaking.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon, would you forebear on that question?

Senator EXON. I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much and thank you, General.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. I pass.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, throughout the morning you have said that the SALT II Treaty limited only launchers. Is that correct? Does the treaty not also limit warheads?

General ROWNY. The treaty indirectly limits a certain number of warheads in that there are certain limits on warheads on missiles which are agreed to. So there is a certain correlation. What I was getting at was that by agreeing to limit launchers to equal numbers we have not taken the next step. We have not limited the number of warheads to equal numbers. That is what I was getting at, sir.

Senator HART. But there are, in fact, limitations on warheads contained in this treaty.

General ROWNY. There are some limitations on warheads; yes, sir.

Senator HART. They are important ones.

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. Many of the military witnesses testified before this committee and the Foreign Relations Committee that the most important achievement of the SALT II Treaty was its limitation on the number of warheads in that it provided predictability about the size of the Soviet threat and permitted us to carry out our force modernization programs in the strategic field to accommodate that defined threat.

So, when you say that the treaty limited only launchers, as you have several times, that is not particularly accurate. Is that not the case?

General ROWNY. What I was trying to portray in that statement is that by limiting the numbers of launchers to equal numbers, we lost sight of the fact that we have agreed to great asymmetries in the number of warheads on those launchers. This asymmetry is on the order of three to one in the important category of ICBM warheads. So if the statement is that for the period that a SALT II Treaty might be extant we would limit the Soviets to three times our number of ICBM warheads, then yes, there is a limit.

Senator HART. You are concerned with the issue of throw weight, obviously. It seems to me that there are at least two ways to deal with that. That is overall limits on quantitative throw weight, somehow defining that. The other is limitations on what that throw weight can do.

Was it not the position of the negotiating team under two or three administrations to adopt the latter course, not attempt to restrict the quantity of the throw weight but rather limit what that throw weight could be used for, namely to the number of warheads tested on those missiles? Is that not the case?

General ROWNY. I fail to see the difference, sir. I do not understand the question.

Senator HART. What good does it do you to have a .44 magnum pistol if you are allowed only one bullet? That is not a good analogy. I will think of a better one.

General ROWNY. I think I now understand the thrust of your question.

Senator HART. What good is the excess throw weight capacity if the number of warheads which the throw weight can be used for are limited?

General ROWNY. It is the potential capability for breakout that is so important. That is why an SS-18 throw weight limitation would be so important. If we were to sign a SALT II Treaty along the present lines and if we were to grant the Soviets a 3-to-1 advantage in ICBM warheads which this treaty would permit them, there is no guarantee that the Soviets would not exercise their breakout capability in short-order time to further increase that 3-to-1 ratio to an even higher ratio.

Senator HART. So you are really worried about violations of the treaty.

General ROWNY. No, sir, I am worried about breakout.

Senator HART. You are speaking of breakout in what respect?

General ROWNY. I am speaking of breakout in terms of capability. Had this treaty been approved the way it was written, the Soviets would have been permitted a 3-to-1 advantage in ICBM warheads. The treaty would have expired at the end of 1985. In the first part of 1986 the Soviets would still have had the capability of further increasing that already large asymmetry to an even larger asymmetry. So it is limiting their capabilities that I am after. And we should limit capabilities.

Senator HART. That answer refers to the last question I asked you in the last round. That is whether you would support or propose for signature a treaty which in effect recommended a freeze with the understanding that it would be followed forthwith by negotiating seeking actual reductions.

What I am trying to get at is whether you are unalterably committed to a treaty which contains actual reductions and would not negotiate any other kind of treaty?

General ROWNY. I will try to answer that question by answering the last point first. I would carry out the instructions of the President. I am his representative: If the President felt that on balance certain advantages which he thinks are desirable could compensate for certain disadvantages, he is the boss.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, may I intervene for a moment? I would be a bit relucant, if you are the witness, to see you articulate a neogtiating position in an open session. If we want to explore this matter in more detail I would suggest that we reserve it for a closed session. We certainly do not want to telegraph your punch to the people with whom you are likely to be negotiating.

Senator HART. I respect the chairman's point of view. I do not quarrel with it. However I think the General's last answer solves the problem.

Chairman TOWER. I would rather err on the side of caution.

Senator HART. I understand. What we are really asking is his personal point of view with the understanding that he works for the President. In the case of the last President he did not agree with him and so he moved on. Presumably he would hold that possibility open in the present situation.

General ROWNY. There is one important difference, sir. It is that this President has talked about the necessity for reductions and there is no ideological or philosophical gap that I can discern between his views and mine.

Senator HART. Was that gap there throughout the term of the last President or just in the latter period?

General ROWNY. The latter period. The first period of his term was one of great excitement and great expectation for me, so that I supported and helped defend the March 1977 proposal. It was after that March 1977 proposal was abanoned that I discovered that there were indeed large differences philosophically and militarily and ideologically between us.

Senator HART. Again back to the issue raised by the chairman, it is important to me to know the policy or position of our chief negotiator on a fairly fundamental question. He is obviously a man of principle. He resigned his position because he could not agree with the policy of the last administration.

What I am trying to find out is his own personal policy on the issue of freezes versus actual reductions. I do not know where best to pursue that. Are we going to have a closed session?

Chairman TOWER. We will go into closed session at the election of any member. I will entertain a motion to that effect.

Senator HART. And it is the chairman's position that the witness should not answer this question in open session?

Chairman TOWER. I will rely to the witness' judgment on that. I simply raise that as a caution.

General ROWNY. Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat reluctant to proceed along these lines, too. As you know any good negotiator does not state what his bottom line is going to be and give his positions away. In that spirit, and in the interest of being a good negotiator, I do not want to foreclose options. Nor do I want to suggest that in all cases my recommendations will be absolutely bought.

I am saying that I have enjoyed a very good success so far at being together with the President. I have no reason to believe that this will not continue. We do see eye to eye at the present time. But it is difficult for me to lay out specifics when there are so many things that have to be taken into account.

Senator HART. This is really a general question, not a specific one. It is the type of treaty that we should be negotiating, not the specific terms of it. I will withhold the question for the time being.

General, on the issue of the MX, are you aware of the number of warheads that the current MX deployment mode favored by the Air Force is designed to counter or survive?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator HART. And that number is how many?

General ROWNY. It is designed to counter a limit in excess of 6,000 warheads on Soviet ICBM's. These are the limits permitted under the SALT II Treaty as presently written. Roughly there are 6,000 to 6,600, in unclassified figures, versus about a 2,100 ICBM warhead count on our side.

Senator HART. General, if the Soviets were to decide to break out, if you will, of the present situation in which we find ourselves and increase that number above to 10,000 warheads instead of the 6,000, what do you think we should do with regard to the design of that system and its deployment?

General ROWNY. Let me say, in the first place, that I would hope that we could avoid having that condition face us. I do not relish the prospect, after having spent another $70 billion (or whatever the figure is on trying to make our ICBM force invulnerable) of then having to spend another equal increment because the Soviets capitalize on their capabilities of placing more warheads on their heavy missiles. So I would do everything I could to avoid that situation, that is, to keep it from occurring.

That is why I have said that a future treaty, in my opinion, should limit the number of warheads, should limit throw weight and specifically should limit the huge Soviet asymmetry in ICBM warheads.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. General Rowny, one of the weaknesses of SALT I is in the area of unilateral interpretations. To what extent were such unilateral interpretations a factor in the SALT II agreement?

General ROWNY. I would say to a much lesser extent than in SALT I, sir. Even though the U.S. negotiating team shifted players rather rapidly, I was there from the beginning through the end. Our SALT II negotiating team recognized the undesirability of making unilateral statements. So we tried to eschew them, tried to avoid those. To a degree we succeeded. But did not completely succeed.

Senator HUMPHREY. With regard to the upcoming negotiations, is it your view that in dealing in national security matters and especially with the Soviets that it is a prudent course or an imprudent course to negotiate a treaty that embraces unilateral interpretations?

General ROWNY. It is on the whole imprudent to negotiate such a treaty. We should negotiate the letter of the law. This would make unilateral statements unnecessary.

Senator HUMPHREY. And that will be your recommendation to your superior?

General ROWNY. It will, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Suppose you are overridden, in effect, and we produce a treaty that once again relies on unilateral interpretation. What would be your course of action?

General ROWNY. I would obey the instructions of duly constituted authority and carry them out, pointing out which instructions were not desirable and which were not in our interest. But if there were certain reasons in the President's mind why such a thing should be done and he decided to make certain unilateral statements, then I would obey. He is the boss and I am the surrogate.

Senator HUMPHREY. Under those circumstances could you make a professional recommendation to the Senate that all other things being acceptable that the Senate ratify such an agreement?

General ROWNY. I think the criteria would be first, is the treaty which we are bringing forward for ratification in our national security interest? I do not foresee us bringing a treaty to the Senate that would not be in our national interest. The second criterion would be does it accomplish the overriding objective of deterring the Soviet Union from commencing an all-out nuclear war? The third criterion would be: does it help us restore stability in times of crises?

If these three criteria were met, and I think they would be met under any future treaty that was brought here, then I think there would be no problem, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Under those circumstances you would not be worried about the Soviets taking advantage of the terms of the treaty in the way that they took advantage of the terms of SALT I?

General ROWNY. You said in the way they did in SALT I. If they took advantage of the treaty the way they did in SALT I, I would be worried. But if there were certain, let's say unilateral, statements which we were asked to make which did not impinge on those overall criteria, I think it is a matter of balance, sir. Nevertheless, it is generally not a good idea to make unilateral statements.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it your experience in dealing with the Soviets that an agreement involving unilateral interpretations is more than likely to be abused than not? In other words what I am saying is are they not going to take advantage of us again?

General **Rowny**. Yes, sir. The Soviets do not believe in agreeing to the spirit of agreements. When they agree in principle, they do not mean what we mean: a handshake and let's go ahead and get an agreement. They generally abide by the letter and not the spirit of the law. So therefore we should close all loopholes and not make unilateral statements.

Senator **Humphrey**. Suppose the administration comes forward with a treaty that does not close all loopholes.

General **Rowny**. If it is still in our national security interest and accomplishes the goal of deterring the Soviet Union and restoring stability in times of crises, then I do not think I would be a purist and insist that every possible unilateral statement must be avoided.

Now let me hasten to add, Senator, that at times this cuts the other way. I think that the unilateral statement which the United States made at the end of the ABM Treaty negotiations and at the time the interim agreement was made was in our interest and was a proper statement to make. You will recall, sir, that Public Law 92-448 said, in addition to the criterion that we should not have levels of forces inferior to the Soviets, that in the absence of a more complete agreement to replace the interim agreement we would consider taking another look at the ABM Treaty.

In that context, a unilateral statement on our side which is an exposition of our intent in signing the treaties, I think, would be a proper one. So I do not want to close out any thought of making unilateral statements when in some instances it could be a restatement of the public law of the land and our interpretation of what is proper.

Senator **Humphrey**. How can you be certain that an agreement will accomplish the goal of deterrence if you cannot be sure the Soviets are going to comply with the letter, much less the spirit? How can you be sure that it is going to accomplish the goal if you have unilateral interpretations? It seems to me impossible.

General **Rowny**. In the first place I think I have made it clear, sir, that I would not welcome unilateral statements in the treaty. Second, the letter of the law would have to be so negotiated so that we did not allow loopholes to exist, particularly in the compliance field. Therefore, I do not foresee that condition occurring.

Senator **Humphrey**. Is not a unilateral interpretation a loophole?

General **Rowny**. In some cases it is; it has been in SALT I and again in SALT II. I was pointing out the one type of unilateral statement that is not necessarily a loophole, but is a statement of the intent of the spirit of the agreement, such as the one we made in 1972.

Senator **Humphrey**. Do you regard unilateral agreements as loopholes or not?

General **Rowny**. Sir, I regard unilateral statements which avoid specifying the letter of the law of agreements as loopholes; yes, sir.

Senator **Humphrey**. I hope and am confident, General Rowny, that notwithstanding the disappointment which would be attendant that you will once again show the courage that you have shown in the past if you come up with something less than a treaty free of loopholes and free of reliance on unilateral interpretations.

General **Rowny**. I intend to do so, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. Senator Exon?

Senator Exon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you approach this matter of getting together with the Soviets, what is your interpretation on their compliance with the terms of SALT I?

General Rowny. My interpretation, sir, is that they built into the agreement as many loopholes as they could and, therefore, they feel that they are not required to comply with something that is not the letter of the law.

I draw a large distinction between the spirit of an agreement and the letter of an agreement. I have said that in general the Soviets do not believe in the spirit of agreements, and it was in this vein that they then moved in a number of directions which violated the spirit of the agreements. However, they did not violate the letter of the law because the letter of the law did not exist.

Senator Exon. It was not a very well negotiated agreement then. Is that what you are saying?

General Rowny. That is a polite way of saying it, yes, sir.

Senator Exon. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. Senator Levin?

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rowny, let's go back if we can to the question I left you with. In terms of throw weight how much closer do we have to come to the Soviets before they realize that we are serious about closing the gaps that you have identified?

General Rowny. Let me try to answer it this way, Senator. The most telling agreement that we could make, the one that makes the most sense, is one which does not render our ICBMs vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

If the Soviets were to reduce their throw weight in ICBM warheads so that our force was no longer vulnerable or not completely vulnerable, or if we did things to our own ICBM force to render it invulnerable, then at that stage I think we would have sufficiently closed the gap. We could then take the risks still attendant in the treaty of having inequalities in certain areas. We could then enter into an agreement if it still assured deterrence and stability in times of crisis.

Senator Levin. General, you have told us on a number of occasions that in order to achieve an agreement which is acceptable we have to become stronger and close the superiority gap which exists. I want to know how much do we have to close the throw-weight gap before they know we are serious and would negotiate an agreement that you have just described?

General Rowny. I think, sir, that that is something I cannot answer precisely because it depends on a subjective view by the Soviet side. I think that when the Soviets are convinced that we have the commitment and the will to continue that commitment—and I hope they are convinced sooner rather than later—they will then see the wisdom of coming to an agreement in which they will reduce this inordinate threat, this asymmetrical threat they have over us.

Senator Levin. But you have indicated that in order for them to become convinced, we have to take steps to close these gaps. I want your opinion as to how much we have to do to close that gap in terms of throw weight.

General Rowny. I do not know how else to answer you, sir, except to say that we must close enough of the gap so that the Soviets do not render our ICBM force vulnerable to a first strike.

Senator Levin. What is the present gap in throw weight?

General Rowny. About 4½ to 1, sir, in unclassified terms.

Senator Levin. You indicate that that gap is unacceptable?

General Rowny. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. I want to know do we have to substantially close that gap before they know we are serious?

General Rowny. You ask whether we have to close the gap. Either we do or they do, but the gap must be closed.

Senator Levin. But they will not do it, you keep telling us, unless they know we are serious. We are not going to get a decent agreement until they know we are serious.

General Rowny. That is right, so we have to begin. We have to make the commitment and then we have to begin to do so.

Senator Levin. What commitment do we have to make before they know we are serious? We have to close it to what, 3 to 1, 2 to 1, substantially close it?

General Rowny. In the ICBM field they have to have less than a 2-to-1 advantage. It generally takes at the present time two ICBM warheads——

Senator Levin. I am talking about throw weight, General. This is the indicator that you put so much emphasis on. It is the existence of that gap that you believe has in part created superiority on the part of the Soviets. I want to know what commitment do we have to make to close that gap before they know we are serious.

[Pause.]

General Rowny. On advice of counsel, which merely reinforces my position, I do not think that I can answer that in specific terms because I do not think that the question is one that lends itself to a precise answer.

The Soviets have a large asymmetry in throw weight, particularly in the ICBM field. So long as this large asymmetry exists we cannot sit still. We have to do two things. Build up our own throw weight by building more MX's and make our ICBM force less vulnerable.

At some point when the Soviets see that we have the will and the commitment to continue to close this gap, it is my opinion that they will then begin reducing the throw weight on their ICBM's.

Senator Levin. Do we have to substantially narrow the gap?

General Rowny. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. And if they continue their buildup while we continue our buildup and that gap remains 4½ to 1, do you think it is impossible to negotiate a SALT agreement?

General Rowny. If those conditions come about—and I do not think that will be what results—but if it does come about and they continue to build, then we have to build even more than we now plan to build.

Senator Levin. Do I understand your testimony correctly that we must actually close the gap to some degree before we are going to negotiate a fair treaty?

General Rowny. No, sir, we do not have to close the gap completely. But we do have a commitment to closing that gap before we have any hopes of reaching an agreement with the Soviets. Now this does not mean that closing the gap is necessarily tied to when we negotiate. We begin to negotiate at the point when the Soviets perceive that we have demonstrated our will and determination to commit resources designed to close the gap.

Senator Levin. In your opinion does the building of the MX meet that or the commitment to build the MX meet that requirement?

General Rowny. A commitment to the MX in the MPS mode, as I understand the various options, would meet the requirement, provided there is a follow-on SALT agreement or an agreement which replaces SALT II which puts a limit on the capability of the Soviets to increase the number of warheads on their S-18's to more than 10.

Senator Levin. So they could not continue to build up while we build MX for your precondition to be met.

General Rowny. I think they might build up. I would hope that they would not. What I am saying is that they must not have the opportunity of having a breakout capability of deploying more warheads which the present throw-weight asymmetry gives them. That is what I am trying to get at, sir.

Senator Levin. Are you then saying that if the President decides against the MPS system as the prior President proposed, then we cannot do it?

General Rowny. I would see it as difficult to achieve in the absence of some way of protecting our land-based system. It is difficult for me to see how we could then, have any future agreement which would deter the Soviet Union.

Senator Levin. And, therefore, it would be difficult to find any way of negotiating a treaty.

General Rowny. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Would you agree with the Air Force staff's statement last year about MPS which was as follows. Here I am quoting:

> While we cannot predict the charatcter of a Soviet MPS system, should they follow our precedent with regard to design features and cooperative measures, we believe the system could be adequately monitored. Without the incentives associated with the need to comply with a SALT agreement, it is unlikely that a Soviet MPS would be designed to allow such monitoring.

Do you agree with that statement?

General Rowny. Yes, sir, in general I agree with that statement. I think what it says in other words is that we would build into any MPS system certain verifiable measures which would then become precedents to which the Soviets would have to adhere. I think that is what is meant by the statement and I agree with it.

Senator Levin. So you would be opposed to building any MPS system that does not have those verification measures built into it?

General Rowny. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Is it not correct that the SALT Treaty permitted both sides to have equal numbers of ICBM warheads, 8,200?

General Rowny. No, sir. I have never heard that statement.

What the SALT II Treaty permitted was for the sides to be permitted to build up to 820 MIRVed ICBM systems.

Senator Levin. With 10 RV's per system?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Is that not 8,200 a side?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think you said the Soviets would have 2 or 3 warheads for every U.S. ICBM?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I said that since we are not permitted to build heavy missiles, and since the only missile we can build under the terms of the treaty is the MX—which is equal to throw-weight to their so-called light missile—that you cannot get there from here unless you build up from our present 550 MIRVed Minuteman systems to 820 MIRVed MX systems. You would then have to put 10 warheads on each of 820 MX systems, and you cannot do that in the next decade.

What I am saying is that under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, had the treaty been approved or if we would continue not to do things inconsistent with it, you would not be able to get there from here and close the ICBM warhead gap during the life of that treaty. They are permitted a 3 to 1 advantage in warheads in realistic terms. The treaty limitations permit them that advantage.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin, your time has expired.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I would like to ask the members if they would like to pursue questioning further, in which case I would suggest that we recess until 2 this afternoon and ask the witness to return.

Is there a desire on the part of the members to ask additional questions.

Senator LEVIN. I have only 5 more minutes or so, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. All right, if you can finish in 5 minutes we will go ahead. If that is not possible we will reconvene this afternoon.

Senator LEVIN. So you are saying with or without SALT as a realistic matter it would not be possible for us to equalize that number with the Soviets.

General ROWNY. That is true, yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think that gives a somewhat different impression than your testimony earlier this morning, may I say, but we will let the record speak for itself on this.

You have testified, General Rowny, that the Soviets have used their strategic superiority to cause trouble in the world. I am wondering if you would specify the instances where they have caused trouble where the United States was deterred from acting in a particular way because of Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

General ROWNY. I do not think that my statement lends itself to specificity, sir. What I said was the overall international climate which occurs when the Soviet Union has strategic superiority is one where they can move with impunity and can pursue the goal, their self-announced goal, of furthering their system of government throughout the rest of the world.

When we had strategic superiority we did not use our force structure to move in the political arena. What I am trying to say is that the general climate of being able to move with impunity once they achieve superiority is different because their goals are different from ours.

Senator LEVIN. But you cannot specifically identify any particular trouble spot which the Soviets have created where we would have moved differently had there not been superiority?

General ROWNY. I think that that is a difficult question to answer, sir. I think we would have been able to act perhaps differently in various areas had we known that they did not possess strategic superiority on top of their conventional and theater nuclear force superiority.

Senator LEVIN. Can you specifically give us those areas?

General ROWNY. Specifically?

Senator LEVIN. Can you specifically identify those areas?

General ROWNY. No; I said I could not give specific instances where I could demonstrate the generally accepted notion that strategic superiority gives the Soviets a feeling of adventurism and a feeling that they could act with impunity. I can tell you the areas in which they have moved: Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cambodia, you name it, sir.

Senator LEVIN. But the areas where you think we would have acted differently had they not had what you view to be superiority, you cannot specify one of those areas or any other area?

General ROWNY. No, sir, except that in general the Soviets would have been inhibited had they not had this feeling of power and we may have felt less inhibited in doing what we did.

Senator LEVIN. From your logic, General, since the Soviets are behind us in warheads, do you think they are going to want to negotiate a reductions agreement until they are closer to us in warheads?

General ROWNY. Yes, sir. I think the total warhead number as it now stands is not a very good measure. The advantage which we temporarily enjoy in the total number of warheads is in areas which are not usable in a so-called first strike exchange. Our temporary lead is in the SLBM field and in the bomber field; generally in second strike or follow-on strike capabilities.

I think that the Soviets have their eye on the ball and the ball is ICBM warheads. In this field they are building apace. That is the effect that has to be constrained.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if possible, to submit other questions for the record. Will it be kept open for a few days?

Chairman TOWER. The record will be kept open. Let's put a time limitation on it. Can you submit the questions today?

Senator LEVIN. It might be a little more helpful if I had tomorrow but if today is the deadline, I will meet it.

Chairman TOWER. We will keep the record open until 5 o'clock Wednesday afternoon for the submission of additional questions to be responded to in writing.

Senator LEVIN. I thank the Chair.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER

Chairman TOWER. What should be our most important goal in strategic arms talks?

General ROWNY. The most important goal in strategic arms talks is to enhance deterrence of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

Chairman TOWER. What has been the biggest mistake we have made in the past in negotiating with the Soviet Union?

General ROWNY. The biggest mistake we have made in the past in negotiating with the Soviet Union has been to assume that their goals and objectives are the same as ours.

Chairman TOWER. What is it that the Soviet Union hopes to achieve out of the arms control talks?

General ROWNY. The Soviet Union hopes that it can, through arms control talks, freeze the United States into a permanent state of strategic inferiority.

Chairman TOWER. How can we best negotiate from a position of strength?

General ROWNY. We can best negotiate from a position of strength by demonstrating that we have the will and determination to match the Soviets at any level to which they want to build. We will then have demonstrated to the Soviets the folly of their building strategic forces to such high levels.

Chairman TOWER. Is negotiating from strength the same as having bargaining chips?

General ROWNY. No, negotiating from strength is negotiating with strong strategic forces behind us to support our position. Having bargaining chips implies that the systems involved are not needed for our national security, and that we plan to develop or deploy forces primarily to toss them in as chips.

Chairman TOWER. What is the status of U.S. policy with respect to compliance with SALT I and SALT II?

General ROWNY. The U.S. policy with respect to compliance, as I understand it, is not to take any action that would undercut existing agreements while our SALT policy review is underway, so long as the Soviets exercise the same restraint.

Chairman TOWER. How much progress has been made in negotiating greater cooperation from the Soviet Union on verification and compliance issues?

General ROWNY. Some modest progress has been made in negotiating positions which call for greater cooperation from the Soviet Union on verification. We have negotiated several provisions on verification which are more precise than heretofore, and have gotten them to agree to the provision of some cooperative measures (such as Functionally Related Observable Differences (FROD's)), and have gotten their agreement to a rudimentary data base. On compliance issues we have established a forum, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with compliance issues.

Chairman TOWER. How did the SS–19 come to be classified as a light ICBM when many people thought that SALT I had made such as missile a heavy ICBM?

General ROWNY. In SALT I we agreed that the size of launchers, and not the destructive power of missiles, would be limited. The Soviets complied with the letter of the agreement, but not its spirit. The Soviets replaced their SS–11's and SS–13's, which had roughly the same destructive potential as the Minuteman, with SS–17's and SS–19's which have three times the destructive power of the missiles they replaced. The United States should have insisted that these actions made the SS–17's and SS–19's "heavy" missiles. However, a policy decision by the U.S. administration determined that the SS–19 would be called the heaviest of the light missiles.

Chairman TOWER. What is the origin of the concept of forward-based systems and what is its significance for the Alliance?

General ROWNY. The Soviets originated the concept of forward-based system (FBS) as a way of supporting their argument that SALT, a negotiation between the United States and the U.S.S.R., should involve weapons which can strike the territory of either side. U.S. nuclear systems placed in Europe to help restore the theater imbalance were, by Soviet reasoning, to be included in the U.S. totals because these weapons could strike the U.S.S.R. However, the more numerous and more powerful Soviet nuclear ssytems which could strike targets in Europe (to include striking U.S. weapons and troops in Europe) were not, by Soviet "logic," to be counted in their totals because they would not be striking targets in the United States.

The significance to the Alliance is that this Soviet "logic" does not recognize the validity of article V of the NATO Treaty. The United States has made a commitment that an attack on one NATO ally will be considered an attack on NATO as a whole. Therefore, the United States has, in effect, rejected the Soviet contention that the "terriortial" argument argument is the government criterion. The United States considers an attack on one NATO ally to be an attack on the United States, a principle of fundamental importance to the viability of the Alliance.

Chairman TOWER. To the best of your knowledge why was the B–1 bomber limited to 20 air-launched cruise missiles in SALT II, and would such a limit apply to the B–1 variant being considered now as a long-range combat aircraft?

General **Rowny**. At Vladivostok President Ford discussed only air-launched ballistic missiles and did not discuss air-launched cruise missiles. However, the language of the Vladivostok Accord referred to air-launched missiles, which the Soviets interpreted to mean cruise as well as ballistic missiles. The Soviets subsequently got our agreement to a provision in SALT II (Art. IV. 14) which would have limited the number of long-range air-launched cruise missiles to the product of 28 times the number of heavy bombers equipped for such cruise missiles. In addition, the U.S. agreed that "no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types" will be equipped for more than 20 long-range cruise missiles. In this way, a B-1 variant—if it were actually of the B-1 type—would have become subject to this limitation if it were equipped for long-range cruise missiles.

Of course, B-1 variants that were not so equipped and had externally observable differences demonstrating this would not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles, pursuant to the provision of the Fourth Agreed Statement to Article II.3 of the SALT II Treaty.

Chairman **Tower**. How can we best define an equitable agreement?

General **Rowny**. In my opinion it is best defined in P.L. 92-448 which states that the United States will not enter into an agreement with the USSR at levels inferior to those of the USSR. The record of the discussions in the Senate at the time P.L. 92-448 was being considered makes it clear that the Senators had in mind not ceilings on equal numbers of launchers, as is the case in SALT II, but ceilings on equal levels of destructive potential. Such an agreement would be equitable.

Chairman **Tower**. What were the major flaws in the SALT I and SALT II Treaties?

General **Rowny**. The major flaw in SALT I was that it did not prevent the Soviets from upgrading their missiles and thereby greatly expanding the destructive potential of their forces. The major flaws in SALT II were that it did not provide for an equitable or verifiable agreement. Further, it failed to place constraints on qualitative improvements to Soviet ICBMs. Finally, it limited or the most part U.S. systems where we had a technological advantage (cruise missiles).

There are many more flaws in SALT I and SALT II but the above are the major ones.

Chairman **Tower**. Under what circumstances should we consider renegotiation of the ABM Treaty?

General **Rowny**. There are two such circumstances. First, if the United States and U.S.S.R. fail to reach a satisfactory agreement on limiting strategic offensive arms, we should examine whether (as provided for in P.L. 92-448) it is not in our best interest to invoke the supreme interest clause and abrogate the ABM Treaty. Second, if it becomes necessary to defend the MX by ABMs in the basing mode selected, then we should consider amending the existing ABM Treaty.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator **Levin**. General, you have stated that in order to reach an arms reduction agreement with the Soviets, we have to build up our forces.

You also point to throw-weight and warheads as the "salient" measures of strategic strength—not launcher levels.

In terms of total warheads, we currently exceed the Soviets—do we not—by as much as 1,000 warheads?

General **Rowny**. Yes, we currently exceed the Soviets in the total number of warheads, probably by as many as 1,000. However, in the area of ICBM warheads, by far the more powerful and more accurate ones, and thus most threatening to the United States and our Allies, the Soviets possess a huge advantage over us, rendering our land-based missiles vulnerable to a first-strike. Using unclassified figures (and I shall continue to use unclassified figures throughout the rest of my answers), it is estimated that the Soviets currently exceed us by more than 2,500 warheads on ICBMs.

Senator **Levin**. How many more warheads do we need—how much farther away from the Soviets do we have to pull in numbers of warheads to lay the foundation for a reductions treaty?

General **Rowny**. At issue is not whether we will pull away from the Soviets; the Soviets will exceed us in total numbers of warheads by 1982. The important issue is how much further ahead of us will their vigorous ICBM and MRBM (i.e., SS-20) programs go. It is the Soviet Union that is racing; in overall power they are ahead of us and will increase their lead. In short, the Soviets far exceed us in numbers of warheads on ICBMs and will probably continue to for the rest of this decade.

Continuing to use unclassified and approximate figures, the Soviets will have more than a 4-to-1 advantage over us in ICBM throwweight (U.S. 2.5 vs. Soviet Union 10.2 million pounds). In SLBM throwweight, we will be approximately equal, at about 2.2 million pounds each. It is the warheads on ICBMs that create the threat to our land-based force. Not only do they far exceed our numbers in such warheads, but these are the warheads which are most accurate and highly powerful.

Senator LEVIN. How do you intend to measure what is an acceptable number of warheads for the United States to be ahead of the Soviet Union so as to be able to reach an arms control agreement achieving real reductions?

General ROWNY. It is not the total number of warheads that is a measure of Soviet destructive potential but the number of warheads on ICBMs and their destructive capability which is the governing criterion. In this respect, we are behind and will continue to be behind in the number of warheads on ICBMs, and in the total amount of destructive power which these ICBMs or warheads represent. It is my view that our thinking should extend beyond dealing simply with warheads, and should encompass such factors that contribute to destructive capability as: throw-weight, accuracy, megatonnage, MIRVing, etc. In all of those areas the Soviets are ahead of us and pulling further ahead in the future. Our goal should be to reduce the destructive capability of Soviet systems to a level equal to ours.

Senator LEVIN. From your logic, General, since the Soviets are behind in warheads, do you think they will want to negotiate a reductions agreement until they are closer to us in warheads?

General ROWNY. First, I do not accept or agree with the premise of the question; the Soviets are far ahead of us in the more important warheads, those on their ICBMs. My logic, as I hope I have made clear in the preceding three questions, is that it is not the total number of warheads that count. Rather, it is the great disparity of warheads on ICBMs that causes the great disparity of potential destruction. Moreover, even though we are ahead in SLBM warheads as of the current time, we anticipate the Soviets will continue to increase their warheads both on ICBMs and SLBMs so that in 1982 they will be ahead of us in total numbers of warheads as well.

From what I have said in this and the preceding three questions, I trust I have I have made it clear that my logic is based on a realization that the more accurate and more powerful ICBM warheads carry the highest priority as to systems which need to be limited. It is the 3-to-1 asymmetry favoring the Soviet Union in ICBMs on warheads that makes our land-based force vulnerable and which gives rise to the need for deploying the MX in a survivable mode.

Senator LEVIN. As we build up our throw-weight and expand our warheads, do you think that the Soviets will stand still—that they will not react by expanding their own forces in response to our efforts?

General ROWNY. The Soviets may well decide to increase the number of their systems, the number of their warheads and hence their capabilities. I cannot judge whether that would be related to our attempts to correct the dangerous vulnerability of our own forces which came about by virtue of the Soviets having raced ahead of us. If the Soviets decide, for whatever reasons, to expand their nuclear forces, I do not believe they will be able to expand them by a great deal. They are now expending between 12 and 16 percent of their gross national product for their forces in comparison to 5.2 percent which we spend of our GNP for our forces. This is a tremendous drain on their economy and is keeping the standard of living for Soviet citizens at a dismal level. In this connection, whereas the Soviets were previously increasing their armed forces at approximately the same rate as the annual growth of their GNP, their GNP growth rate is now receding. Therefore, we can estimate that any expansion will be quite modest.

Senator LEVIN. If we cannot close the gap in throw-weight or if they continue to get closer in warheads, are you saying it will not be possible to reach an arms control agreement achieving real reductions?

General ROWNY. No, whether or not it is possible to reach an arms control agreement is dependent on their actions as well as ours. First, the Soviets must see that we are making a commitment to begin to improve our armed forces to take care of our defensive needs. Second, they must see that we have demonstrated the will to continue this commitment. Having seen continued commitment on our part, it is my conviction that the Soviets will begin to consider entering into agreements to reduce their forces downward from their currently high levels.

Senator LEVIN. When do you think we will be in this more advantageous throw-weight position to achieve substantial reductions?

General ROWNY. As in the answer to the preceding question, we can achieve a treaty and achieve substantial reductions as soon as the Soviets are convinced that we have made the commitments to improve our forces and have demonstrated the will to sustain such commitments.

Senator LEVIN. It took 7 years to reach a SALT Treaty which did not reduce Soviet throw-weight in your view.

It should take several more years to convince them to reduce their throw-weight, shouldn't it?

Since the Soviet ICBM modernization program has much more momentum than ours—they could deploy more launchers above SALT II limits more easily than the U.S.—wouldn't it be to the U.S. advantage to have a freeze a la SALT II first then go for deep reductions?

General ROWNY. The reason it took 7 years to reach a SALT Treaty which did not reduce Soviet throw-weight was because we did not insist on throw-weight limitations but settled upon limitations on numbers of launchers. This was contrary to the mandate of P.L. 92–448.

I do not believe it would take years to convince the Soviets to reduce throw-weight; I believe we can begin convincing them as soon as we demonstrate to them that it is in their interest to reduce their large advantage in throw-weight.

It should be clear from the preceding answers that I do not put much stock in limiting numbers of launchers and therefore believe that freezes on launchers (à la SALT II) would not work to our advantage toward achieving the goals of enhancing deterrence or restoring stability in times of crisis.

Senator LEVIN. In your writings and your testimony before this committee and the Armed Services Committee on SALT II, it was clear that you were very unhappy with the way that treaty negotiations came out. It is probably fair to say that you made your dissatisfaction with the treaty known in the bureaucracy and to visitors to Geneva during the course of that negotiation.

Is it accurate to say that you resigned in protest following the signing of the SALT II Treaty?

General ROWNY. I began making my dissatisfaction with the treaty known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1978. At that time I pointed out that we could reverse the trend and arrive at an agreement satisfactory to the U.S. On January 1, 1979 I again expressed my dissatisfaction with the treaty to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended that urgent action be taken if we were to arrive at a satisfactory SALT II agreement.

In mid-May 1979 I informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the emerging treaty would not, in my opinion, be in the interest of the United States and asked to be relieved from my duties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that I return to Geneva and continue to work on the treaty until after it was signed. Following the signing of the SALT II Treaty my resignation was made effective on June 30, 1979.

Senator LEVIN. If SALT resumes, do you believe that you can be an effective negotiator whether or not you agree with the decisions which might be made by the administration or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

General ROWNY. Yes, I believe I can be an effective negotiator, and it is for this reason that I am accepting the appointment offered me to be the Chief Negotiator. I do not believe that the question of whether or not I agree with the decisions of the administration or the Director of ACDA will come up. For the last 2 years I have been in agreement with the views of candidate Reagan and now President Reagan. I cannot visualize any change occurring in this situation.

Senator LEVIN. You have characterized the final months of the SALT II negotiation period as being the time when the major concessions were made which prevented SALT II from being a clear and verifiable treaty. You have also cited as proof that it was unclear and unverifiable to (1) allow the Soviets 308 heavy missile launchers; (2) not to count 375 intercontinentally-capable Backfire bombers; and (3) to allow them an asymmetry in ICBM throw-weight.

Some believe that those decisions were basically made at the time of the Vladivostok Accords in November, 1974. At a background briefing following

Vladivostok, Secretary Kissinger told the press that Vladivostok, and the surrounding discussion, had led to exclusion of the Backfire. Vladivostok also carried on the freeze in the numbers of land-based missiles, including heavy missiles. In his backgrounder, Secretary Kissinger also argued that the throw-weight issue, "has been vastly overstated" and that any decision to close the throw-weight gap, "will be taken for our reasons and not simply because the Soviet Union has heavier missiles than we do."

If these issue were decided, as the Secretary indicated in connection with Vladivostok, then it would appear that those matters which struck you as flaws in SALT II had been decided 5 years earlier.

Do you believe that this is a fair characterization of Vladivostok? If so, why did you stay a member of the delegation for 5 years after these decisions were made?

General Rowny. No, I do not believe that what has been stated in the question is a fair characterization of Vladivostok. The Vladivostok Accord was a set of guidelines which were to lead to the achievement of an acceptable treaty to the United States.

The fact that the Soviets were allowed 308 heavy missile launchers was to have been compensated for in other ways which favored us. The facts are: First, even without the SS-18 the Soviets have a far superior ICBM force. Secondly, Vladivostok froze new launcher construction; it did not preclude reductions, that is, Soviet ICBM numbers were not frozen at their higher numbers.

To the best of my knowledge, no decision was made to exclude the 375 intercontinentally-capable Backfire bombers from the treaty. The best proof of this was that the United States insisted and the delegation was instructed to count Backfire in the Soviet aggregates; we continued to do so in our version of the Joint Draft Text until the spring of 1979. You will recall Secretary Kissinger had that portion of his Vladivostok press conference revised to excise the statement you quote.

As for throw-weight, all military experts that I know disagreed with Secretary Kissinger's reported statement that the throw-weight issue "has been vastly overstated." Even at face value such a statement does not constitute a "decision" to concede an advantage to the Soviets. In fact, Kissinger's statement clearly says that any decision on throw-weight was not made at Vladivostok, but would be made in the future.

It was my view, both before and after Vladivostok, that the President was to be guided by Public Law 92–448 which stated that the United States should not enter into a treaty in which our level of forces was inferior to those of the Soviet Union.

As I have indicated in my hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee in 1979 and again in July of 1981. I stayed on as a member of the U.S. delegation because decisions had not been made at Vladivostok which necessarily would lead to an unequal and unverifiable treaty. It should not be forgotten that well over 2 years after Vladivostok the United States proposed a radical reduction in the number of Soviet heavy missile launchers—further evidence that the "decisions" at Vladivostok were not decisions at all, but merely statements made to the press. I trust I have made it clear that I do not believe the flaws in SALT II had been decided 5 years before the treaty was signed.

Senator Levin. You have been quoted as favoring achievement of a SALT Treaty incorporating equal limits for both sides on the total throw-weight of missiles, with the freedom for each nation to structure strategic forces within this overall limit as it wishes.

Considering the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with a SALT I agreement which permitted heavy ICBM's for the Soviets and prohibited them for the United States, why is it so important to have equality in throw-weight?

General Rowny. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with SALT I they were agreeing to a freeze in Soviet ICBM systems. The fact that this freeze permitted certain large asymmetries in favor of the Soviet Union to occur, particularly in ICBM throw-weight, was to have been rectified by the application of Public Law 92–448 to future arms agreements. The clear implications of this law are that future agreements must be much more balanced and equitable than the SALT I Interim Agreement.

In connection with the above, it must be stated that the JCS agreed to SALT I contingent upon three conditions being met:

(1) that the United States would pursue a vigorous R. & D. program;
(2) that there would be sustained growth in ongoing U.S. programs; and

(3) that there would be significant improvements in our compliance and verification capabilities.

Equality of ICBM throw-weight provides predictability in the quick hard target kill area—the most crucial determinant of crisis stability and maintenance of a secure second strike (retaliatory) ICBM force.

Senator LEVIN. If throw-weight is such an important measure of strategic capability, why do you think the JCS decided against deploying heavy ICBMs, even when the United States was in a position to do so?

If throw-weight became a much more important measurement of strategic strength over time since SALT I, why do you think the JCS agreed to continue the provisions which permitted Soviet heavy ICBMs but prohibited them for the United States at Vladivostok?

General ROWNY. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against deploying heavy ICBMs because to have done so would not have been in keeping with the perceived need for a show of restraint, and would have been interpreted as entering into an arms race with the Soviet Union.

I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to continue provisions which permitted Soviet heavy ICBMs because thye believed that we would receive compensatory concessions in other fields. The outcome of SALT II demonstrates that we did not.

Senator LEVIN. As SALT II now stands, we have an unratified treaty which does not have the support of this administration, and it is not yet clear how the administration will proceed.

In your National Security Affairs Institute paper of June 1980 you said that President Carter's "biggest mistake since Afghanistan has been to declare that he will abide by the terms of SALT II."

The administration has declared that pending the outcome of its studies to formulate new SALT negotiating positions, and assuming reciprocal Soviet restraint, the United States in its defense budget, program and deployment decisions will not do anything to defeat the object and purpose of the SALT I and II treaties, as well as the ABM Treaty, nor will it do anything to violate the terms of those agreements.

Do you support this policy?

General ROWNY. Yes, I support the administration's policy. The difference between the policy of the previous administration and this administration is that this administration has said that "if * * * there was some situation that required a particular course of action that was not consistent with * * * SALT II * * *, then * * * we would not feel bound by the SALT II formulation which has never become a treaty."

Senator LEVIN. If so, do you consider that to be a mistake by President Reagan?

General ROWNY. No, I do not consider President Reagan's policy decisions to be a mistake. I consider this administration's policy to be correct.

Senator LEVIN. To the best of your knowledge is the Soviet Union continuing to abide by the terms of SALT II? If so, do you consider that to be a mistake on their part?

General ROWNY. No, I do not believe the Soviets are continuing to abide by the terms of SALT II. If they did, they would now be reducing their number of systems from 2,500 downward towards the 2,250 limit which was scheduled to commence on January 1, 1981 and be complete by December 31, 1981. At the same time, I have no reason to believe they are doing anything inconsistent with the provisions of the treaty. I think that since they are so far ahead of us, it is not to their advantage to do anything inconsistent with the treaty. By not expanding their forces they hope that we will follow suit indefinitely and therefore continue to be in an inferior position to them.

Senator LEVIN. What do you see as the ideal kind of new SALT agreement to achieve with the Soviet Union?

General ROWNY. The ideal kind of a new SALT agreement to achieve with the Soviet Union is one that is equal, balanced, and verifiable. It is one that does not render our strategic Triad vulnerable to a first-strike but permits us a significant retaliatory blow in a second-strike. The treaty should be one which enhances deterrence and helps restore stability in times of crisis. It follows, therefore, that the ideal treaty would be one which was achieved in close harmony with our allies and did not undermine their interests.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that it makes sense to incorporate any particular parts of the already-negotiated treaty into a revised treaty?

General **Rowny**. Yes, I believe it makes sense to incorporate some parts of the already-negotiated treaty into a revised treaty.

Senator **Levin**. How flexible do you believe the Soviets will be in any new SALT discussion?

General **Rowny**. It has long been my view that the Soviets want and need a SALT agreement and would consider such an agreement to be in their long-term interest. Therefore, I believe they will show only so much flexibility as is necessary for them to enter into an agreement with us which can be ratified by the Senate.

Senator **Levin**. Do you believe that the Soviet Union would build more strategic arms without a treaty than with one?

General **Rowny**. It is not clear whether the Soviets would build more strategic arms without a treaty than with one. The Soviets have been continuing to build their forces at an unrelenting rate for the last 15 years. There are indications that this rate of growth may not be significantly increased. If a treaty were properly formulated, it would cause the Soviets to turn downward their expenditure for strategic offensive and defensive arms. If this could be achieved, we would be entering into a treaty which in fact placed a limit on Soviet strategic build up.

Senator **Levin**. What do you see as the incentives for the Soviet Union to achieve a SALT agreement with the United States?

General **Rowny**. There are several incentives for the Soviet Union to enter into a SALT agreement with the United States:

(1) the Soviets would view a SALT agreement as the best way of continuing their policy of detente which permits them to continue with their own course of expansionism in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives;

(2) with a SALT treaty the Soviets would have a better opportunity to enter into trade agreements with the United States;

(3) an agreement would give them a better chance of achieving transfers of technology which they so sorely need;

(4) the Soviets may be at the point where they are spending too much for "guns" and not enough for "butter," especially in view of the fact that the peoples in their satellites enjoy a higher standard of living than do those in the Soviet Union; and

(5) The Soviets realize that in the long run, in the absence of an agreement, the United States might be forced into an arms race which the Soviet Union could not hope to win.

Senator **Levin**. Who do you believe would win an all-out arms race?

General **Rowny**. I want to make it clear that I do not believe in the "arms race" explanation for defense planning. As I indicated in the preceding question, the Soviets recognize that they could not better us if we were forced to compete. Since the United States has twice the GNP as the Soviets, and since we and our allies possess more than four times the GNP than the Soviet Union and its bloc, there are no objective reasons why we must continue to be inferior to the U.S.S.R. in strategic arms.

Senator **Levin**. What do you see as the justifiable incentives for the United States in achieving an acceptable SALT agreement with the Soviet Union?

General **Rowny**. There are a number of justifiable incentives for the United States to achieve an acceptable SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. It would:

(1) enhance deterrence of nuclear war;

(2) help achieve a situation whereby stability could be maintained in times of crisis;

(3) reduce the levels of destructive capability, starting with the larger Soviet arsenal;

(4) insure strategic equity;

(5) provide rationale for an acceptable TNF agreement; and

(6) protect our own interests and those of our Allies.

Senator **Levin**. At the National Security Affairs Institute conference on defense planning and arms control, you said, "arms control should be allowed to enter the defense planning only when and where it does not interfere with the provision of adequate defense for the United States."

Do you believe that we should be pursuing arms control negotiations at this time?

Would you elaborate on how arms control negotiations should be approached so as to avoid interference "with provision of adequate defense"?

General ROWNY. Yes, I do believe we should be pursuing arms control negotiations at this time.

The way to approach arms control negotiations so as to avoid interference "with provision of adequate defense" is to first plan, budget and prepare the forces that are necessary for our national security. We can then integrate these plans with our foreign policy objectives. As a corollary, we should not make arms control negotiations the centerpiece of our foreign policy.

Senator LEVIN. In the case of the MX missile deployment, considering that without SALT II limits the deployment system has little, if any, prospect for surviving against the expected Soviet threat, would you think that arms control could help rather than "interfere" with provision for the adequate defense of the United States?

General ROWNY. I do not accept the premise that SALT II limits in the treaty as currently written would help rather than interfere with the provision for the adequate defense of the United States. Unless and until the Soviet throw-weight capability of their ICBMs is reduced, they will possess a break-out capability for rendering our MX and other ICBMs vulnerable.

Senator LEVIN. During the 1979 Senate hearings on SALT II, and even before that agreement was signed, there were strong statements from anti-SALT forces that, whatever their public statements, Europeans privately opposed the proposed treaty. Given the strong renaissance of arms control fervor in Europe over the theater nuclear forces modernization issue, how would you assess the current European mood with respect to the desirability for the United States to renew negotiations on strategic arms cotnrol as soon as possible?

General ROWNY. I would assess the current European mood as one which desires renewal of negotiations on strategic arms control as soon as possible. I think that a combination of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, combined with the economic and social difficulties in Europe, contribute to the European mood to press for the resumption of negotiations on strategic arms control as soon as possible.

Senator LEVIN. At the last NATO Ministerial meeting, on May 5, 1981, a final communique was issued—one with which the United States agreed—which stated that the allies: "welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year."

Secretary Haig reiterated this commitment to negotiate TNF arms control within the SALT framework just two days ago in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City.

How soon after these TNF negotiations begin would you expect the United States to be ready to re-open SALT negotiations with the Soviets?

General ROWNY. It is difficult for me to gauge precisely how soon after TNF negotiations begin the United States would be ready to reopen SALT negotiations. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has given as his "realistic expectation that talks and discussions, and perhaps SALT negotiations, could begin next spring." As for my part, I will be ready to play my role as chief negotiator prior to that time and will do all that I can to see that the date for resumption of negotiations comes about as soon as possible.

Senator LEVIN. Without renewal of SALT talks soon after the TNF negotiations begin, don't you think our European allies might have further doubts about the new administration's commitment to renew SALT negotiations?

General ROWNY. I do not think the question lends itself to a definitive answer. I think that our European allies will be quite interested in how the TNF negotiations are proceeding, and will continue to be interested in the prospects for SALT as well.

Senator LEVIN. One of Europe's most respected newspapers, the Manchester Guardian, stated the following in an editorial entitled "The Allies Begin to Be Restive" on May 10, 1981: "President Reagan has not disowned his earlier commitment to renegotiate SALT but he has linked the talks to Afghanistan and Poland. Afghanistan has got no worse in recent weeks. If the Russians can have their grain why not the SALT to go with it?"

Would you agree that the administration's willingness to "de-link" the grain embargo from continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan makes it difficult to link renewal of SALT negotiations with Soviet behavior in that Southwest Asia region?

Given the de-linkage with the grain embargo, at least in the eyes of our European allies, doesn't this appear to be a rather hypocritical position for the United States to be espousing?

General ROWNY. I do not agree that the administration's willingness to "delink" the grain embargo is relevant to a decision whether or not to commence SALT negotiations. Linkage between arms control negotiations with the Soviets and Soviet behavior around the globe is a fact of life that cannot be ignored.

Senator LEVIN. The Wall Street Journal, in a recent article from Bonn entitled "U.S. Defense Policy Worries Europe," reported the following reactions from high-level European defense officials about the TNF negotiations: "Unless the United States enthusiastically engages in arms control talks, European governments can't sell their publics on the idea of carrying out the 1979 allied decision to base the new U.S. missiles in Europe."

Would you agree with this assessment?

General ROWNY. I agree that the Wall Street Journal article correctly assesses what many high-level European defense officials say about TNF negotiations. The U.S. has indicated it will engage in TNF negotiations later this year. Therefore, there appears to be no reason why the European governments cannot continue to adhere to the 1979 allied decision to base new missiles in Europe.

Senator LEVIN. The article continued: "The defense officials praise Secretary of State Alexander Haig for agreeing last week to resume planning for talks with the Soviets on reducing short- and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. But they are irritated and worried that the U.S. seems to see the talks as futile, as little more than a political cover for the new deployments, aimed at fulfilling the 1979 allied condition that any new missiles must be accompanied by talks."

Are these negotiations only "a political cover for our TNF deployments? Do you think that these talks are "futile"?

General ROWNY. No, I do not see the negotiations in any sense "a political cover for our TNF deployments." The United States agreed in December 1979 to a dual-track approach; pursuing TNF modernization and at the same time pursuing negotiations on control of arms in Europe. We are preparing for serious, substantive negotiations. In no way do I think that our talks are "futile"; to make that judgment even before they've begun is to doom them to failure.

Senator LEVIN. We base our estimates of the threats posed by Soviet strategic nuclear forces to our nation on the knowledge we gain from our efforts to monitor these forces—primarily by national technical means of verification, do we not?

General ROWNY. Yes, we gain knowledge of Soviet strategic nuclear forces primarily by NTM.

Senator LEVIN. When our knowledge of Soviet strategic forces is less than we would prefer—if there are gaps in our knowledge, if you will—based on difficulties we have in monitoring their forces, it is our general practice to assume that the threats are worse than they might be if we had better information about them, is it not?

Thus, the worse our knowledge of Soviet strategic nuclear programs, the worse might be the threat posed by them to this country, is this not so?

General ROWNY. No, it has been my observation that when we have difficulties in monitoring Soviet forces we have usually underestimated rather than correctly estimated or overestimated the threat. Therefore, based on an analysis of our estimates over the past fifteen years, it has not been true that the worse our knowledge of strategic nuclear programs the worse we perceive the threat to be.

Senator LEVIN. There are great difficulties associated with monitoring Soviet strategic nuclear forces, even under SALT provisions against Soviet concealment and deception, is this not so?

General ROWNY. Yes, there are difficulties associated with monitoring Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

Senator LEVIN. Considering the great difficulties involved in our monitoring of Soviet strategic forces—in keeping track of their numbers, deployments and performance characteristics—do you think it would be wise for this nation to do anything which would make it more difficult to monitor these forces?

Do you think it would be wise for us to do anything with respect to the deployment of our own strategic forces which would give the Soviets the incentive to adjust their own deployments to make it more difficult for us to monitor their forces?

General ROWNY. No, I do not think it would be wise for this nation to do anything which would make it more difficult to monitor Soviet strategic forces.

No, I do not think it would be wise for us to do anything with respect to deployment of our own strategic forces which would give the Soviets the incentive to adjust their own deployments to make it more difficult for us to monitor their forces.

Senator LEVIN. Unless the Soviets construct a mobile ICBM system as complicated as our proposed MX system—especially as it relates to the ability of each nation to monitor with confidence the ICBM force levels of each other—there exists the possibility that the Soviets could clandestinely make and store many more ICBMs and launchers than we would be able to monitor, is this not so?

General ROWNY. Yes, unless the Soviets, in designing and constructing a mobile ICBM system, followed guidelines for verification comparable to the ones we established to allow monitoring of our MX system in a multiple basing mode, there exists the possibility that the Soviets could clandestinely make and store more launchers than we would be able to monitor.

As for Soviet ICBMs, they now possess the capability of clandestinely making and storing them. However, I should point out that the Soviets' ability to clandestinely make and store more ICBMs is unrelated to the verifiability of the MX deployment plan. We will deploy our MX missiles in such a way that the Soviets can verify how many we deployed and then attempt to hold the Soviets to the same standards. They will know how many missiles we build and store because such information is available to them. We will not know how many they build and store unless the Soviets agree to cooperative measures which go beyond the use of national technical means.

Senator LEVIN. This could give them the capability to "break out" of any future arms limitation treaty—even a Reagan re-negotiated' SALT II—with enough ICBMs and other nuclear forces to successfully threaten our MX system and engage in nuclear blackmail, would it not?

General ROWNY. Yes, the break-out capability would exist on two fronts. First, the Soviets might not follow the precedent we established for their ability to monitor ICBM systems. Second, unless Soviet ICBM throw-weight is reduced, the Soviets possess the break-out capability of greatly expanding the number of accurate and powerful ICBM warheads. This would render our ICBM forces vulnerable to attack.

If a Reagan administration re-negotiated SALT II treaty reduced the Soviet ICBM throw-weight by a substantial amount, the second of the two break-out capabilities mentioned above would be precluded.

Senator LEVIN. Thus, even without any arms control agreements, we could face this situation of not knowing how many ICBMs the Soviets have and of a possible "break out' from a force structure we might think they have, to one which is far more, could we not?

General ROWNY. I agree: we could face such a situation. But, with the proper type of arms control agreement we could hope to know how many ICBMs the Soviets have. Furthermore, a proper type of arms control agreement would be one which eliminated the capability for a "break-out" by reducing their large advantage in the strategic potential which already exists.

Senator LEVIN. Thus our national security would be far less in either "break-out" case, would it not?

General ROWNY. As you can see from the answers to the preceding questions, our national security would be less if the treaty permitted any break-out capabilities.

Senator LEVIN. Thus, there can be no confidence that the Soviets will be so obliging as to build a mobile missile system we can monitor easily—especially in the climate of the military competition the new administration is discussing, in the climate of a "no SALT II" world, and in a world without SALT II's prohibitions against deception and concealment of each nation's forces, is this not so?

General ROWNY. From the answers to the preceding questions, I trust I have made it clear that a proper SALT agreement would be one which:

(1) Reduced the Soviet ICBM throw-weight asymmetry so that a break-out would not permit them greatly to augment the number of their ICBM warheads;

(2) Establish precedents through our own deployment schemes which we would attempt to have followed; and

(3) Permit us to build and deploy more systems to counter theirs in the event they did not follow our precedents.

Senator LEVIN. Therefore, why should we proceed with the MX mobile missile system, since its combination of mobility and warhead yield and accuracy will force the Soviets to build some type of mobile ICBM in response, thus actually diminishing our security rather than increasing it?

General Rowny. We should proceed with the MX mobile missile system. U.S. deployment of MX would not "force" them to build some type of a mobile ICBM in response. The size of our planned MX force would not give them any cause for fear that we were building a first-strike capability.

Senator Levin. Wouldn't the United States be more secure not facing the type of break out threat the MX missile could prompt the Soviets to mount?

General Rowny. As I made clear in answers to preceding questions, I do not believe that deploying the MX missile in a multiple or moveable basing mode would in any way force the Soviets to respond in ways which adversely affect our interests. Any argument that they would be prompted to do so would not have a basis in fact.

Senator Levin. Do the Soviets have the national technical means of verification to monitor how many mobile missiles and launchers we might deploy if we clandestinely hid these systems in factories or in caves?

General Rowny. I cannot conceive that the United States would clandestinely hide its missiles and launchers. I believe whatever multiple basing scheme we adopt would permit the Soviet Union to monitor how many missiles and launchers we actually do deploy. The availability of information to the Soviets in our open society does not require that we adopt a scheme which makes such information available to them. However, by adopting the proper schemes we would establish precedents we would hope the Soviets would follow if they decided to deploy similar systems.

Senator Levin. Do we have these monitoring capabilities with NTM, if they clandestinely hid mobile ICBMs and launchers in factories or caves?

General Rowny. No, if the Soviets were to successfully and clandestinely hide their mobile ICBMs as described in the question, we would not be able to monitor their actions with NTM.

Senator Levin. Wouldn't the United States be more secure not facing the type of break out threat the MX missile could prompt the Soviets to deploy?

General Rowny. I do not accept the premise that the MX would prompt the Soviets to deploy a like system.

Senator Levin. General, Secretary Weinberger has said he agrees we should continue development of the MX missile, but that he has problems with the current proposed basing mode. He has said DOD is again studying how to best base the MX missile—including options of basing at sea.

Do you share Secretary Weinberger's concerns about the current MX basing mode, and if not, why not?

General Rowny. The Townes Commission is studying what the proper basing mode should be for the MX missile and has not yet reported their views. Therefore, I do not know what the "current proposed basing mode" is. I do indeed share Secretary Weinberger's concern that whatever MX basing mode is adopted be the most cost-effective one that can be designed and deployed to provide for our security.

Chairman Tower. General Rowny, thank you very much. It has been very useful testimony and we appreciate your appearing here today.

General Rowny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. This meeting is adjourned.

[Thereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ARMS CONTROL POLICY, PLANNING AND NEGOTIATING

FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1981

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND PLANNING

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond, presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond (presiding), Warner, Humphrey, Jepsen, Quayle, Jackson, Cannon, Nunn, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine E. Cowart, assistant chief clerk; Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Ronald F. Lehman, James R. Locher III, Anthony J. Principi, E. George Riedel, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson and Brenda K. Hudson, staff assistants.

Also present: Chris Lehman, assistant to Senator Warner; George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Herman Pirchner, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Dorothy Fosdick, assistant to Senator Jackson; and Michelle Robbins, assistant to Senator Jackson.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator Thurmond. The committee will come to order.

Today I would like to welcome to the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Rostow brings to that office distinguished credentials from a noteworthy legal career that make him a most suitable Director.

Arms control can play an important part in the national security of the United States. Indeed, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 provides that: "Arms control and disarmament policy, being an important aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national security policy as a whole."

The Arms Control Act provides further that the Director of the Arms Control Agency shall have, under the direction of the Secretary of State, primary responsibility for arms control and disarmament matters.

This is our second hearing on arms control this year, the second of many hearings which will be held. It is important that arms control policy be coordinated with the foreign and defense policies of the United States, both in the executive and legislative branches. Defense programs should proceed taking into account arms control just as our arms control efforts must take into account our defense programs and problems. Our goal must be to enhance the security of the United States.

It is my belief that this committee distinguished itself in its detailed consideration of the SALT II Treaty, pointing out to the Nation some of the deficiencies in that treaty. Hopefully, that criticism will point the way to a better approach to arms control, and to more successful negotiations. Among the members of this committee you will find strong support for arms control agreements which are equitable, verifiable, and promote the security of the United States, Mr. Rostow. It is our hope that you will work closely with this committee to that end. We thank you.

Mr. Rostow, you may proceed now with your opening statement unless some other members would like to make a statement at this time, and if so, I will be pleased to hear from them. And I would first call on Senator Warner of Virginia.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The only difference I would have with your statement is I feel that arms control is an essential part of our overall national defense strategy, and you, Mr. Rostow, have the opportunity that perhaps none of your predecessors in recent time have had, namely, the total support of the President who is determined to provide this country with the necessary strategic nuclear strength to indicate to the Soviets our absolute determination to safeguard this country and the free world absent an arms control agreement.

I wish you the best of good fortune in getting that agreement.

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted in joining with my colleagues in welcoming Gene Rostow to this committee. I have worked with him over a period of many, many years, and he is indeed eminently qualified by reason of a long scholarly background, but in addition, a tremendous amount of experience in this area, and I think we are fortunate to have him as the Director of ACDA.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. I, too, echo the statements of my colleagues. Mr. Rostow, I remember very vividly the spring and the long, hot summer of 1979 when we were getting reports that SALT II was a must, and that dog and pony shows were presented all over this Nation lauding the report with all of the things that we had in question, and when we asked the questions originally, many of us were accused of, of course, being the warmongers and this type of thing. I saw those discussions and debates go all the way from absolutely have to sign it, to absolute superiority, to well, maybe we ought to take a longer look and maybe we have equivalency, and maybe we now have a window of vulnerability, and my, how things changed when the facts were given, the facts. And I appreciate and I sleep better with you in your position. I look forward to hearing your remarks.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, I notice you have a pretty lengthy statement, and I was just wondering if you would care for us to put that in the record and let you summarize or highlight it.

Would that be agreeable with you?

Mr. ROSTOW. I will do, of course, Mr. Chairman, whatever you like, but I think there are always risks in that course.

Senator THURMOND. Would you prefer to deliver it in full, and if so, that would be agreeable with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you, I should prefer it, because, as you know, a great many people are watching what I say, what any Government official says on this sensitive subject, and it is better to be precise.

I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the very kind and encouraging things which you and your colleagues have said about me and about the role of arms control in this period, and I am very grateful for them. I strongly appreciate, too, what you said about the fact that I may be in a better position than many of my predecessors because of the President's strong commitment not only to restoring the nuclear balance, but to pursuing a very active and energetic approach to the search for balanced arms control agreements.

And I am very honored to appear before this committee in the first of what I hope will be a long series of meetings and consultations on many aspects of the responsibilities which we share.

At this point I shall try not simply to repeat the ideas of the three recent expositions of administration policy in the field of arms control: the President's statement of July 16 on nonproliferation policy; Secretary of State Haig's speech of July 14 at the Foreign Policy Association in New York; and the opening statement which I presented on June 22 at my confirmation hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee. Instead, I shall open our conversation today by commenting on some of the main policy problems of arms control as I am beginning to see them from my new desk.

Let me start with the principle upon which all three of the statements to which I have referred are based, the principle laid down in the statute, that arms control agreements are an integral, potentially a useful part of our foreign and defense policy, but not a substitute for it, and by no means "the political centerpiece or the crucial barometer" of Soviet-American relations, in Secretary Haig's phrase. No proposition about arms control is more nearly self-evident. But I have been startled during my first few weeks on the job to discover how many people do not really believe it. Both at home and abroad a substantial number of people are convinced that there is magic in arms control agreements, and indeed, even in the process of negotiating with the Soviets about nuclear arms, and that if we sign an agreement with the Soviet Union about strategic nuclear arms—any agreement—the risk of war, and especially the risk of nuclear war, will diminish.

I cannot tell you how often even in these first few weeks I have heard variations on this theme: "But if we insist on verification," people say, "or on reductions in the size of nuclear arsensals, or the disclosure of data by the Soviet Union or whatever, the Soviets will say 'no'," as if that were a conclusive objection to the suggestion I had put forward. The implicit premise of remarks like these, of course, is that it is better to have even a bad agreement than no agreement at all, and that we must in the end agree to whatever terms the Soviet Union lays down in order to have the security blanket of an arms control agreement.

It is difficult for me to understand how such views could have survived our recent experience with arms control. Manifestly, arms control agreements cannot and do not guarantee the peace. The Versailles Treaty and the naval arms limitation agreements of the twenties and thirties did not prevent the Second World War. Nor did the SALT I agreements or the process of negotiating SALT II keep the Soviet Union from radically enlarging its sphere of influence through the systematic use of war as an instrument of national policy. The pace of Soviet expansion has been accelerating for the last decade. The state system itself is now crumbling before our eyes under the impact of that pressure. With Soviet campaigns of expansion actively underway in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean, with Europe, Japan, China, and the United States itself under threat, we have reluctantly become conscious of the strategic goals and the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy and the menacing weight of the military buildup on which it rests. And we have become conscious, as well, of the fact that we are close to a turning point—that unless we and our allies act decisively now to restore the stability of the state system, and back our policy with clearly adequate deterrent force, our capacity to protect our vital national interests in peace will become problematical.

President Reagan has said that "the first and foremost" objective of our foreign and defense policy is "the establishment of lasting world peace." I emphasize the word "establishment." It is fully justified by the transformation of the balance of power and of the political situation which has taken place since 1970 or thereabouts.

President Reagan's thesis that the establishment of peace is our most vital national interest is not a simple idea. It means far more than the fact that at any given moment the guns may be silent. For the United States to be truly at peace as a free nation within a generally peaceful society of nations requires us to face problems of world public order we have long preferred to take for granted or to ignore. Peace is not a political condition which just happens. It is not even the natural state of international society. On the contrary, peace is a system, based on accepted rules and the essential cooperation of the great powers in enforcing those rules generally and fairly. It must be achieved by the sustained effort of governments. Peace will be restored only if we and our allies actively encourage it, nurture it, and enforce it by devising and carrying out policies of global and regional stability and persuading the nations that in the nuclear world there can be no real alternative to the principle of mutual restraint in international affairs.

To pursue such policies effectively, we must create the objective conditions for peace—the articulation of clear goals for our foreign and defense policies, and the organization of strong regional coalitions to see that those goals are fulfilled. To that end, the administration has revitalized the policy of containment which has been the bipartisan cornerstone of U.S. foreign and defense policy since 1947. The President and the Congress together are moving vigorously to rebuild our military forces, to strengthen our alliances, and to forge new relationships with other nations which share our concern about the threat to world public order posed by the Soviet Union and its satellites, its proxies, and its proteges. Our allies are taking important steps to enhance their contribution to our program of collective security. As this committee knows very well, diplomacy without force behind it is impotent. With the world in disarray, peace can be achieved only by deterring or stopping aggression, not by wishing it away.

Our problem today is to define the role of arms control in the quest for peace. As Secretary Haig said on July 14, "The search for sound arms control agreements should be an essential element of our program for achieving and maintaining peace." That sentence, along with the arms control principles the Secretary spelled out in his Foreign Policy Association speech, provides a clear compass for our policy in negotiating arms control agreements, and a standard for judging arms control agreements when they are reached.

Negotiations must never be allowed to decouple us from our allies or to interfere with the process of restoring the military balance. The instructions to our negotiators will make it clear that agreement, however desirable, should rest on the bedrock of what is necessary to carry out the national strategic policy objectives of the United States. It has sometimes seemed that we have put the cart before the horse by allowing arms control considerations to influence our policy with regard to weapons procurement and even strategy. This is a risk we must guard against at all costs, particularly as the pressures of Soviet arms control propaganda increase. Sound strategic planning must not be sacrificed on the altar of SALT, or as we are now beginning to call it, START.

At the threshold we face the dilemma which has haunted arms control negotiations from the beginning: The United States and the Soviet Union have different policies with regard to the nuclear weapon and different objectives in negotiations about possible agreements to limit the mad spiral of nuclear arms accumulation. The two nations have similar interests in opposing nuclear weapons proliferation, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was not exceptionally difficult to negotiate. This has not been the case with the SALT agreements, as we all know. Unless the Soviet Union comes to accept a different philosophy about the objectives of its foreign policy and the role of the nuclear weapon in world politics, we can anticipate a stormy time in the negotiations now before us about long-range theater nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.

U.S. doctrine is that the goals of our nuclear forces are deterrence and stability. Our nuclear arsenal exists to make certain that neither the Soviet Union nor any other country could use or brandish nuclear weapons in world politics for aggressive purposes. Our purpose is to maintain a credible second strike capability so that the United States, its allies, and its vital interests are protected at all time against nuclear attack or the threat of nuclear attack. With an assured second strike capability, we should be able to use military force in defense of our interests if it should become necessary to do so, not only in Europe but in many other strategically critical parts of the world as well.

In my view—and here I speak for the President—this is and must remain the minimal goal of our nuclear arsenal and our minimal goal in nuclear arms negotiations.

The Soviet Union has not yet adopted this position. On the contrary, the mission of its nuclear forces is intimidation and coercion, and if necessary, victory in a nuclear war. The Soviet Union has been building one nuclear weapon system after another in an obvious effort not only to equal but to surpass the United States and thus to paralyze the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Achieving such a position, they believe, and say, would permit them to expand their domain almost at will, using covert methods of subversion or conventional forces under the protective cover of what they consider to be superiority in nuclear arms.

During the SALT period, the Soviet Union made great progress toward this end. I need not recite the litany of new weapons deployed by the Soviets in the last 10 years. In general terms, the most threatening features of this buildup have been the massive increase in hard-target-kill-capable ICBM reentry vehicles, the growth in the desructive potential of Soviet strategic forces as a whole, the deployment of mobile, highly accurate and MIRVed long range theater nuclear forces, and the continued development of their already extensive strategic air defenses.

The United States failed to respond adequately to the Soviet buildup, partly because we placed excessive faith in arms control as a solution for our strategic problems. As a result, two legs of our strategic Triad are now threatened: the survivability of American ICBM's to a Soviet first strike is in question, and bomber penetration of the Soviet Union will be assured only by a vigorous U.S. modernization effort. In addition, large scale Soviet SS–20 deployments threaten Europe and the Far East, and if unanswered, would increase the hazards to NATO of resistance to Soviet aggression. The Soviets now lead the United States in important measures of strategic strength, leads which translate into coercive power through perceptions of American weakness.

The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed not at strategic stability, but at strategic instability. Soviet strategic programs are designed to threaten the survivability of our strategic forces. This emphasis in Soviet military doctrine and action is in itself a repudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction which many Americans thought both sides had adopted in 1972. The Soviet lead in heavy and accurate ICBM's capable of destroying a large part of our nuclear ICBM force in a first strike undermines the basis for reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a situation is a recipe for nuclear blackmail. It is no accident that one now hears discussion of such disturbing options as launch-on-warning of missile attack.

What are the broader effects of this buildup and of the delayed American response to it? I believe the Soviet strategic buildup operates on two levels: first, on a day-to-day basis, the Soviet drum acts on the collective psyche of the United States and its friends and allies. There is great fear abroad, not only of nuclear war but of American inadequacies and ultimately of abandonment by the United States.

This fear cannot be diminished if the Soviets run while we continue to walk.

Second, the Soviets may feel emboldened to undertake more conventional force aggression, like their invasion of Afghanistan, secure in the belief that their strategic forces can checkmate ours. Certainly Soviet behavior in recent years suggests that their pursuit of strategic instability has had its predictable consequences: unprecedented risk-taking and aggression in conventional and covert conflict. Given the global nature of our foreign policy interests, and local Soviet conventional superiority in certain areas, strategic instability is a very dangerous condition. It matters little, after all, if the Soviets turn out to be wrong about the American response to nuclear blackmail; a devastating conflict could result just the same.

Third, the Soviets have had little incentive to negotiate arms reduction. They view the SALT process as having been enormously successful—at least in the short term.

The situation I have just sketched has not developed suddenly, but has grown day by day throughout the SALT period. Neither the SALT II Treaty nor cosmetic amendments to it would have changed the situation. Somewhere along the way we lost our bearings and forgot what we wanted from arms control. Not only did we accept greater threats to our forces, but we agreed to ceilings and definitions that would permit the Soviets far greater capabilities against us than now exist. We settled for superficial limitations while the threat grew by leaps and bounds.

In this situation, what is our posture toward arms control negotiations? Obviously the profound changes in the strategic environment since 1972 require the United States to review the arms control policies which have failed and to devise new ones better adapted to the world as it is. That process of review is now going on throughout the executive branch, under forced draft. Some of the issues are complex. We are working on new measures of destructive power to replace deployed launchers as the counting unit of the new agreements; we are trying to solve the riddle of verification; and we are tackling a number of other fundamental issues. A review of this character takes time. I can assure you that I am doing everything I can to speed it along.

At the same time, the President and Congress together are making the decisions to restore our deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. These decisions are indispensable in themselves from the point of view of security. Moreover, fair and balanced arms control agreements would be inconceivable without them.

I might add a word here on the much mooted subject of linkage. President Reagan has not laid down particular criteria of Soviet behavior as a precondition for negotiations. He has instructed us to approach arms control only as a vital problem in foreign policy and national security through which we and the Soviet Union might jointly stabilize our relations and contribute to the restoration of world public order. In his Foreign Policy Association speech, Secretary Haig pointed out that certain forms of Soviet behavior directly affect the possibility for success in arms control. For example, in 1968, when I last was in the Government, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, and President Johnson canceled a trip to Moscow to discuss strategic arms limitation, among other things. Under the circumstances, it would have been unthinkable for the President to go. As Secretary Haig remarked, this kind of linkage is a fact of life.

That problem aside, the linkage we seek between Soviet behavior and arms control should not be merely a transitory or isolated Soviet action, the sight of a dove on the troubled waters or the visits of Russian ballet companies to American cities, but the restoration of world order sustained by deterrence. The process of seeking arms control agreements could and should play a positive part in that effort.

No arms control agreement can contribute to the goal of a peaceful world order unless we have confidence that the Soviet Union is abiding by its terms. We must insure that arms control limitations are verifiable. The problem of verification is fundamental to meaningful progress on arms control. Reciprocal restraints can only be induced if each party has confidence that the other is indeed reciprocating. But the scale and complexity of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the changing technology of nuclear weapons are pushing us to the limits of national technical means of verification. The Soviet leadership must understand that their secrecy about weapons production and deployment is counterproductive. The cat and mouse game must end.

The Soviet Union is now our equal—at least—in military strength. If they cannot be more forthcoming given the present correlation of forces, it is difficult to imagine what level of military superiority would be required to induce more cooperation. We are considering the possibility of early discussions with the Soviets on general principles of behavior in arms control verification and compliance matters. These would not be negotiations, but talks looking to agreements further down the line, perhaps as part of the START agreements. And we have undertaken a fundamental review of the technical aspects of verification, monitoring, and compliance in relation to existing and prospective arms controls agreements.

At this stage, I can offer two principles which will guide our thinking on verification. First, we shall not confine ourselves to negotiating only about aspects of the problem which can be detected by national technical means. We shall begin by devising substantive limitations that are strategically significant, and then construct the set of measures necessary to insure verifiability. These measures may well include procedures of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as detailed data exchanges and provisions to enhance our confidence in data obtained by national technical means. Second, we shall seek verification provisions which not only insure that actual threats to our security resulting from possible violations can be detected in a timely manner, but also limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing. Ambiguity can never be eliminated entirely, but we shall do our best to keep it to a minimum. Ambiguous provisions result in compliance questions, and compliance questions, even if ultimately resolved, strain the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.

Given the importance of verification for the viability of arms control across the board, Soviet willingness to consider cooperative measures to improve the verifiability of specific limitations may be a litmus test of their commitment to serious limitations.

An important element of our review of American arms control policy will be to set priorities among our objectives so that specific approches and goals for the next agreements can be advised.

We shall be analyzing several arms control issues in the months ahead using these principles as our guidelines. On theater nuclear forces, the substantive position we are developing is consistent with our requirements. It is important to move ahead quickly in order to meet the threat of Soviet Backfire s and SS-20's.

On SALT, or I should say START, the weapons systems necessarily covered are more varied, the technical issues associated with them are more complex, and there is a close relationship between our arms control posture and weapon procurement decisions not yet made, such as the MX and a new strategic bomber. I continue to hope and expect that our preliminary discussions with the Soviets will culminate in negotiations by early next spring.

But in my view, there is little to be gained and much to be lost by haste in this area. We ought neither to rush to the table nor rush to an agreement. Once talks begin, we must be prepared to negotiate persistently and patiently and not raise expectations or rapid progress.

I should note other arms control areas in which study is underway within ACDA and the Government as a whole. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty have been signed but not ratified for 7 and 5 years respectively. While all options are being considered, I personally believe we should either request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify these agreements or return to the negotiating table soon if some changes are deemed necessary. I believe there is merit in these treaties, and that we should move forward on them.

The ABM Treaty review is scheduled for 1982. We will be taking a particularly close look at the agreement in light of the ICBM basing mode deicision when it is reached. I should urge caution, however, on those who favor a precipitous withdrawal from the agreement.

Antisatellite arms control is also under review. There were three rounds of negotiations in the previous administration, and some progress was made toward an agreement. We are reviewing the net affects of an ASAT agreement and studying the verification questions in this complex and novel field.

The underlying basis of our nonproliferation policy cannot be different from that in other areas of our foreign policy. Our watchwords again are stability and reciprocal restraint in the peaceful pursuit of world public order. The President's statement on non-proliferation issued on July 16 makes this clear.

First, as the President said, we must attempt to address the underlying motivations which are driving a number of nations to consider acquiring nuclear explosives. Regional instabilities and the general deterioration of the international environment have contributed significantly to the insecurities that lead states to flirt with the nuclear explosive option. Unless we, our allies, and other nations move decisively to restore world public order both generally and regionally, there is little or no chance over the long run to prevent nuclear proliferation on a large scale. In this context, we are examining the possibilities of encouraging the negotiation of a treaty which would make the Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone. It seems to have a great deal of promise, and we are giving it a high priority on our agenda.

Second, there must be international norms and guidelines that can provide reasonable assurance that countries are not acquiring nuclear explosives, and that nuclear programs are not being used for such purposes. While these safeguards can never be perfect and will always need improvement, they deter most nations from seriously considering the nuclear weapons option, and they give us early warning of developments in the other direction. We must move vigorously in this area. Without such a regime, the possibility of proliferation will undermine American efforts to restore stability.

In this regard, the President has declared our continued support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and strengthened IAEA safeguards. In addition, the principal nuclear supplier nations must further improve cooperation in restraining commercial exports, with particular emphasis on regions of instability, to insure that exports of nuclear technologies do not contribute to the risk of proliferation.

Last, the President declared that reestablishing the United States as a reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation is essential to our nonproliferation goals. Our ability to gain support and to exercise influence in this critical area will diminish if we do not remain an active and responsible supplier of the nuclear programs of other countries.

The President's statement reflects the continuity of our policy in its emphasis on the importance of nonproliferation as one of the critical challenges facing the United States in international affairs.

The Soviet Union continues to make arms control an important feature of its unremitting worldwide propaganda and disinformation campaign against us. Countering that campaign must be an important aspect of ACDA's work, in close cooperation with ICA and other agencies of the Government. You will all recall the case of the enhanced radiation warhead, the so-called neutron bomb, a few years ago. The Soviet Union scored a stunning propaganda victory in that episode, and a very damaging one. It did not deserve its victory. The Soviet argument was ridiculous. But our response was inadequate and they prevailed. I have the neutron bomb affair very much in mind when I read Soviet propaganda to the effect that the United States is unwilling to negotiate arms control agreements, and is seeking nuclear war. I can promise you, I think, that we shall not be outdone again on this front.

To strengthen the prospects for success in establishing peace, reaching useful arms control agreements, and minimizing the spread of nuclear weapons, it is essential that the Congress continue its support of the military budget proposed by President Reagan. The executive and legislative branches should continue their partnership in rebuilding America's Armed Forces. Weapons systems procurement must not be delayed for arms control negotiations or vice versa. We cannot hope to achieve the promise of peace without the discipline of power and perseverance. We shall need both. We must be strong enough to convince the Soviet Union that its best course is to respect the fundamental rules dealing with the international use of force, and to embark on a cooperative effort at arms reductions.

The Soviet Union is now engaged in a vicious and cynical campaign of propaganda and intimidation. It is aimed at separating the United States from its allies and derailing Western rearmament programs. It shall not succeed. We do not accept the responsibility for the current sorry state of United States-Soviet relationships. The Soviet Union bears that responsibility. They invaded Afghanistan; they continue to threaten intervention in Poland; they support aggressive and unacceptable actions through their surrogates. The Soviet Union has continued to build weapons—at every level—while we have exercised restraint.

The Sovites must be made to see that their future is better and more secure under a regime of reciprocal restraint and international order. If we can succeed, and with your help we can, then we shall reverse the long history of disappointment with the results of arms control negotiations. Our goal will be to subordinate the international use of force and the arms race to the rule of law, and to induce respect for the rules of reciprocal restraint in world affairs. The ACDA statute makes it the duty of the agency to provide impetus toward the goal of achieving a world political system in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law. The pressures of nuclear reality are inexorably pressing the nations to realize that the rule of law is the only possible way they can assure their own security and the future of mankind. As my whole career attests, I find the mandate of the ACDA statute altogether congenial.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, you made a very fine statement. I am sure that we all appreciate your presence here and the contributions you have made in this important position to which you have been appointed.

I have a few questions. You have covered, I think, a great many of them, but the answers you can make very brief so we can move on. We will just take about 10 minutes apiece and rotate and wait.

Mr. Rostow, just briefly, what are your goals as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and what do you hope to accomplish in that job?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, to carry on the program that is laid before me to successful completion; to supervise the negotiation of a new strategic arms agreement, to replace the interim agreement of 1972 and the SALT II Treaty that failed, hopefully with a more realistic treaty that would provide greater assurance of stability and arms reduction; to help solve the problem of theater nuclear weapons on which we are now facing negotiations before the end of this year; to complete a treaty for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East along the lines of the suggestions made by Israel and Egypt a year or so ago; and above all, to maintain the unity of the alliance, to have the process of discussing these complex issues of nuclear weapons and weaponry consolidate our alliances rather than divide them. That, I would say, would be my hopes for the next 4 years.

Senator THURMOND. Some of us were very strongly opposed to the SALT II Treaty. We felt it was an unequal treaty. I presume from what you said—and I am very pleased with your position—that you will not consider that your goal is just to get a treaty, but to get an equal treaty.

Mr. ROSTOW. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I was very active in the opposition to SALT II, and I agree with what you have just said. We want a treaty that will be balanced, equal, verifiable, contribute to stability, and contribute to the possibility of developing cooperative relations between the United States and the Soviet Union rather than worsening those relations.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what is present U.S. policy on abiding by or not acting inconsistent with the SALT I and SALT II Treaties?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, the present U.S. policy in this regard is that we will not take actions inconsistent with those treaties so long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraint. This is not a requirement of law, but it is a requirement of commonsense in this period—that is, we are not going to rock the boat while there is hope for profitable negotiations in the future, and the Soviet Union seems to be following the same course.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what is the status of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, those treaties have been signed but not ratified. They are before the Senate technically. We are reviewing them. We may recommend some modifications, some amendments, or it may be that the final governmental position will be to recommend their ratification. But I myself regard it as a matter of some urgency to move forward and either modify and ratify the treaties, or simply to ratify them as they stand. I cannot now predict the outcome of consideration within the Government on this subject, but I can assure you that the question is being very actively considered, and that an answer will be forthcoming quite soon.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, can you very briefly give us a summary of your view of how well the Soviet Union has complied with arms control procedures and agreements thus far?

Mr. ROSTOW. There are very grave questions about compliance. Of course, the detailed issues are taken up in the SCC, and those are kept secret. I will be glad to go into them in executive session. But in general, I would say that the compliance record and the verification problem leave grave questions in our minds, and that is one of the reasons why I am putting so much stress in my approach to the problem on the verification issue, and why we are considering talks on the subject with the Soviet Union.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, in your prepared statement you say the Soviets have had little incentive to negotiate serious arms reductions. How do you believe the United States can best provide an incentive for serious arms reductions?

Mr. ROSTOW. First, by a clear and formal commitment by the Congress and the President to restoring the nuclear balance, to restoring our second strike capability beyond any peradventure of doubt, and by restoring the conventional forces needed to deter conventional force aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and proxies; by building a coalition of nations to restore the vitality of our old foreign policy of containment so as to maintain the balance of power in the world, and to make it clear that there really is no alternative to a policy of returning, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, to the rule of respect for the rules of the Charter of the United Nations against aggression. I think it is only through strength that we shall be able to achieve that goal, strength plus a sympathetic, conciliatiory, but very firm diplomacy.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what is the status of preparations for the ABM Treaty Review Conference?

Mr. ROSTOW. They are in the preliminary stage of active bureaucratic study.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what do you believe to be the key issues in antisatellite treaty negotiations?

Mr. ROSTOW. This is a very complex affair. I think we first have to make up our minds where our national interests and strategic interests lie and what the implications of any possible development in that area may be. I would say at this stage I am not prepared to indicate a position in either direction.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what do you believe are the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty?

Would you prefer to answer that for the record?

Mr. ROSTOW. I think perhaps.

Senator THURMOND. I thought you might wish to answer that for the record.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; I would be glad to.

Senator THURMOND. All right.

We will proceed now to questions.

Senator JEPSEN. Excuse me, would the Senator yield?

Would the Chairman tell us what your plans are with regard to voting.

Senator THURMOND. We will stop at the 5-minute bell and come back immediately and continue with others who may have questions.

Senator JEPSEN. So we will stop and go vote as a group and come back as a group.

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

If anyone wishes to go ahead and vote now and come back, he could chair the hearing for the rest, but if he doesn't do that, then we will continue as I stated.

Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rostow, I wish to join the others in congratulating you on a very sound statement with which I totally agree.

However, there is one exception, I feel, in your statement that should be addressed this morning, and we talked about it earlier, namely, that the essentials to successful achievement of an arms control agreement are the resolve of the President, namely, to go forward with those programs to provide stability, and you acknowledge at this time there is a destabilized situation. Assuming that the President will continue to seek such programs and that the Congress will lend the necessary support in authorizing and appropriating the funds for those programs. That support will constitute a critical component of our arms control negotiating posture. As you know, we have several weighty decisions coming up on the necessity to strengthen the strategic Triad, both in terms of land based systems and the air-breathing systems reflected by a new manned bomber.

It seems to me that there is a second essential element, and that is the necessity for the Nation as a whole, the people, to lend their support, and that support really comes in two ways: First, concurring in the Presidential and congressional decisions with reference to the arms program and, second, the willingness to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of our economy to provide for those weapons systems.

Thus far, I detect across the land that willingness is present, and we, the United States, have an industrial base and an economy which is far superior to that of the Soviets. And as we look down the road in terms of the means by which to establish this ability, those of us who have considered and studied these new systems in detail recognize we are heading in a certain parallel course where, as we leapfrog; each nation has the ability to almost parallel the other in terms of either a defensive system or, in the case of the Soviets, a new offensive capability.

Take, for example, the recent press coverage on the possibility of utilizing an air-launched type of MX system. In my judgment, the Soviets could quickly build up a capability whereby they could drop a warhead on each airfield which could accommodate a plane of the magnitude needed for an air-launched system and in that way within a short period of time build in their form of deterrence to that type of a system, which leads me to the conclusion that this race as such, this arms race is predicated on the relative capability economically of the two countries to compete.

Would you address your thoughts on the economics as they relate to arms control?

Mr. **Rostow**. I agree with the thrust of your statement altogether, Senator Warner. It is clear that these more and more complicated, more and more expensive systems proliferating in different directions make not only national will and technology in each country an ultimate element in the possibility of success, but also economic strength. These systems are enormously expensive. And we can see their implications in some of the defense decisions being made around the world, and those implications highlight the central significance of the nuclear weapon and other highly advanced technological weapons as tremendously significant factors not only in war, but in diplomacy. The British Government decision recently to cut back on the Royal Navy in order to maintain its nuclear weapons is a dramatic illustration of this fact.

So I think the significance of the decisions now in train in the United States, attempting to put a cap on inflation, attempting to control the rate of growth of the welfare state on the one hand, and at the same time, to increase our defense budget, will have and should have an enormous impact. In an economic race, of course, we certainly can win.

Senator **Warner**. Let me address a possible scenario which I have considered, namely, in order to redress the issue of destabilization, we do go forward with a total commitment, possibly——

Senator **Thurmond**. Excuse me just a minute, Senator. Would you preside? The 5-minute bell just rang.

Senator **Warner** [presiding]. I would be happy to. Fine, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Thurmond**. And if you wish to stop and vote, we will just take a recess at your convenience.

Senator **Warner**. I shall do that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Let me go back to the beginning of my second question, and that is a scenario that I have given consideration to, namely, that this Nation goes forward with those programs necessary to correct the destabilization that now exists. Possibly some modified form of the MX land-based system would be adopted or, perhaps, we would opt to strengthen our sea-based system, together with a manned bomber program.

Is it not conceivable that we could be midway in those programs, at a point where stabilization is achieved, and it would become the judgment of the President and the Congress, presumably yourself, that we could stop those programs and incur savings providing that agreement was achieved?

Mr. Rostow. It is certainly possible, or not impossible, I should say.

Senator Warner. In other words, as long as we have the resolve and the commitment to go forward and thereby giving you the strengthened hand to show the resolve of this country, it could be that we are halfway through the program, stabilization is achieved, and we could stop?

Mr. Rostow. Certainly.

Senator Warner. I think that is an important option.

At this time the committee will take a recess until such time as the members return.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Warner. I will complete my questioning. I was exploring with you the area or the possibility of this Nation not having to complete the full programs now envisioned, namely, for the manned bomber as well as the possible new system for land-based missiles and the strengthening of the sea-based. I want to make it very clear—and I draw on your own statement where you point out that in the past in anticipation of an arms agreement we have stopped beforehand doing those things which were essential to maintain stability. Certainly in my question I wanted to make it clear that we had to achieve stability, particularly in the judgment of those who are responsible for making the technical evaluation, namely, the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department.

But it is conceivable that we could reach a point in both programs, or three, if it becomes necessary, at which time an agreement comes into fruition establishing numerical limits, which limits are less than the original program as envisioned. Take for a rough example, we talk in terms of 100 B-1's. It could be that we would reach an agreement whereby 50 would be sufficient to stabilize the situation, and therefore we provide in the agreement and that program could come to an earlier termination, and likewise with the ground-based missile, because I am deeply concerned, as I go into the analysis of the systems, it is just a parallel situation and a leapfrog unless we achieve some type of arms control. Each time we plan something they now have the technical capability to match it. Of course, there is the doubt that they have the economic capability to match it.

Thank you very much, unless you have further comment on that observation?

Mr. Rostow. The only comment that occurs to me, Senator Warner, is that there is rejoicing in heaven when the sinner repents.

Senator Warner. Thank you.

Well, I am deeply concerned about the impact of these new defense budgets on our overall social programs and our ability to provide a quality of life for our citizens which they deserve. Yet we may have to make that sacrifice until such time as you are successful.

Thank you.

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rostow, as I understand it, a condition precedent to undertaking negotiations with the Soviets in this area would be a series of talks first.

Will those talks determine when negotiations would get under way?

I assume that their attitude on the various points that you have made in your excellent statement would determine what is going to happen in terms of actual negotiations.

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not think the talks to which I referred about verification and data should be characterized as conditions precedent. We are taking the view that of course there are certain kinds of events which would preclude talks, but that, as Secretary Haig said, is simply a fact of life, and I gave as an illustration the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

But apart from that, we want to proceed to the talks as quickly as we can once we have solved the intellectual problems that are involved and done the necessary consultations.

Senator JACKSON. Talks or negotiations?

Mr. ROSTOW. Negotiations.

Senator JACKSON. You see, I think——

Mr. ROSTOW. No, no, I understand. Excuse me. I misspoke.

Senator JACKSON. Right.

Mr. ROSTOW. We are proceeding on the assumption that we will move toward negotiations as fast as we can, assuming that the political climate does not as a matter of fact preclude them, as rapidly as we can be ready for them, and try to resolve these questions not in advance of negotiations but through the process, the entire process of negotiation and its surrounding diplomacy.

But I want to be very clear in what I said in my statement about linkage. We were not making conditions precedent.

Senator JACKSON. I was very much interested, and obviously I think it is indeed the most important point right now, your statement that the Soviet Union continues to make arms control an important feature of is unremitting worldwide propaganda and disinformation campaign against us.

It seems to me, Dr. Rostow, that the biggest problem that we face with our allies, that we face with the talks and eventual negotiations, is a political problem. Unless the political problem is solved, we are not going to get very far, in my view. The Soviets have been able to convince our friends in western Europe that the SS-20 is not a threat but cruise missiles, which are subsonic, not ballistic, which carry a much smaller payload, as you know, and the new neutron warhead are a threat.

Therein I think lies one of the fundamental problems that we face in negotiations with the Soviets, and it seems to me that we need a political strategy before we can have credible talks and then negotiations. Unless we lick that problem, I think the obvious frustrations that are going to occur in the actual talks are altogether too obvious.

Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I entirely agree——

Senator JACKSON. I do not want to get into details on what that political strategy should be, but that is a realistic challenge to us, and they have done a tremendous job convincing our allies, and in many areas neutralizing large segments of the European public.

Mr. ROSTOW. I fully agree with you about the gravity of the situation. I am trying to devote as much time as I can both to planning that political program and to participating in it, and the only caveat I would enter is that I do not think that the governments of our allies have been neutralized. I think large sectors of European opinion and large sectors of our own opinion, reacting with very natural fear to the intensification of anxiety about war, have been seeking desperately for some way out. They want to be sure that their governments are doing everything possibe to prevent war and to protect our interests without war, and so there is a heightening of concern both in Europe and in the United States and in other countries about these implications of the pressures of Soviet policy.

But I would not take quite so pessimistic a view as your question implied about the stability of European governmental opinion. It seems to be firm and steady despite the increase in these pressures.

Senator JACKSON. Well, would you not agree, though, that there has been some erosion in the last 2 or 3 years as far as the strong support that we had, for example, to deploy cruise missiles and the neutron warhead, and the attitude about nuclear-free zones? You have it coming out now. I am not talking about the heads of state; they are affected by their own political party.

Mr. ROSTOW. No question about that.

Senator JACKSON. As you know, in the Social Democratic parties in particular, the tail is wagging the dog. The far left, a very small percentage, is making foreign policy, I regret to say.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, that certainly is not true in France where the——

Senator JACKSON. Oh, well, that was just a recent development, but we have got a real problem in Holland.

Mr. ROSTOW. Oh, yes, indeed.

Senator JACKSON. Germany, Denmark, and Norway.

I mention these things because, you know, the Soviets have established a certain element of confidence in their ability to influence the negotiating process in those countries, and clearly they have had a conscious policy that I have seen just checking around a little bit, to achieve that goal of softening them up. You have a lot of the religious groups who are now out pushing hard for, in effect, unilateral disarmament.

I mention these things because it is all a part, Mr. Chairman, of arms control, and the need to direct an effort here that will reach the people of those countries.

In this connection, I think we should be on the offensive on arms reductions, challenge the Soviets as to whether they are really for peace when they want these big arms buildups and we want reductions, and that we are willing to take those savings and dedicate a part of the savings to help the poor and the downtrodden in the third world—I think we have missed the political boat here several times—and challenge the Soviets directly on the issue of arms reductions.

I think we need that kind of an offensive. Obviously they must be mutual, they must be equal, verifiable, all those things. But make the thrust of it to get a lowering of the threshold of violence.

As you know, some of us advocated for the previous administration, they made one small proposal and then retreated, but we should lay it on the table and be willing to engage in a protracted discussion with them and with the people of the world, and that way I think we could do more on the political side than any one thing that would dramatize the issue.

Obviously while we are doing all those things we must close the gap in a number of important strategic systems. But it seems to me that we really must concentrate on a more effective and credible political strategy.

Mr. ROSTOW. I entirely agree with you, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Dr. Rostow for a very fine statement. I see my time is up.

Senator WARNER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to pick up on what Senator Jackson was saying, and you referred to in your statement that there is this growing perception that any treaty is better than no treaty at all. This is very difficult to argue, in particular with people saying that a SALT Treaty, an arms control treaty connotes peace. And I know that is not necessarily the case.

Could you share with us some of what Senator Jackson is talking about, your political strategy as we proceed toward arms negotiations, not only with the Soviet Union but also our articulation of that policy around the world, how we are going to counteract the very successful propaganda engagement by the Soviet Union, in particular with our European allies and a lot of people here at home. I would be interested in some of the political strategy which is, I think, very, very important, on how we pursue our arms control policy.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, there are two levels, there are two categories of political strategy that I have been stressing—and the only previous formal statement I made was in my confirmation hearings a few weeks ago in the Foreign Relations Committee—in this, the statement we prepared for today's hearings, and in my interviews with the press. The first level is diplomatic, the importance of a full restoration of the policy of containment, along with other elements of a coherent foreign policy, and backing of that through regional coalitions around the world, that is, the development of our diplomacy to restabilize world politics, the foreign policy that we pursued on a bipartisan basis from the end of the 1940's until the turbulence of Vietnam; second, on the propaganda and public education information front, to do exactly what Senator Jackson was talking about, to devise themes that would not be defensive but would be entirely factual and realistic and would emphasize the shortcomings of the Soviet side in the process of explaining our policy. They are attempting to blame us, and we want to bring out the various ways in which they have been treating the arms control negotiating process with total cynicism as a device for furthering or permitting their expansion.

Now, so far I have been emphasizing the importance of the verification problem and of the data problem in trying to bring out the fact that the Soviet Union has been totally uncooperative in those areas until very recently. We have negotiated these agreements on the basis of data we ourselves supplied. The man in the street understands very well that there is something profoundly wrong with that. He would not buy a car or a horse or a farm on that basis if the seller said, well, you provide the data and then we can make a deal.

There has been a beginning of change. The NATO Council called, in its Rome meeting recently, for further change in that direction on the part of the Soviet Union, but both the verification and the data problem, it seems to me, offer excellent opportunities for public education in which we would not be on the defensive.

Now, in fact, the way in which the Soviet arsenal has built up and with the forms of Soviet actions and their implications, we have to keep explaining anyway.

But there are great problems in it. I am not an expert by any means in information and I will work with ICA and the other information agencies in and near the Government to carry this message. But as I said in my prepared statement, I have the experience of the neutron bomb very much in mind, and I do not want to have that repeated.

Senator QUAYLE. Switching from defensive to offensive, you mentioned education and communication. As we move to an offensive nature in saying, OK, if you are serious about arms control, you know, here is what has to be done. Containment, linkage, certain limitations, do you envision as going on the offensive an action having a proposal, a specific proposal to the Soviet Union in the area of arms limitation that would be a talking point that we could refer to in a psychological or a propaganda campaign, to say all right, here is our proposal, and if they are serious about arms limitation, by golly, these one, two, three, four, five conditions have got to be met, period, and then we can convince our allies and the people in the world that we are the ones that are talking about the establishment of peace?

Mr. ROSTOW. No question about it. We must do that.

Senator QUAYLE. We must do that.

Mr. ROSTOW. We want it to be clear throughout that if there is any failure in this enterprise, it will not be through the unwillingness of the United States to consider and agree to a fair and balanced and verifiable proposal. And we will exercise our imaginations to try to develop such proposals.

Of course, the process of negotiation will be secret, but it cannot be, and it should not be totally secret. And certainly the broad lines of our approaches will be made public. They will have to be.

Senator QUAYLE. Is there any timetable estimate on when the framework of our proposal would be made public and we could go not only to the American people but also to our allies to underscore what we are doing?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, we have two dates that have been mentioned—the NATO commitment to begin the Theater Nuclear Weapons talks this year, which will be met, and the various estimates about when strategic negotiations can begin as far as we are concerned. I made an estimate of 9 months during my hearings late in June. I said that was not a promise, it was not a deadline, it was an expectation, it was a hope. I used every word I could think of to hedge it, but nonetheless it became a pretty important number. And I still think that number is realistic. It is, of course, about 8 months from now. But it will take that length of time or something close to that length of time to work out these problems and to devise the kind of solid and well-considered position that we should have before we come back in.

Senator QUAYLE. So you are saying basically next spring sometime there will be forthcoming a well-thought-out substantive proposal on the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. ROSTOW. Certainly the principles of it will inevitably be explained to the public.

Senator QUAYLE. You mentioned the verification. I have long been very skeptical of our ability to verify. I, as just one Senator, would hope that in the verification issue that comes up, that you would push for onsite inspection.

I know that it seems to be a no-no with the Soviet Union, but I mean, if we are going to verify, there is no way we can rely on—I mean, we have seen what happened in Iran, and what could be more fair and much more commonsense, hey, look, we will go over there and see what you have got and you come over here and see what we have.

So I would hope, as I said, as just one Senator, that we would really up front push this issue, and push it with our allies, and push it with the Soviet Union to say that this seems a very commonsense, reasonable approach.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, it certainly is on the agenda, and I certainly would not exclude it. And as I indicated in the first part of my statement today, the fact that the Soviet Union has been opposed to an approach doesn't mean that we should not advocate it.

Senator QUAYLE. Absolutely. You know, let them be on the defensive. Let them go ahead and oppose it. Let's take the offense and say, hey, look, they will not even agree to this.

I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Rostow.

Senator WARNER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rostow, General Rowny was before the committee just the other day, and I asked him about the reports in the press that he was worried about verification and the ability to verify through national technical means. And I know that you dwelt at some length on that in your statement, as well as your exchange with Senator Quayle.

Do you feel that any agreement we are likely to conclude can be verified by national technical means?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I cannot rule it out in advance, but as I said in the statement—and I have said frequently already in my short career in this job—we are approaching the limit, if we have not passed it, in many areas of what can be verified reliably by national technical means. National technical means simply are not adequate to verify missile production, for example, or the number of warheads actually on missiles. There are many things that are simply beyond the reach of our national technical means, no matter how sophisticated they are, and they are very sophisticated, so that they must be supplemented by cooperative measures, and we must spend a great deal of time and effort in trying to persuade the Soviet Union that their basic attitude on this subject is simply unacceptable. The issue has come up in a great many other negotiations. the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna and others. So it is not unique to the nuclear arms negotiations, but it is fundamental to everything, because after all, any such relationship of arms limitation, any attempt to stabilize the system depends in the end on trust.

Senator HUMPHREY. You say that the alternatives to verification through NTM are cooperative measures.

Can you be a little more explicit?

Mr. ROSTOW. No; I think I can't really be a little more explicit. As I recall it, General Rowny mentioned a few examples. There are some even in the SALT II Treaty of approaches that began to get beyond purely national technical means. There are a good many forms of cooperation. I think once the principle is accepted, many will occur. It is Soviet resistance to the principle of cooperation in this field that has so far been the blocking point.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do these cooperative measures extend beyond data exchanges?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me focus on the area of data exchanges. That is what it seems to imply.

Can we trust the Soviets to give us reliable data?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, the data they give us has to be compatible with the data we accumulate through our national technical means.

Senator HUMPHREY. But there are some data that we cannot accumulate through our national technical means.

Mr. ROSTOW. There are indeed some data we cannot accumulate.

Senator HUMPHREY. In which case, are we prepared to rely on the Soviets' word?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, not at the present time, no, not until that change of heart to which I referred occurs, the repentance.

Senator HUMPHREY. That seems to leave only onsite inspection. Is that an active——

Mr. ROSTOW. I am not by any means excluding onsite inspection; but onsite inspection itself in some perspectives is not adequate. Which sites?

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, presumably we would have to have open access.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I am glad to hear that the administration is considering that as an alternative. It seems increasingly the only reliable means of verification.

I was interested in your statement on revitalizing the concept of the policy of containment.

What steps have been made or will be made to revitalize containment, and of course, there is a new element here that when the policy of containment was formerly in being, we did not have this surrogate business that we have today.

How would this new policy of containment deal with that?

Mr. ROSTOW. I went into that aspect of it at considerable length in the statement I prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee on my confirmation, and I thought I would spare you the detailed exposition of that. It takes quite a few pages.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I must confess I have not read it, but I will.

Mr. ROSTOW. I would be happy to answer your question.

The policy of containment as it developed historically in the late 1940's, and then under each of the succeeding Presidents of both parties, was part of and was indeed the cornerstone of a comprehensive foreign policy that had economic elements, political elements, and always a quest for nuclear control. That is, from the beginning, our foreign policy included one chapter on seeking to limit nuclear arms and to prevent nuclear war, and we began in the late 1940's and continued, despite all rebuffs, to try to bring the nuclear weapon under control and to eliminate it as a menace to humanity.

Now, that policy went through a period of turbulence and uncertainty after Vietnam, but I think, and the administration thinks that we have recovered from that, and that it is the only realistic policy, the only policy that corresponds to our interests and to our nature as a society.

Now, it rests on the notion that there should be collective enforcement through regional groupings of the rules of the Charter of the United Nations against aggression, and there really is no other definition of détente that you can achieve. And indeed, unless these rules are reciprocally respected, unless they are respected by both sides, they are going to cease to have any influence at all on world politics. And it is that sense of descending toward chaos and anarchy that is so dominant a feature of public opinion about world affairs today. People know it, feel it, the writings reflect it, and that was the question I was addressing, and I think that the policy of the administration is to redress that and to move back toward establishing world peace, in the arresting phrase the President has used, "establishing" peace. Now the implication of "establishing" is that it is not here now.

And I used that as the theme of both this statement and the statement I made before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. I certainly wish you well in revitalizing this policy. It is going to be difficult because it seems to me you have mentioned these regional groupings, alliances, and so on, it is hard enough to persuade them to attend to their own defense or that of their region much less to worry about containing Soviet expansion. That is going to be a really difficult undertaking. And I would like to suggest that it is about time—I am getting out of your area, I know, but since it is in your statement, I would like to suggest that it is about time the United States started using, actively and vigorous propaganda, in our case truth and facts, to try to shape world events. It is not enough for you to testify or for someone else to issue a white paper or to give a speech before a foreign relations council somewhere, world affairs council or whatever. There has got to be a constant drum beat. We need to be as clever and as insidious, if you will, as the Soviets are in the use of communications.

Mr. ROSTOW. Not insidious, Senator, surely.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I think you understand what I mean.

Mr. ROSTOW. I do.

Senator HUMPHREY. What are your views on permitting unilateral interpretations of elements of arms agreements?

Mr. ROSTOW. We have had a very unfortunate history on that. It began with the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 when we made a unilateral interpretation of that treaty and told the Soviet Union that any statement or action on its part contradicting that interpretation would result in the abrogation of the treaty, the treaty would be dead. And that was on a very, very important issue, namely, that if a European political entity were formed, it would become a nuclear power by virtue of succession to the nuclear status of Britain and France, an extremely important issue obviously going to the heart of our relationship with our allies. The Soviet Union was silent, and the treaty was then ratified.

Now, it was that experience that led in 1972 to the practice of issuing unilateral interpretations of the interim agreement part of the SALT I package, and the Soviet Union simply went ahead and built the weapons that we said were contrary to our understanding of what the treaty meant, at least in spirit, so that was a very unfortunate setback, and against the background of that experience I should be opposed to any kind of unilateral interpretation dealing with matters involving both parties to the treaty, strongly opposed to it.

And that is why I said something about minimizing ambiguity. Certainly I would never try to perpetuate ambiguity in the context of our bitter experience in 1972 by doing it again.

Senator WARNER. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Rostow.

Senator WARNER. I have but one observation. Then I will turn to Senator Levin.

Mr. Rostow, in listening very carefully to the response to Senator Humphrey, you mentioned the word "trust," and I would like to get an elaboration of your concept of the use of that word in terms of arms control, and as you know, I have some modest experience in negotiating with the Soviets. Based on that and a lot of personal study, I, as a person, this one Senator, do not believe that any arms control agreement can be predicated on any element of mutual trust between these two nations whatsoever. Not only is the basic Soviet philosophy so opposed to ours, but also there is the constant change of the leadership in both nations, and therefore, in my judgment, the arms control agreement must stand squarely on the written text and not rely in any way on trust.

Do you disagree with that predicate?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, no. When I referred to trust, what I had in mind was change in policy achieved over a considerable period of time through an experience in cooperation, whether that cooperation was cooperation of necessity or cooperation of will.

Now, in my view, the nuclear arms problem is forcing the nations to contemplate the modes of coexistence, to use a word that the Soviet Union loves and uses in a very special sense. Cooperation is indispensable simply in order to survive. Out of that experience, maintained exactly the way you suggest, one can hope for trust because I said, or I hope I said that in the long run such arrangements exist on trust. I had in mind, for example, the relations between the United States and Canada, the United States and Mexico, a stormy history in the background, but gradually the building up of trust.

Senator WARNER. I am certain that you will carefully look at the record. It may well have been that my note was in error, and I thank you very much.

Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Rostow.

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree that different basing modes for the MX missile have different implications for arms control?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree that some of those basing modes make arms control negotiations, discussions, and successes more difficult than others, perhaps?

Mr. ROSTOW. No; I shouldn't suppose that. I thought you had in mind implications for ABM and that sort of thing.

Senator LEVIN. Including ABM.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Do different basing modes have different implications for arms control?

Mr. ROSTOW. Possibly, yes, of course they would, but I do not think they would make it necessarily more difficult, no. You see, we are already dealing with mobile missiles.

Senator LEVIN. Well, whether the implications can be categorized as more difficult, there are implications for arms controls of different modes.

Mr. ROSTOW. Surely.

Senator LEVIN. Have you made known to the Secretary of Defense and the President the implications for arms control of those various modes so that when they look at the MX basing question they can have the arms control inputs from you?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, not yet. I think when the Secretary has made his decision I shall present from the point of view of the Arms Control Agency the implications of those decisions before the President makes up his mind.

Senator LEVIN. Shouldn't the Secretary have the benefit of those implications?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, in a generic way—we do not know as yet what the Secretary is going to decide on the basis of various studies that have been made in the Defense Department and for the Defense Department.

Senator LEVIN. Shouldn't the Secretary have those implications in front of him when he is making his decision?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is the Secretary's choice. He has got enough complications now.

Senator LEVIN. You have not been asked for those.

Mr. ROSTOW. No; I have not participated in that process.

Senator LEVIN. You stated that we should comply with the terms of SALT, assuming reciprocal Soviet restraint.

Mr. ROSTOW. "Not take action inconsistent with."

Senator LEVIN. Not take action inconsistent with SALT, assuming reciprocal Soviet restraint, even though you opposed the SALT Treaty.

Mr. Rostow. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Do you see anything illogical about that?

Mr. Rostow. No.

Senator Levin. Would you recommend any action or have you recommended any action in your long and illustrious career, may I say, for strengthening the United States which was inconsistent with SALT?

Mr. Rostow. Yes.

Senator Levin. What would that action have been?

Mr. Rostow. Back in 1978 and 1979 I urged a quick-fix program for protecting the vulnerability of our ICBM system by the manufacture of a considerable number of Minuteman III missiles and their deployment in the shell game mode, which was inconsistent with SALT II.

Senator Levin. You are not recommending those now?

Mr. Rostow. It is not my function now.

Senator Levin. If you were asked, would you recommend that now?

Mr. Rostow. I have not made a study of the details of the problem since that period, and I am not up on the latest information in that field. I believed at that time, and I believe still, that that was an extremely promising way of closing the gap of vulnerability for our ICBM's.

Senator Levin. You indicated that negotiations must not be allowed to decouple us from our allies.

Mr. Rostow. Yes.

Senator Levin. Do you feel that lack of negotiations should not be allowed to decouple us from our allies?

Mr. Rostow. Surely.

Senator Levin. The statement has been made that there would have to be some mutual understanding with respect to progress on a solution to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan before new SALT talks could start.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Rostow. No; I was at some pains in my prepared statement to clarify the position about linkage in that regard.

Senator Levin. My understanding is that is what Secretary Haig said on the "Today Show." Is that not your understanding of his remarks?

Mr. Rostow. I didn't see him on the "Today Show," but I have his remarks on this subject in his speech in New York, and I discussed that with him yesterday, and he fully agrees with what I said here.

Senator Levin. So far as you are concerned, it is not Haig's position that there would have to be some mutual understanding with respect to progress on a solution to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan before new SALT talks could begin.

Mr. Rostow. That is my understanding. His view is that under some circumstances, the political behavior of the Soviet Union is simply a fact of life that will affect the SALT talks, and I gave as an illustration the situation in 1968 when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia.

Senator Levin. The fact of life statement I think I understand and could concur with without much difficulty. It is a fact of life.

Mr. Rostow. That, I think, is exactly what he said.

Senator LEVIN. But you are not excluding, and to your understanding Haig is not excluding the beginning of SALT talks until that point that I just defined relative to Afghanistan.

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not believe so. Of course, circumstances can change.

Senator LEVIN. But at this point he is not excluding it.

Mr. ROSTOW. No.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Are you familiar with the proposal which was made by Senators Laxalt and Garn relative to MX basing?

Mr. ROSTOW. I have seen it only in the newspapers. I have not pursued it in detail.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, we will send that along to you, if we could, and I would appreciate your reaction for the record relative to the ABM Treaty impact of that. Since you are not familiar with it, I will not ask you about that any further this morning.

Mr. ROSTOW. I would be glad to do that, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Senator LEVIN. I would appreciate, for the record, a statement on what impact the Garn-Laxalt proposals for alternatives to MX/MPS would have on the ABM Treaty.

Mr. ROSTOW. With regard to the deployment of 200 MX missiles in Minuteman III silos, the effectiveness of an ABM defense of MX in modified Minuteman III silos would be limited by the ABM Treaty. Deployment of more than 100 missile interceptors or more than 20 radars, changing the ABM location from the Grand Forks region, or making the ABM defense mobile would require ABM Treaty amendment.

With regard to setting a 1986 deadline for START, it is not clear that setting any specific deadline would be in the best interest of the U.S. The history of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations would lead me to be skeptical.

With regard to the acceleration of ABM research and development, ABM research and development has been going on and is being increased. It will insure our ability to deploy an ABM system, if necessary, and could increase our leverage in arms control negotiations.

With regard to the acceleration of space-based ABM technology development, the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or its components. Within these limitations, however, it is possible and desirable to pursue, as we are doing, research on the needed technology to develop and deploy a defense system if necessary.

Other of the Garn-Laxalt proposals are not directly relevant to the ABM Treaty, but they could reduce the need for ABM defenses.

Senator LEVIN. You indicate in your statement that the Soviet Union has been building one nuclear weapons system after another in an obvious effort not only to equal but to surpass the United States and thus to paralyze the U.S. nuclear arsenal. After achieving such a position, they believe and say—and those are the words I would like to concentrate on—achieving such a position, they believe and say, would permit them to expand their domain almost at will, using covert methods of subversion or conventional sources under the protective cover of what they consider to be superiority in nuclear arms.

Having also had some conversations with the Soviets and having found it extremely difficult to get them to say any such thing, although I believe that that at least at times is their motive, when have they said that?

Could you supply either today or for the record their statements that they seek superiority to permit them to expand their domain almost at will?

Mr. Rostow. Yes. I shall be glad to supply the text of statements of military doctrine and so on for you to that effect.

Generally speaking, the formula is that the correlation of military forces will determine the future course of world history, and you see it applied in all sorts of contexts.

Senator Levin. Well, whatever you can supply which supports your statement that they say what you said they said would be most helpful, because I think we would very much like those statements the next time we meet with the Soviets.

[The information follows:]

Soviet Correlation of Forces

Mr. Rostow. Senator Levin, as I said in my statement, the Soviet Union sees the mission of its nuclear forces as intimidation and coercion—and, if necessary, victory in nuclear war. The Soviet Union has been building one nuclear weapon system after another in an obvious effort not only to equal but to surpass the United States, and thus to paralyze the United States nuclear arsenal. Achieving such a position, they believe, and say, would permit them to expand their domain almost at will, using covert methods of subversion or conventional forces under the protective cover of what they consider to be superiority in nuclear arms.

The ordinary rule of law and of life is that we must judge intent objectively. We conclude as a practical matter that people intend the natural consequences of what they do. But many Soviet writers and speakers make their intent explicit. The literature on this subject is conveniently revised in three recent monographs: *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies* by Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Richard Soll (Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1973); *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979); and the Spring 1980 issue of *Survey* (Vol. 25, no. 2, Oxford University Press for the London School of Economics and Political Science, London).

As these reviews make clear, important Soviet political and military leaders have often said that what they refer to as the "correlation of forces" can be employed to determine the future course of world politics. These officials are convinced that visible Soviet military superiority, both in conventional and nuclear arms, can be focused to intimidate and paralyze the U.S. and its allies and thus permit the Soviet Union, by one carefully designed move after another, to outflank and neutralize the U.S. and Europe and force other powers to acquiesce in the face of this Soviet dominance.

As I wrote in my Foreword to *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*,

> Why have the American people found it so difficult to accept the Soviet view of Soviet policy? In the teeth of our experience since 1945, many of us persist in believing that detenté in our relations with the Soviet Union is not an aspiration but a reality; that Soviet motivations are the same as our own; and that the Soviet Union is a conservative state, governed by a cautious, elderly ruling elite interested only in preserving the status quo.
>
> The Soviet Union makes it clear that its policy is quite different. On August 5, 1978, in the course of a full dress speech in Karelia, Yuri Andropov, a member of the Politburo and head of the KGB, defined detenté between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms that are breathtaking: "Here in Karelia, one must stress the significance attached to the lengthy experience of neighborly, genuinely equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today form an integral and stable system of equal cooperation in various spheres of political, economic and cultural life. This is detenté embodied in daily contacts, detenté which makes peace more lasting and people's lives better and more tranquil. In the last analysis this is the highly humane meaning of the foreign policy of socialism and the foreign policy activity of our party and the Soviet state."

In addition, I think it is significant to note the importance that the Soviets place on gearing their industrial production toward their military requiremens, ratther than focusing on production of consumer products. In the following statement from an article published in the authoritative *Communist of the Armed Forces*, No. 23, December 1974, the Soviets note the importance of this difference in emphasis by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The article states: "In analyzing the economic potential of a state, it is necessary to also consider the specific features of the structure of the nation's industrial production. In the USA, a great deal of the total volume of industrial production consists of articles such as luxury items, advertising means, passenger automobiles, household appliances and so forth; these articles are useless in satisfying military requirements or they have limited significance in this area. From this standpoint, the following indicator is also important: while the volume of industrial production in the U.S.S.R. now amounts to more than 75 percent of the American level on the whole (in 1950 it amounted to less than one-third of the USA level), the output volume of the means of production in the U.S.S.R. is no lower than 90 percent of this kind of production in the USA. It is obvious that this is not only of enormous socio-economic, but also military-economic significance."

In several public statements, Leonid Brezhnev has made clear the goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in its obligation" to spread world socialism. In his report of March 30, 1971 to the opening session of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, General Secretary Brezhnev had the following to say: "In recognition of its international duty, the CPSU will continue to pursue a line in international affairs toward promoting the further activation of the world anti-imperialist struggle and the strengthening of the combat unity of all its participants. The total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable, and for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength."

Just shortly after Brezhnev's first "summit" meeting with President Nixon in May of 1972, he spoke at a Kremlin banquet for Cuba's Fidel Castro on June 26, once again reiterating the goals of the Soviet socialist system. He declared: "While striving for the confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence, we recognize that successes in this important matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle. On the contrary, it is necessary to be prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still sharper form of antagonism between the two social systems. And we do not have any doubts about the outcome of this struggle, for the truth of history, the objective laws of social development are on our side!"

In order to achieve these goals of world socialism, the Soviets stress the importance of the armed forces, and the utilization of the nuclear arsenal, if necessary, to accomplish this purpose. In the Soviet Communist Party's principal periodical *Communist* for May 1972, General A. A. Yepishev, head of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, elaborated in military terms:

> In the present era, which is characterized by a strengthening of the positions of socialism and by sharp antagonism between the two social systems, a deepening of the external function of the Soviet armed forces has logically taken place.
>
> * * * It must be seen that socialism's military might objectively assists the successful development of the revolutionary, liberation movements and that it hinders the exportation of imperialist counterrevolution. In this lies one of the most important manifestations of the external function of the armed forces of a socialist state.

The Soviets make it clear in their writings that if it were necessary to employ nuclear forces to achieve their goals, they would do so, despite the terrible destructive capability of such weapons. This is succinctly explained in the following statement from the November 1975 issue of *Communist of the Armed Forces*. "The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain burgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons lead war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary. . . . The description of the correlation between war and policy is fully valid for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Far from leading to a lessening of the role of policy in waging war, the tremendous might of the means of destruction leads to the raising of that role. After all, immeasurably more effective means of struggle are now at the direct disposal of state power."

Following are further statements about the role of nuclear weapons as a foreign policy tool to shift the correlation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. The first is a statement by Col. Ye. I. Rybkin from *Scientific-Technical Progress and The Revolution in Military Affairs*. Col. Rybkin states: "The nuclear missile weapons in the hands of the Soviet state were under modern historical conditions a necessary element guaranteeing the final victory of socialism in the USSR and other socialist nations* * *." "* * * attention must be paid to the fact that the military might of the socialist nations is not viewed as a condition or a means for preventing all wars generally, that is, civil, national-liberation, or in the defense of the sovereignty of peoples. The communists have always recognized that along with reactionary and unjust wars, there are also progressive and just ones. At present there are circumstances when the suppressed classes and peoples are forced to fight for there is no other way out. Such wars cannot be 'prevented,' and they are legitimate and just."

Further defining the political utility of their military forces for achieving the goals of the socialist system, Col. V. M. Kulish makes the following statement in the "Conclusion" from *Military Power and International Relations:* "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries by virtue of their increasing military potential, are changing the correlation of military forces in the international arena in favor of the forces of peace and socialism. This is exerting a very sobering effect on extremist circles in imperialist states and is creating favorable conditions for achieving Soviet foreign policy goals in the international arena, based upon the principles of peace coexistence * * *." "* * * military power is one of the most important instruments of foreign policy available to states, and its role and effectiveness, together with other means, depend upon specific international-political situations and upon the specific balance of forces developing in the world or region."

And let me include one final statement which was made by V. Gantman in the May 1973 issue of *Kommunist* in an article entitled "A Policy That is Transforming the World—On the Role of Soviet Foreign Policy in Present-Day International Relations," showing the Soviets interpretation of how they have successfully exploited their military might. The statement reads as follows: "The role of Soviet foreign policy, based on the USSR's might and on the balance of world forces, which has changed in socialism's favor, is growing increasingly tangible, and the very process of the changes in the international situation taking place under this policy's influence is developing in depth and breadth * * *. According to the valuations of Western politicians, the Soviet-American agreements reached during the Moscow talks in May 1972 have meant that the United States has finally recognized the actual correlation of forces in Europe and in Soviet-American relations."

From the various Soviet officials and authoritative publications which have been quoted above, one can see that the Soviets do believe and say that their military strength and growing dominance gives them the leverage to pursue their goals in the international arena; that is, to spread world socialism.

Senator Levin. You indicate on page 16 that there must be international norms and guidelines that can provide reasonable assurance that countries are not acquiring nuclear explosives, and that nuclear programs are not being used for such purposes.

In your opinion, did such international norms and guidelines give Israel that assurance at the time of her strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor?

Mr. Rostow. No. I said here somewhere that these arrangements that we have with regard to controls serve as a deterrent for most countries, and they serve as an early warning in other situations, and what I have in mind there is that none of these arrangements can be perfect, but that they are useful, and they are not a substitute for our own vigilance in trying to keep abreast of trends in this area.

Senator Levin. Then it is your position that existing international norms and guidelines do not provide that reasonable assurance that countries are not acquiring nuclear explosives, and that nuclear programs are not being used for such purposes.

Did I understand that to be your answer, that existing norms?

Mr. Rostow. I think that they do not in themselves do so. I think it is a very complex and difficult problem, and I have said elsewhere before the Foreign Relations Committee that the Israeli attack in Iraq was—well, perhaps the most sensible thing for me to do is to find the passage and read it.

Senator Levin. Perhaps you could supply that for the record since my time is up.

Mr. Rostow. Surely.

[The information follows:]

(The following exchange took place during the Senate Foreign Relations Committe hearing of June 22, 1981)

Senator Pell. In connection with the recent strike on Baghdad, or at the nuclear plant near Baghdad by Israel, I would like to ask you whether in your view the United States vote in the Security Council resolution condemning Israel constitutes a change in any way of United States policy?

Mr. Rostow. No, Senator Pell, I am certain it does not. The resolution to which you refer, like any other legal document, must be read in its context of policy. Furthermore, I might point out it is only a recommendation of the Security Council and not a binding decision.

As far as the nonproliferation aspects of the problem are concerned, I participated in the discussions and I fully support the policy summed up in what President Reagan said at his press conference the other day, in my prepared statement here and in Secretary Stoessel's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 17th.

Our policy has several elements. First, it concludes that the Israeli raid on Iraq reveals the explosive fragility of the state system under the stress of nuclear proliferation, a very serious and threatening problem indeed, as the chairman remarked at the beginning of this hearing.

I used the word "foreboding" in my prepared statement, and I think it is apt. It follows, the President concluded, that United States policy should react on an urgent basis in four principal ways: "By seeking to restore stability both globally and regionally, and by strengthening the safeguards system through IAEA and through the concerted policies of the concerned nations."

As applied to the Middle East, Under Secretary Stoessel made clear, the Israeli raid on Iraq accentuates the urgent need to redouble our efforts to achieve peace throughout the region. To be explicit, this means that Israel's other neighbors should follow the wise example of Egypt in negotiating peace and good neighborly relations with Israel in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts.

On that basis, I might add that we are going to begin exploring the possibilities of the Israeli proposal which Egypt also has supported to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. Our policy so far is noncommercial. We are only studying it, but we are studying it with interest and with sympathy.

So I think that is the background against which we should evaluate the American vote in the Security Council on Friday. As we all know, policies do not always develop in straight lines; they evolve and are applied in irregular ways with all sorts of eddies and fluctuations, especially in situations of turbulence like that of the Middle East.

The Security Council vote was simply one episode in the organic growth of the policy I have described, a policy which fully respects President Reagan's firm support for the security of Israel both on moral and on strategic grounds.

Senator Levin. I do have a few additional questions, Mr. Chairman, but my time is up. You may answer them for the record.

Mr. Rostow. I would be happy to do that.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. The Chair announces that the record of this hearing will remain open until 6 o'clock tonight for the purpose of including questions addressed to the witness.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rostow, thank you for coming and giving us your thoughts and ideas.

Some of the questions that I will be asking do not necessarily represent my point of view, but trying to get for this one Senator at least an understanding of where you are coming from and where you are going on this whole matter of arms control.

I would say, as I have said before, that I suspect that there is no one that is more intricately involved in the chance for peace, at least the further buildup of arms around the world, than the important position that you hold in the administration, and I happen to feel you are highly qualified for that position.

I apologize for being late, and I am not aware as to whether or not there have been questions asked previously about the story in the Washington Post of this morning headlined "U.S. Reportedly Rejected Soviet 'Backdoor' Proposal."

Have you been asked about that?

Mr. ROSTOW. No and I have not read it, I'm sorry to say. I have not seen the headlines.

Senator EXON. Let me read some of the pertinent statements therein. I would just like to get your comment on it because while you may not be directly involved, certainly it is in your sphere of influence in the administration.

It says:

> Moscow. The Soviets recently suggested a secret channel of communication to the Reagan White House in an effort to reopen substantial contacts, but the offer was firmly rejected by Washington, according to well informed sources. The Soviets reportedly made the overture in the apparent hope that a secret, backdoor channel would draw the new administration into communications on east-west relations and arms control issues despite President Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric.

Do you care to comment, or can you expand on this story to say whether there is any accuracy to it from your knowledge?

Mr. ROSTOW. No, no. My excellent staff work here has now produced a copy of it, and I think the sensible posture for me to take, if you will permit me, Senator Exon, is to say I should make no comment.

Senator EXON. You have been described as a hardliner—hardliner on arms control matters.

Do you concur in this evaluation of yourself?

Mr. ROSTOW. Not at all; I have been described as a good many other things, too. I hope I am an idealist, an optimist, and I try to be a realist.

Senator EXON. Mr. Rostow, it seems to me—and tell me if you think I am wrong—that the policies of this administration on arms control seem to be in sharp contrast to the last administration which at least had a policy of attempting to limit the sale of arms produced in this country to foreign nations.

Am I right in my assumption?

Mr. Rostow. No. The President has just issued after several months of consideration and review a comprehensive restatement of policy on arms sales which has many elements of continuity with the past, but certain elements of change and adaptation. But there is a policy. I think it is an excellent policy, and it does contrast in some ways with that of the previous administration, of course. But it reflects the main themes of arms export control policy which have been developing in the United States for a good many years.

Senator Exon. I have just had a chance to review a portion of your prepared testimony, and in there you make a point that arms control have not prevented wars in the past. I take it from that that you are not saying that even if you were ultimately successful in your goals that you were going to insure peace. But certainly you do not mean to imply that the sale and distribution of more and more arms around this old troubled world of ours is a necessarily stabilizing influence with regard to peace, or do I interpret your feelings incorrectly?

Mr. Rostow. Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not. Arms sales in themselves can be stablizing or destabilizing, and it depends on many, many factors in each situation. Of course, the fact of the matter is that the writ of the United States does not run everywhere, and there are many sources for arms. For example, in the early 1950's, the United States, Great Britain, and France adopted a policy about arms sales in the Middle East, which was a very constructive policy, the so-called Tripartite Agreement of 1950, and for several years it worked quite well in preventing the build-up of arms in any state in the Middle East that might be the basis for aggression.

Then in 1954 Egypt made an arms supply agreement with the Soviet Union and the Tripartite Agreement ceased to have any utility.

Senator Exon. Let me get into something somewhat specific.

What is your position, your official position and your personal position, and certainly indicate, if you can if there is a conflict between them, on the proposed sale of the AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia?

Mr. Rostow. I have not completed our studies of that. I shall have to make a statement on that subject, I presume, somewhere down the line fairly soon, and I have read some of the preliminary documents, but I have reached no final conclusion as yet.

Senator Exon. Has the administration contacted you about your views on this?

Mr. Rostow. No; I took office after the decision was announced.

Senator Exon. Would it have been proper for them to do so?

Mr. Rostow. Not yet.

Senator Exon. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. Thank you. We would hope that the witness would be out of here in about 10 minutes. We gave him that assurance when we started the hearing at 10 o'clock this morning.

Senator Humphrey, I understand that you would like a few minutes, and perhaps Senator Levin, a few more minutes.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

Senator Warner. Senator Humphrey?

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rostow, we were discussing unilateral interpretations, and I distinctly got the impression that you had no great taste for unilateral interpretations.

Would you be disposed to recommend in dealing with the President, that is, recommend to the President that he send to the Senate a strategic arms treaty that contained provisions on which the Soviets had unilateral interpretations?

Mr. Rostow. Only if we agreed with them.

Senator Humphrey. In that case they are multilateral, aren't they?

Mr. Rostow. It depends, You might very well be willing to accept a unilateral interpretation but not to sign it. I do not know. It is a hypothetical question that I would rather not be categorical about.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Mr. Rostow. But certainly I would apply the same standard of international law to their unilateral interpretation that I would apply to our own. It is a question of what the standing of such a statement is in international law.

Senator Humphrey. Would a treaty containing unilateral interpretations, provisions which are interpreted unilaterally by either side be stabilizing, which is one of the principal purposes?

Mr. Rostow. No, because it would not provide certainty or as much certainty as possible, and the main function of such agreements is to reduce uncertainty at any rate.

Senator Humphrey. Let me touch upon the ABM Treaty.

I am increasingly concerned that irrespective of whatever land-basing mode that we assign to the MX, if we do, that the Soviets have so little regard for costs that they are simply going to construct whatever numbers of boosters and warheads it takes to blanket all of the structures, in which case there is, it seems to me, little hope for a land-based system without some sort of anti-ballistic missile protection.

Do you disagree with that point of view?

Mr. Rostow. The Soviet Union—well, you asked do I disagree. I neither agree nor disagree. Let me just explain. I have not followed the economic data very carefully, but I am aware of the fact that the current rate of increase of Soviet military spending, somewhere around 4 or 5 percent a year in real terms, is now greater than the rate of increase of the Soviet gross national product.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Mr. Rostow. So that further expansion of Soviet military spending is bound to cut quite drastically or rapidly into what is available for consumers or for investment in the civilian sector.

So I think there are economic restraints on the kind of reaction that you assume would happen.

Now, the Soviet buildup has been going on now for a long time at about that rate, which is an astonishing fact, and it would be remarkable if it could go up even more rapidly in the near future. Now, of course, it is not a general increase, and they have stocks, so that I would not exclude that possibility quickly. But I think it would hurt them.

Senator Humphrey. Undoubtedly at some point it will, sufficiently so, that they will change their course, but it seems to me that various expert witnesses have been suggesting for a couple of years now that the Soviets have gone about as far in miiltary spending as they can, and yet they continue to surprise us.

Mr. **Rostow**. I should just add, Senator Humphrey, if I might, that considerations of that kind really should not be decisive for us. We cannot base a policy on that kind of expectation.

Senator **Humphrey**. Yes.

Mr. **Rostow**. It may happen, that is all.

Senator **Humphrey**. But it seems to me that if we have a land-based MX in a land-based mode without an ABM of some kind, that we are choosing to premise it on the idea that the Soviets will not be willing to bear the cost of providing the boosters and warheads to negate that basic system, just an observation.

One last question, if I may, one area.

You obviously feel that the SALT II Treaty agreement was not worthy of being considered by the Senate, should not have been ratified by the Senate, and yet you and the administration feel that we should not take any actions inconsistent with the treaty.

Well, if the treaty was not in our national security interests, as this committee stated, although some members abstained, if it is not in our national security interests to ratify it, then how is it in our national security interest to essentially comply with it, and for how long would you recommend that we comply with it?

Mr. **Rostow**. I think for the moment, as we said a little while ago, it seems a very practical thing to do in terms of the programs we have in mind. The posibilities on the other side, and the prospects for negotiation. To rock the boat at this point could well be destabilizing, whereas to keep it steady really does not interfere with what we are planning to do or can do.

Senator **Warner**. Would the Senator yield on that question? His time is up.

Would you also address in that context the rule of international law which governs treaties which, although they have been executed by the President or head of state, they remain the necessity for ratification by the legislative branch?

Mr. **Rostow**. Surely.

Senator **Warner**. I think that bears on this issue, doesn't it?

Mr. **Rostow**. It does.

I was going to say it is not a fully elaborated rule and it is a rather general one. But it is the established practice in international law and a sensible thing to do, when two nations are in negotiation, have reached agreement on a treaty, and have signed it, that neither side should defeat the object and purpose of the treaty pending ratification. It is a perfectly normal rule in the conduct of foreign relations. Now, it is subject to many kinds of exceptions. It is codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and it is the background of our policy positions here. But it is not, I emphasize, the heart of it.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Rostow, we will turn to Senator Levin. Hopefully we can conclude here shortly.

Senator Levin?

Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I asked you whether or not you had been asked or whether you had offered your views to the arms control impact of the various MX basing modes, and you answered no. Then Senator Exon asked you whether or not you had been asked or offered your views on the——

Mr. Rostow. I said not yet.

Senator Levin. Not yet. Well—not yet, that's correct.

Senator Exon asked you whether or not you had been asked your views relative to the AWACS sale, and you said no, and he asked you whether or not you thought it was appropriate, if I remember his question correctly, and you said no, and now my question is why would it not be appropriate for you to be asked your views on AWACS, first, and on the arms control implications of the MX basing mode, second?

Mr. Rostow. I suppose it is a possible procedure, but the Director of the Arms Control Agency is not normally a participant in every Defense decision, or even in every defense aid decision. He makes a comment under the statute when asked; I believe the budget is the trigger for the arms control impact statements, and I expect to speak to the arms control implications of the decisions now before the Secretary of Defense when they are recommended to the President, at an appropriate time.

Senator Levin. But my heavens, why should the Secretary of Defense make those recommendations without the benefit of your input?

Mr. Rostow. I think the Secretary of Defense has a right under the statutes and under the customs of the United States to make defense recommendations, and I do not propose to barge in on him.

Senator Levin. I am absolutely mystified by that answer, I must tell you that. Where there are arms control implications of the basing mode, the MX basing mode, for you to say that those implications which are also security implications, because arms control is part of defense, for those implications not to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense absolutely mystifies me.

I will leave it at that because we have a vote, and I am running out of time.

Senator Warner. Senator Exon?

Senator Levin. Oh, no, I have one more question. I have not run out of time. I am running out of time.

You say in answer to Senator Thurmond's question that—you said the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate, is the way he rephrased your testimony, have little incentive to negotiate serious arms reductions. You said that we must be strong enough to convince them it is in their best course to respect fundamental rules. You said that the only time that is going to happen, in answer to Senator Thurmond's question, will be when our nuclear strength is restored, and our conventional strength is restored, and that is your word, "restored."

My question to you is, you have seen the budgets, I presume, for our purchases of weaponry and for our strengthening of our defense establishment. When will we be strong enough for the Soviets to have the kind of incentive you think they must have for there to be balanced arms control negotiations? You know how much we are spending this year and next year and what we are proposing to buy.

When will we be strong enough for you to have a chance to come up with a good treaty to start those negotiations?

Mr. Rostow. I have said that we are perfectly willing to start the negotiations——

Senator Levin. Before we are strong enough?

Mr. Rostow. Yes; once the commitment is made——

Senator Levin. Oh, all right.

Mr. Rostow. On the assumption that the commitment by then will have been made, but the President has rejected the course of delaying any arms control negotiations until we have restored our strength. That option was considered and rejected.

Now, we have not formally made any such condition. We said there are no conditions precedent to the negotiations, and that is correct.

Senator Levin. I read your testimony, we must be strong enough to convince the Soviet Union. I read that as being strong enough. You are saying now that we must have a commitment which is strong enough to convince the Soviets.

Mr. Rostow. No; the language I used was carefully considered, and I do not think it has that implication. I said that I thought that we could start negotiations in something like by the spring of 1982 when we should have finished considering and solving the intellectual problems that we face in devising a new SALT strategy.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. Excuse me, Senator Levin, in my own work with ACDA, my recollection is that you periodically file an impact statement with respect to each weapon system.

Am I not correct in that?

Mr. Rostow. That is correct.

Senator Warner. Therefore, the Department of Defense would receive the viewpoints of your agency with respect to the MX system, and have, and that report is maintained in a current status.

Mr. Rostow. That is correct, but it comes at a later stage in the evolution.

Senator Warner. I see.

Mr. Rostow. That is what I meant by referring to timing, and under the statute it is triggered by the budget.

Senator Warner. Yes, fine.

Senator Exon?

Senator Exon. One last question, Mr. Rostow.

It seems to me that we would agree that any arms control or reduction between nations has to have some benefit of faith in what we and they will do.

In that context, there have been many interpretations with regard to the Soviets' degree of compliance with the details and the spirit of SALT I. The American people basically have been led to believe that we cannot really trust the Soviet Union.

What is your view on the degree of Soviet compliance with the details and spirit of SALT I? Do you think they have?

Mr. Rostow. As far as the spirit is concerned, that refers to the language of those unilateral interpretations that we put forward based on what we called the spirit of the agreement, and those interpretations have not been complied with. The Soviet Union has taken the view that they were not obliged to do that, and they have not.

So far as the terms of SALT—of the interim agreement and ABM Treaty are concerned, that has been a matter of discussion between us and the Soviet Union, diplomatically and through the SCC, the Standing Consultative Commission established for the purpose, and we have regarded throughout its history those deliberations as secret, and I would be happy to discuss them with you in executive session.

Senator WARNER. We thank you very much, Mr. Rostow.

We have a number of questions from the committee members which will be submitted for the hearing record.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Rostow, what do you believe are the advantages and disadvantages of negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. A number of arguments have been put forward in favor of an adequately verifiable CTB. First, it is said, such a ban would arrest the development of new weapons and thus impose qualitative limits on nuclear arms competition. This would complement efforts aimed at quanitative reduction and limitation of strategic and long range theater nuclear forces. A CTB would make it more difficult to field new weapon designs which, for example, would prevent the Soviets from taking full advantage of their greater missile throw-weight and would also retard their ability to develop a cruise missile force competitive with our own. Second, a multilateral CTB would contribute to non-proliferation objectives by increasing the number of states which would agree to renounce the option of carrying out nuclear explosions. Some believe that it might well have broader support than the NPT, since it would impose the same burdens on all signatories, and would not give special privilege to nuclear weapon states. Third, a CTB treaty along the lines of the draft which has been under negotiations among the US, UK and USSR would establish important precedents in verification of arms control agreements by providing for monitoring stations and on-site inspections on Soviet territory. Such precedents could be valuable in future arms control negotiations.

On the other hand, there are important security concerns about a CTB as well. First, would it slow down or even prevent the United States from catching up with the Soviet Union by developing new weapon systems needed for the purpose? Second, there is the issue of whether confidence in the reliability of weapons stored in the stockpile could be maintained under such a Treaty regime. While extensive checks should be made, it would not be possible to detonate nuclear devices as a reliability test. Third, could such a treaty be verified by national technical means? There is the possibility that tests by others at low yield could escape detection and identification by the present monitoring system. Fourth, there is concern about whether, under a CTB, the US would be able to retain over the long term the personnel required for competence in weapons design and testing, should they be needed in circumstances which may not now be foreseeable.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER W. JEPSEN

Senator JEPSEN. Mr. Rostow, on page 19 of your statement you state your "goal will be to subordinate the international use of force and the arms race to the rule of law" yet on page 3 of your statement you state that "arms control agreements cannot and do not guarantee peace". If you believe that arms control agreements do not guarantee peace, how do you plan to fulfill your stated goal of subordinating the international use of force to the rule of law?

Mr. ROSTOW. History makes it clear that arms control agreements alone do not achieve and maintain peace. Arms control can be part of a larger, complex process of developing world public order. That process has diplomatic, military, economic, and political elements. World public order in this sense is the true goal of our foreign and defense policies. The rule of law is based upon world public order, and if the nations enforce the law, it helps to sustain lasting world peace. International arms control treaties, if they are fair, balanced and verifiable, are an important part of this process, but by themselves cannot and do not guarantee peace.

Senator JEPSEN. Strategic defense is an integral part of Soviet nuclear doctrine and their emphasis on defense of civilian and military targets is one of the major reasons for their growing strategic warfare capability. This issue has not been adequately addressed in previous arms limitation talks. Do you plan to give this problem greater attention in future talks. If so, how?

Mr. ROSTOW. The ABM Treaty limits U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missile defenses to a low level. Pursuant to its terms, the Treaty was reviewed by the Parties in 1977 and will be reviewed again in 1982. The U.S. has been concerned with other Soviet defenses such as air-defense and civil defense, but as yet they are not subject to limitations. We intend to consider addressing them in future negotiations, and in future recommendations of policy by ACDA to the President and Congress.

Senator JEPSEN. Did President Carter or members of his administration acknowledge violations that occurred during his term of office?

Without discussing their motivation for their relative silence, let me ask you what the practical effect of their silence has been on arms control talks and overall defense policy?

Have all the Soviet violations of the previous arms control agreements been made public?

Would you provide a list of these violations for the record?

Mr. ROSTOW. The Soviet Union has often pressed to the borders of agreements, and they have taken advantage of ambiguities in treaties, and some of their activities. These discussions are necessarily private.

(SCC) is a confidential forum for discussion of compliance issues and ambiguous activities. These discussions are necessarily private.

This administration has recently completed a thorough review of Soviet compliance with all arms control agreements. The conclusion which that review compels is that the verification of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements is a matter for grave concern. There is no ground for complacency on the subject. Our policy is and will be to hold the Soviets strictly accountable for their actions relating to compliance with arms control agreements. We have made this clear to the Soviets, and will do so with increasing emphasis in the months ahead. In view of the fundamental character of the problem, we are also considering the publication of a document on the subject, insofar as such publication is possible.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

Senator QUAYLE. As you know, the ABM Treaty is up for review next year and there is talk of modifying or abrogating the Treaty in order to permit the defense of our land-based strategic force. If we decide to rely on an active ABM system, what are our options in regard to the ABM Treaty? What ICBM–ABM deployment schemes could be accommodated within the bounds of the current Treaty? What deployment schemes would require modification or abrogation of the Treaty?

Mr. ROSTOW. The administration is studying a number of possible ABM deployment concepts that could enhance the survivability of the U.S. ICBM forces. The LoAD (low-altitude defense) option would defend hardened point targets using low-altitude nuclear-armed interceptors. Several ABM Treaty and Protocol provisions would have to be amended in order to deploy such a system. First, the ABM Treaty prohibits deployment outside the Grand Forks region. Second, development and testing of a mobile ABM system is prohibited by the Treaty. And third, an effective ABM defense would require deployment of more than the 100 missile interceptors and 20 radars allowed by the Treaty. Any system which employed interceptors using multiple kill vehicles would require ABM Treaty amendment, since only one warhead is allowed per missile by the Treaty. In short, any BMD system for defense of ICBMs would probably require substantial changes to the Treaty.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Rostow, on page 9 of your statement you speak of "disturbing options such as launch-on-warning of missile attack." This Committee has long felt that it is too dangerous to rely on launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack for the survivability of our ICBM's. I wonder if you would elaborate on why you find launch-on-warning "disturbing"?

Mr. ROSTOW. I find launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack disturbing because under such policies the decision to initiate a nuclear strike, with incalculable consequences for this nation and all mankind, would have to be made in a very short time on the basis of fragmentary information. Because of the changing logic of the Soviet-American nuclear equation, with its increasing threat to our ICBMs, launch-on-warning has been considered by some U.S. strategic planners. As the Committee is aware, strategic programs are being developed to redress our increasing ICBM vulnerability, such as MX deployment. These programs would provide a more reliable deterrent than reliance on a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack strategy. Other procedures to minimize the risk that we would be pressed to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy include increasing the number of our ICBMs and strengthening the bomber force, which of course would give the President more time to deal with reports of a possible nuclear attack.

Senator WARNER. The hour of 12:30 having arrived, the hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

ARMS CONTROL POLICY, PLANNING AND NEGOTIATING

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The committee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room 6226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, Jackson, Hart, Exon, and Levin.

Also present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; Frank J. Gaffney, Ronald F. Lehman, James R. Locher III, José E. Martinez, James C. Smith, Kathleen Troia, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Karen A. Love, Kimberly A. Manning, staff assistants.

Also present: Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; George Kohl, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; and Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The Armed Services Committee is pleased to welcome before it as a witness today Mr. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Secretary Perle, in his many years of service to this committee as an aide to Senator Henry M. Jackson, distinguished himself as an expert on matters concerning arms control and nuclear forces in general. I am confident that expertise will serve him well in his present capacity, as he is charged with the responsibility of representing the Department of Defense in the formulation and implementation of the U.S. arms control policies.

As Secretary Perle is well aware, this committee has had a longstanding interest in the military implications of United States-Soviet arms control negotiations. Most recently, that interest was manifested in a report on the military considerations of the SALT II Treaty.

In that document, the Armed Services Committee made clear its view that any arms control agreement reached between the United

States and the Soviet Union must be fully verifiable, it must provide for equality in forces by all relevant measures of merit, and it must be clear and unambiguous in its terms.

These are stringent conditions, but ones which must be met if such agreements are to be in the mutual interest of both nations.

I might note that Mr. Perle had a major hand in the drafting of the report that was issued by the Armed Services Committee, which concluded that the SALT II Treaty was not in the national security interest of the United States. I anticipate that the Senate Armed Services Committee will show very keen interest in the talks aimed at reducing theater nuclear forces, which began in Geneva yesterday.

In fact, we have asked Secretary Perle to appear here coincident with the opening of those negotiations, in the hope of establishing an important and continuing dialog between the administration and the committee. Such a dialog can insure that the Congress remains apprised of the important developments in these United States-Soviet diplomatic exchanges and can facilitate the fulfillment of Congress' constitutional responsibility for advising the executive branch with regard to treaties.

Mr. Secretary, we have your prepared statement. You may read that if you choose, or you may summarize it. You may proceed in any way that you see fit.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I will read the statment, which I wrote as a summary.

Mr. Chairman, there is no committee before which I am more pleased to appear and no subject I would rather address than the issue which brings me here today, national security and arms control. It is an issue that I was privileged to work on for this committee during the negotiations that led to the SALT I agreements and the SALT II Treaty. I need hardly say that the judgment of this committee that the latter treaty was not in the national security interest of the United States is a view that has come to be shared by the administration.

I remember well the Senate Armed Services Committee deliberations on the SALT II Treaty. The hearings held by the committee were serious and thorough. They challenged the executive branch witnesses to make a case that in the end the committee judged they were unable to make persuasively.

I hope and trust that you will hold this administration to the same high standard of public policy that you sought to impose on the last. And I hope and believe that this administration will benefit from the committee's wisdom and experience in these matters. I look forward to a process of consultation between us, the end result of which will be, I am sure, a deeper understanding of these issues than either branch could achieve alone.

Unlike the technical issues that attend the selection of one weapons systems over another or those matters of national priority that resolve into levels of defense spending, clarity about the role of arms control in our national defense is as crucial as confusion about it is pervasive.

If we are wrong about the purchase of a plane or a missile or a ship or if we spend too little for national defense, the effectiveness and capability of our forces will be diminished for however long it takes to recognize our error and correct it.

But if we harbor illusions about our adversary and build policies of disarmament upon those illusions, if we sign treaties that create the impression but not the reality that our adversaries have joined us in a search for restraint and accommodation, we will set in motion the trends of history that weapons procurement and budget levels may prove powerless to arrest.

It is now 12 years since the first round of the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland. On the 12th anniversary of the opening of those talks, the United States again finds itself embarking on negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting the arsenals of our two countries.

In the intervening 12 years a generation of Americans then in the first grade has graduated from high school and a generation of government officials has had the benefit of an education about arms control with the Soviet Union. I want to take a moment today to discuss some of what we have learned and how we in the Department of Defense intend to apply those lesssons to the negotiations that lie before us.

I should say at once that a long and dismal history of disarmament preceded the lessons of the past dozen years. It was a history in which there was little in the way of disarmanent that was worthy of the name, a history of disarmament that may be properly described as little more than the story of unsuccessful attempts to bring it about.

I hope I may be forgiven for beginning on a note of skeptic, but the task before us is long and hard, and we will not make the job easier or our policies wiser by ignoring what has come before or romanticizing about what is yet to come. We have learned the last 12 years that Soviet willingness to negotiate is not the same as and must not be confused with Soviet willingness to accommodate.

The Soviets have demonstrated a capacity to negotiate on arms control while building precisely those nuclear forces that are the subject of negotiation. Whatever they may say about the illegitimacy of negotiating from strength, it is standard Soviet practice to do so. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Soviet spending on strategic forces actually increased in the period following the SALT I agreement. From two times U.S. spending prior to 1972, Soviet spending on strategic forces increased to three times ours in the years following the 1972 agreements.

Indeed, if one compares United States and Soviet strategic forces over the period during which we have been negotiating strategic arms limitations, the picture that emerges is one of a dramatic shift in the strategic balance. Twelve years ago the United States was substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in virtually every indicator of strategic power except the number of warheads. Now, 12 years later, the Soviets are ahead of us in each of those same indicators except the number of warheads. And if current trends continue, as they are likely to do, it is only a matter of time before the Soviets will surpass us in numbers of warheads as well.

A dozen years ago all three major elements of our strategic Triad were survivable, even under the most pessimistic assumptions about Soviet strength and American weakness. Today our land-based missiles have become vulnerable to Soviet attack and our bombers face increasingly formidable air defenses that raise serious questions about their ability to penetrate and reach their targets. The strategic balance is less favorable and more uncertain now than it was then.

And all of this has taken place with arms control talks in virtually continuous session. The United States now faces the prospect of vast expenditures—on the order of $180 billion—not to acquire strategic superiority, which is not our goal, but to restore and protect the security and effectiveness of our strategic deterrent.

I would point out that our experience since SALT I got underway has shown that the Soviets have tried, and have in large measure succeeded, to negotiate arms control agreements that permit the continued growth of their strategic forces. The principal argument of the Nixon administration that the SALT I interim agreement would halt the momentum of the Soviet buildup was proven false as the Soviets continued greatly to increase their forces within the confines of the agreement.

This was accomplished in a number of ways. I will mention only one. You will recall that the interim agreement contained limitations on the number of launchers for strategic missiles and on the volume by which existing launchers could be increased. This latter limitation was intended to preclude the substitution of larger or heavy missiles for smaller or light ones.

Shortly after the agreement was signed, the Soviets began to flight test the new missile, the SS–19, that had a volume very substantially larger than the missile that it replaced. In fact, the SS–19 was so much larger than the missile it replaced that Secretary of Defense Laird regarded it as a heavy missile and considered its deployment a violation of the agreement.

When the precise language of the agreement was reviewed, it became apparent that the Soviets had succeeded in building into the agreement a loophole that left the United States with no effective recourse. The end result was a threefold increase in the throw-weight of the Soviet light missiles and an eventual sixfold increase in the number of warheads deployed on those missiles.

What had been advertised as a freeze on the Soviet ICBM force gave way to a thaw which was followed by a flood of increased Soviet strategic offensive power. And it is that force which is deployed today that has rendered our Minuteman missiles vulnerable and imposed on this Nation the burden to respond at a cost of many tens of billions of dollars.

One searches in vain, Mr. Chairman, for evidence that the continuing Soviet buildup has been deflected or diminished by the provisions of the SALT I or SALT II agreements. Of course, it can be argued that in the absence of either or both these agreements, the increase in Soviet strategic forces would have been even larger and our situation today would be even worse. Indeed, it was the essence of the last administration's arguments for that SALT II Treaty, that the number of Soviet weapons permitted under it, as high as that was, would have been even higher without it.

Yet that argument assumes that the absence of an agreement would, in itself, lead the Soviets to go on building strategic forces surplus to their needs, mindlessly adding weapon upon weapons, building for building's sake. In my judgment, no such assumption is warranted. The Soviets plan the evolution of their strategic forces in order to meet their strategic objectives. They certainly prefer to meet those objectives within the confines of negotiated agreements.

But everything we know of the development of Soviet arms control negotiating strategy reinforces the conclusion that they only accept limitations that accommodate their plans and objectives.

There is no persuasive evidence of which I am aware that any of the agreements they have negotiated have caused them to change their plans or alter their objectives.

In light of our experience, I believe that we ought to measure success in arms control not by comparing the levels agreed upon with the inevitably higher levels the Soviets could build in the absence of an agreement, but by comparison with the levels of forces actually deployed when the agreement takes effect.

In other words, our objective ought to be reductions from current Soviet force levels and the test in any agreement ought to be whether it diminishes the threat posed by Soviet forces in being to the United States and its allies. If we reason in the future as we have in the past, we will end up with agreements whose principal effect is to legitimize menacingly large Soviet deployments.

I believe that the term "cosmetic" aptly describes the arms control agreements of the recent past. "Having the power to beautify" is the definition my dictionary gives of "cosmetic," and I should think that the last thing we would desire to do is beautify the massive nuclear arsenal the Soviets have so intently acquired.

If we are to avoid cosmetic agreements in the future, we must insist that any arms control agreement with the Soviets must diminish the Soviet threat to us and our allies in ways that are measurable and militarily significant.

The first plenary session of the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces took place earlier this morning in Geneva. In those negotiations, it is the purpose of the United States to obviate the requirement for the requirement for the deployment of Perishing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe by persuading the Soviet Union to dismantle the several hundred land-based missiles they have already deployed.

In his speech a few days ago, President Reagan made a historic offer to the Soviet Union. He proposed that if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles, the United States would cancel plans, agreed upon by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1979, to deploy some 572 comparable missiles in several allied countries.

The President has proposed a balance in intermediate-range land-based missiles at a level that is equal and fair to both sides because it is zero for both sides. There is no other number that would better serve the interests of peace or better meet the aspirations of people the world over whose desire for genuine disarmament has found no fertile ground in past history.

For the past several years, the Soviets have been deploying modern, accurate, multiple-warhead missiles that can strike NATO's deterrent forces in a matter of minutes. Today, the United States has no comparable missiles in Europe.

If we are successful in the Geneva negotiations, that will remain the case. If we are not, we shall implement fully NATO's decision to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, of which there are now over 250 deployed, each with three warheads, by the deployment of 572 ground-based cruise and Pershing II missiles.

I have had the privilege in recent months to chair NATO's high-level group which some weeks ago completed and forwarded to the Defense Ministers meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, two reports on which these negotiations will rely. These reports achieved a high degree of consensus within the alliance, and they point clearly to the need to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces in the face of a growing Soviet deployment and a growing Soviet theater nuclear threat.

The decision to respond to the Soviet deployment of recent years is now being implemented with a high degree of solidarity among the Allies who made that decision 2 years ago. And despite protests and demonstrations in Europe, the program is on schedule and will lead to an initial deployment in December 1983.

I believe it is clear that our effort to conclude the Geneva negotiations with the treaty reflecting the President's proposal depends fundamentally on the continuing resolve of the alliance to proceed with its own deployment. And I am confident that it will do so.

In the Geneva negotiations, we will also seek limitations on some Soviet systems of shorter range. A failure to limit them by numerical ceilings and other limitations would leave an agreement eliminating the Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles hopelessly vulnerable to circumvention, for the fact is that the Soviets can cover some 85 percent of the NATO targets assigned to the SS-20 with the shorter-range SS-22 if they are deployed in sufficient numbers and moved forward on Warsaw Pact territory. The SS-X-23, while shorter in range than the SS-22, can still strike much of European NATO—as much as 50 percent—when forward deployed.

At Geneva, we will make it plain to the Soviets that any treaty agreed upon must include verification measures that will almost certainly go beyond the national technical means of verification on which the less complex agreements of the past have relied.

The Geneva negotiations will not be easy. They will take time. The Soviets never make concessions quickly, and they never make them easily. It will take firm resolve and great patience to achieve success. When one recalls that it took a full 10 years to get the Soviets to honor their wartime treaty obligation to withdraw the Red Army from postwar Austria, it is clear that in dealing with the Soviets patience and resolve have their own rewards.

Sometimes in the past, we have made the mistake of presenting proposals to the Soviets only to abandon them when they met with Soviet resistance. In March 1977, Secretary of State Vance made proposals to the Soviets for reductions in strategic forces that were withdrawn a mere 6 weeks later. Each subsequent new American proposal was more generous than the last. And in the end, the treaty that resulted could not obtain support in the Senate sufficient for ratification.

The year 1977 belongs to the history from which we have learned, to the experience from which we, as a Nation, have graduated. We will not repeat that mistake. We have gone to Geneva with a proposal that we can defend, and defend it we will.

There has been speculation in the press that Paul Nitze has left for Geneva with a fallback position to be tabled in the event that the Soviets do not embrace the President's proposal. I can assure you that these reports are false. We have learned from bitter experience that nothing would so dash our hopes for the successful negotiation of our proposal as a briefcase full of positions to which we are ready to fall back.

I believe that we will succeed in Geneva if we are firm and deliberate, if we stand by the substance of our proposals. That substance is fair and equitable. It must not be sacrificed to the negotiation.

If I may, I should like to conclude with the reflection on an earlier negotiation of one of the participants in it. The words are those of Sir Samuel Hoare. The negotiation took place in Munich in 1938: Writing later in his memoirs, Sir Samuel had this to say:

> Like [Chamberlain], I had been caught up in the toils of a critical negotiation. The longer it went on and the more serious the issue became, the more anxious I grew to see it succeed. This is almost always the course of negotiations. As they proceed, the parties in them become increasingly obsessed with the need to prevent their final failure. If they are to continue, it is necessary to make concessions and one concession almost invariably leads to another.
>
> The time comes when the question has to be faced: Is the substance being sacrificed to the negotiation, and is it not better to admit failure rather than to make further proposals and concessions? Throughout the Munich discussions, I often asked myself whether the slide into surrender had not started.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared testimony.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Mr. Perle.

Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Senate will be considering over the next couple of days two principal elements of President Reagan's strategic force modernization program. We actually will be considering all of them, but there appear to be two in controversy: the B–1 bomber and the MX, not so much the missile as the basing mode.

Now, there are many of us here who have expressed reservations and skepticism, if not outright opposition, to the President's proposal for a near-term MX basing mode while looking for a longer term solution to the survivability of the MX.

Although I am one of those who have voiced reservations, I am concerned that we do no less than what the President has asked for, for several reasons. I believe that if we do not include funding for the basing mode recommended by the President, at least the R&D on it, we might jeopardize the missile itself in terms of congressional support.

I am also concerned about what the impact would be on these talks that have just begun and talks that will begin at some point on strategic arms limitation or reductions if we fail to fully support the President's recommendation.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. PERLE. I do, Senator. In the same last dozen years that I was talking about earlier, in the context of arms control, the Senate Armed Services Committee consistently has supported proposals made by the administration with respect to strategic forces. It has done so from time to time even when there were doubts and reservations about one element or another of the President's program.

These weapons procurement decisions and research and development decisions, as you well know, are enormously complex and there is great room for difference of opinion on whether one ought to procure one system or another or go about developing a system one way rather than another.

But in the end, it seems to me, those decisions pale into insignificance alongside the larger picture. The larger picture is that, as you so correctly say, we began today negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Senator **Thurmond**. If you do not mind, would you please speak a little bit louder?

Mr. **Perle**. We began today discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation of theater nuclear forces. Early next year we will begin negotiations on strategic nuclear force limitations. And I think it is clear that we will be unsuccessful in those negotiations if the Soviets gain the impression that we will not follow through on the programs we need in order to maintain the balance in the absence of an agreement.

You recall as well as I the difficult decisions the Senate had to make in the early days of ABM deployment when there was great division in the Congress, much of it of a technical nature, over whether the safeguard antiballistic missile system was the best and most fruitful technical approach to the building of an ABM system. But in the end, those doubts were resolved in favor of support for the system. And that resolve, in turn, I think, made it possible for the President to negotiate.

Now, I am not terribly happy with the outcome of those negotiations, as you know. But there would have been no negotiation at all without those decisions. So I hope, and the administration very much hopes, that despite the differences about specific elements of the program, this committee and the Congress will find it possible to support the President's strategic package and give him the strength he needs at the negotiating table.

Chairman **Tower**. Mr. Perle, I was glad to see you state without equivocation that there is no fallback position. We do consider the zero option to be the option which, if agreed to, would best provide for the security of Western Europe. Would you reiterate that assurance for us, not so much for us as for others who are watching the negotiations with somewhat more than casual interest?

Mr. **Perle**. I was frankly stunned, Mr. Chairman, to pick up my New York Times, at about the time the President made his speech, to read reports of fallback positions. The question of fallback positions was specifically discussed as the administration made its decision to take the President's proposal to Geneva.

It was specifically decided that, in order effectively to negotiate, we had to put a single proposal before the Soviets, it is no good offering them a choice, because it is very clear they will always choose the second or third or fourth proposal that comes closer to meeting their needs.

So there is no fallback position, Mr. Nitze has gone to Geneva prepared to argue, I believe persuasively, for the wisdom of the proposal that we have put on the table. We arrived at that proposal, by the way, not by selecting an arbitrary number but only after very careful study of what levels on both sides would produce a more stable military balance in Europe.

Those studies revealed that only as one approached zero was it possible to foresee a balance in which the Soviet capacity to attack NATO's retaliatory forces was significantly diminished.

Chairman Tower. Mr. Secretary, I understand that, in the opinion of some experts, the Pershing II, with its prompt hard-target-kill capability and its rather substantial range, is a particularly forceful inducement to the Soviet Union to negotiate an arms control agreement concerning these weapons. Do you agree with that assessment?

Mr. Perle. I do, indeed. I think the record on this is clear. The Soviets only agreed to these negotiations after NATO made the decision to proceed with the deployment of the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles—but I think the Pershing II, in particular—because those two weapons will give us a capability we do not now have, and that is the capability to strike targets deep inside the Soviet Union with weapons based on the continent of Europe.

The Soviets alone possess the capability today to strike deep into the territory of the other side.

Chairman Tower. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union argues that it is faced with a host of regional and other threats against which it must be prepared. This argument is used to justify their contention that the faces they are maintaining, which appear to be in excess of their military requirements, are in fact necessary and reasonable. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. Perle. Let me address it first in principle. If we accept the proposition that the Soviets face a multiplicity of threats, each one of which justifies a strategic force, I think it is clear that when one adds up the forces necessary to deal with each of those threats as described by the Soviets individually, it will produce a balance that is highly adverse to any one of those countries and, in particular, highly adverse to the United States.

So we cannot accept that proposition. I think that is clear. The regional threats to which the Soviets refer are the British and French independent nuclear deterrents and sometimes the modest deterrent that the People's Republic of China now deploys.

The British and French deterrents are small in number, limited in capability, and I believe are a last resort deterrent to be used in the event of a direct attack on Britain and France by the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. So they really do not figure into the calculations of the theater balance. They are strategic forces from the point of view of Britain and France and preeminently retaliatory forces.

With respect to the People's Republic of China, their forces now and for the foreseeable future are extremely limited. As you know, the Soviets possess many thousands of weapons of intercontinental range, competent to strike targets in China as well as elsewhere in the world.

So we reject the view that the Soviets are entitled to superiority vis-a-vis us, because they have to concern themselves with others.

Chairman Tower. The zero-based option has been attacked or criticized by the Soviets and by others—by, I am sure, well-meaning people in Western Europe and even, appallingly enough, by some people in Washington—as being somewhat unfair, because it requires only the Soviets to disarm.

Would you care to comment on that contention?

Mr. Perle. It is curious that many of the people who make that argument are at the same time advocates of arms control. I do not see how you can have arms control if whenever there is an imbalance the agreements you negotiate have to preserve that imbalance.

The fact is the Soviets have been building a large force of missiles, SS-20's, in particular. We for our part waited while they did that, without responding. We waited until the NATO alliance reached the conclusion that it was no longer safe to wait and watch that deployment continue. We made a decision to counter it.

The proposition we have put to the Soviets is simple and straightforward: We will not go ahead with our program if they will dismantle theirs. So while it is true it requires some disarmment on the Soviet side, it is also true that it would obviate a deployment of considerable capability on our side.

What we need to look at is the end result. And the end result, in our judgment, is fair to both sides.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Perle, I want to compliment and commend you on a very fine statement. I think no American President in modern times has had the unified support that President Reagan has received, growing out of his speech calling for the zero nuclear option. Those of us who have been advocating this over the last 25 years or so are very pleased with the approach the President has made. In fact, the Senate has voted unanimously in support of the objective outlined in the President's speech.

The real question, I think, is as you stated it; that is, whether or not we do have the ability to stay with this kind of protracted negotiation. The Soviets are masters of that art.

I think the tragedy of SALT II, without going into that, was the fallback immediately after the first proposal that was made in 1977, calling for reductions. The fact that we are challenging the Soviets to join with us in a reduction of arms and in this case a zero option in Western Europe, I believe marks a turning point in our approach in terms of nuclear negotiation.

What I would like, if you would, Mr. Perle, is for you to restate very simply what the Soviets now have in the European theater, starting with their ballistic missiles, the SS-4's and so on, and then compare that with what we have in ballistic missiles. We do not have at this point any cruise missiles, so if you could start with the SS-4's through the SS-22's and the SS-X-23, which is not yet deployed, we will get a picture of what will be on the table, hopefully, for negotiation.

Mr. PERLE. I would be glad to do that, Senator Jackson. The Soviets presently have some 350 SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles.

Senator JACKSON. And their range? And what is the warhead yield and so on?

Mr. PERLE. The range is on the order of 1,800 kilometers. The yield is in the kiloton range, but a goodly number of kilotons. To give you on idea of how rapidly they are deploying the SS-20——

Senator JACKSON. And in this area in Europe we have how many?

Mr. PERLE. We have none. The piece of paper that I was given only yesterday [indicating] identifies the number of SS-20's at 250. The actual figure is now greater than that. They are highly mobile and highly accurate. Each one carries three nuclear warheads. The range is on the order of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers.

We believe—indeed we know—that the Soviets have reload missiles for those SS-20 launchers. So 250 SS-20 launchers equates in the first instance to 750 warheads. With a single reload missile per launcher, you get numbers on the order of 1,500 to 1,600 warheads delieverable in a very few minutes and competent to destroy high-value military targets in Europe.

Senator JACKSON. And the SS-20 also does have the advantage that a third stage could be put on an SS-20 which would give it an ICBM, an intercontinental, range?

Mr. PERLE. Well, it might well be able to move into intercontinental range simply by the removal of two of its three warheads. But that is correct: the SS-20 consists of the first two stages of the SS-16, which originally was developed as an ICBM.

So alongside the SS-20, again, there is nothing on the U.S. side. We have no missiles in Europe today of greater than battlefield range, with the exception of the Pershing I missiles deployed in Germany, and they cannot reach Soviet territory from their basing locations.

Senator JACKSON. How many kilometers, roughly, if that is not classified?

Mr. PERLE. A little over 700.

In addition to the SS-4's and SS-5's and SS-20's, the Soviets are presently deploying a new short range missile, called the SS-22, which is launched by a launcher quite similar to that for an older missile, the SS-12. The SS-22, which again is a modern, highly mobile, accurate missile, has a range sufficient to permit it, when deployed forward on Warsaw Pact territory, to strike, as I indicated in my opening remarks, 85 percent of the high-value targets in NATO.

Senator JACKSON. How many have they deployed?

Mr. PERLE. Roughly 100.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, 100 of these?

Mr. PERLE. At this point. Of the SS-22's.

Senator JACKSON. Of the SS-22's.

Mr. PERLE. Yes, that is right.

Senator JACKSON. Now, what about the SS-X-23?

Mr. PERLE. The SS-X-23 is not yet deployed, as you rightly observe. We expect that it will be deployed soon. Again, it is highly accurate and mobile. And like the SS-22, when deployed forward, it can strike a substantial part of the territory of our NATO allies.

So in Geneva we will be making proposals to limit the shorter-range systems so that the deployment of them does not become a means by which the Soviets can circumvent any agreement that is reached on the longer range systems.

Senator JACKSON. Our main counter would be to this ballistic missile deployment would be not a first-strike system but a second-strike system; namely, the ground-based cruise missile. Is that not correct? How does it compare with an SS-20 that is already deployed? As you say, they have more than 250 of them.

Mr. PERLE. Frankly, I would rather have the SS-20 than the ground-based cruise missile. There is no comparison in terms of the capability of that system. For one thing, the SS-20 carries three warheads and the ground-based cruise missiles only one.

Senator JACKSON. One warhead. What is its speed? Would you just describe what it is?

Mr. PERLE. Well, it essentially is an unmanned airplane.

Senator JACKSON. It is a subsonic aircraft, in effect; is it not?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Whereas the ballistic missile of the SS-20 can reach a target in 15 minutes; the other, if it is into the Eurasian area, would take several hours, would it not?

Mr. PERLE. That is correct. But the range of the cruise missiles is substantially less than the range of the SS-20 as well. So on that measure, too, I would prefer the SS-20. Of course, the short time of flight makes the SS-20 a serious threat to those retaliatory forces that NATO now deploys in Europe. The cruise missiles, because of the long time of flight, do not pose the same threat to the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. Are we not faced for the first time with a need to have onsite inspection? How far can we rely on national technical means—which is a euphemism for satellite coverage and all the other things—how far can we rely on national technical means when we are confronted with highly mobile systems?

Mr. PERLE. We have come to the conclusion that we no longer can rely exclusively on national technical means. What additional methods of verification we will require will depend, of course, on the nature of the agreement.

In this regard, Senator Jackson, it is worth observing that the proposal the President has made for zero on each side is significantly easier to verify than would be an agreement that permitted some of these weapons on both sides.

If the level agreed upon is zero, then one closes down the factories that produce these weapons, that presumably produce the spare parts for these weapons. The weapons themselves are visibly dismantled so that we need not be concerned about those presently deployed.

There is no justification for training, because there are no missiles with which to train. And there is no justification for a flight test program, because there are no missiles to flight test.

That combination of measures, taken together, would give us significantly higher confidence of verification than we would have if even a smaller number of SS-20's were permitted to remain.

Senator JACKSON. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you.

Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, I had intended to elicit from you some facts which Senator Jackson brought out, so I will pass on to save time and not duplicate the discussion.

In your statement, on page 11, you stated that the Soviets can cover some 85 percent of the NATO targets assigned to the SS-20 with the shorter-range SS-22 if they are deployed in sufficient numbers and moved forward on Warsaw Pact territory. Would you care to elaborate a little more on that?

Mr. PERLE. Yes, Senator. The SS-22, which is currently presently in production and now being deployed, is a highly mobile system. They are presently based on Soviet territory, but because of their mobility, they could be moved forward within the territory of the Warsaw Pact. And when moved forward, their range is sufficient to strike 85 percent of the high-value targets in NATO.

So we would regard a failure to obtain limitations on those missiles as an open invitation to the Soviets to circumvent whatever agreement may be reached on the longer-range systems.

Mr. PERLE. We took a list of those military installations and related facilities in Europe that are of principal importance to the alliance. We compiled the list and simply drew range arcs on the map and concluded that 85 percent of those targets fell within the range arc of the SS-22 when forward-deployed.

Senator THURMOND. In your statement, you also said that the SS-X-23, while shorter in range than the SS-22, can still strike much of European NATO, as much as 50 percent, when forward-deployed. Would you care to elaborate on that and state what conditions or handicaps they would have in forward deployment?

Mr. PERLE. Yes, Senator. Again, the figure is arrived at by drawing range arcs for the SS-X-23 from forward locations. I think it is clear that when forward-deployed, the SS-22, or the SS-23, for that matter, would in principle be more vulnerable to attack by NATO aircraft than when they are more comfortably deployed deeper inside Soviet territory.

However, if these weapons were to be moved forward in a crisis, one has to assume that NATO would be prepared to attack them preemptively to have any high confidence that they could not be used against the targets that are within their range.

While in theory they are more vulnerable when forward-deployed, in practice, I rather doubt that we would exploit that vulnerability by attacking them in the absence of a war well underway. So the advantages to us of having those systems forward-deployed I think are more theoretical than real.

Senator THURMOND. The President has recommended several weapons, including the Pershing II and other weapons, to go forward with that. In your judgment, unless we go forward with the weapons the President has recommended, do you honestly feel that we can obtain arms control agreement with the Soviets that would be fair and just to the United States?

Mr. PERLE. No, I do not think there is a prayer that we can accomplish an agreement at Geneva if we do not go forward with our own deployment.

Senator THURMOND. Is it not a fact that the Soviets know they are much stronger now and unless they are convinced that we are going to rebuild our Defense Establishment and approach equality with them, that there will be very little chance of getting an arms agreement until that is done?

Mr. PERLE. I believe that is correct. I think the history of arms control, not only with the Soviets but generally, confirms that.

Senator THURMOND. With regard to verification, what is your opinion that we should do concerning verification? Various people have advocated various types of, for instance, onsite inspection, satellites, and so forth. What do you feel as an expert in this field is essential for us to have a proper and sound verification?

Mr. PERLE. I think two things, Senator. First, we will have to go, in my judgment, beyond national technical means of verification, to include measures of verification that will entail a greater degree of cooperation on the part of the Soviets than they have shown themselves willing to engage in, in the past.

Second, I believe that we can alleviate some of the verification problem by eliciting from the Soviets a good deal more information than we have been successful in eliciting in the past. I think we need to talk to them in great detail about the forces they actually possess.

As you know, we went through 10 years of SALT negotiations relying not on data supplied to us by the Soviet Union, but on our own intelligence data, and we seldom questioned them seriously about the status of their own forces, and certainly not in any detail.

And I would think it is an essential element of our current negotiating posture that we request from the Soviets detailed information about the forces that are the subject of this negotiation.

Senator **Thurmond**. Do you feel there is really any use in entering into any arms control agreement until we do have a sound method of verification, knowing the history of the Soviets in the past and that they will cheat and misrepresent and practice fraud?

Mr. **Perle**. I believe we ought not to enter into agreements unless we have high confidence that the terms of those agreements could not be violated without our obtaining reliable and prompt information about those violations.

But I think it is important to bear in mind that these agreements, however valid under international law, have no court in which they can be enforced. So the issue is not simply whether we can determine Soviet compliance, but what we can do about it if we find them to be in noncompliance. And here I think our options are really quite limited. So the problem is a larger one than simply knowing what the Soviets are doing.

Senator **Thurmond**. I think everyone wants an arms control agreement. It seems so foolish and asinine for the countries to keep building weapons and weapons and weapons on both sides if we can avoid this. What do you feel is the single best thing the United States can do to help to bring about a fair, just and equitable treaty with regards to arms control?

Mr. **Perle**. Go on building those forces that we need in the absence of an agreement and stand firm behind the proposal that the President has made.

Senator **Thurmond**. You are satisfied that the President's proposal is a sound proposal and that it is possibly the best course we could pursue to back that proposal?

Mr. **Perle**. I am.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Perle**. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Hart?

Senator **Hart**. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Senator Hart.

Mr. Chairman, first let me welcome Secretary Perle. I have a number of questions.

If the 572 Pershings and CLCM's that we have actually were in place, would we be making the same offer to the Russians that we have made?

Mr. **Perle**. If the balance were as it will be, assuming the Soviets were to stop today with what they are doing, then I would make the same offer, and I would hope that we could get it accepted before we actually have to build those 572.

Senator **Levin**. Well, I would think you would. But why is it to the Soviets' advantage to agree to that if we would agree to it if the 572 were actually in place? Why is it not to their advantage to let them put those systems in place and then agree to a mutual dismantlement, let us spend the billions like they have?

Mr. PERLE. Well, I think first. Senator Levin, there is a political dimension to this negotiation that I personally believe is crucial to the outcome. The Soviet Union is engaged in a peace offensive in Europe. They have sought to persuade our NATO allies that they are reasonable and moderate.

If they simply reject the proposal we have made and force the alliance to respond as it has decided to do, by building ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's they, will put at risk the image they have worked very hard to cultivate. And I think they are reluctant to do that.

Senator LEVIN. It is to their financial advantage to let us build the systems and then agree to dismantle them like you said we would?

Mr. PERLE. I suppose in some sense they would penalize our defense budget by the cost of those systems. But given the small percentage of the defense budget that it constitutes, I do not think it would make much difference.

Senator LEVIN. What is the total cost of that deployment of the 572 missiles?

Mr. PERLE. The total cost would be somewhere on the order of $5 billion.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, I must confess I am not very familiar, at least in personal terms, with "Protestant angst." It is a condition which the Boston Globe of November 26 quotes you as suggesting is the driving force behind the antinuclear movement in Europe. You are also quoted as implying that Catholic Europe is less subject to this "debilitating Protestant disease," a conclusion which would no doubt delight the Pope, [General laughter.]

But without getting into the religious sources of the antinuclear movement——

Chairman TOWER. I might remind Senator Levin that I am a Methodist clergyman's son and might take umbrage. [Laughter.]

Senator LEVIN. Without getting into the religious sources of the antinuclear movement in Europe, you also suggest that there is heavy-duty Soviet involvement in the movement. Do you see similar Soviet or religious motivations behind the recent teach-ins in this country?

Mr. PERLE. I think that, in the main, the protests we have seen in Eurpoe represent the real fears and real anxieties by sincere and concerned citizens.

The remark I made about Protestant angst was by way of observing two things. One is that there is great anxiety about these issues in Europe, and that anxiety seems to be most pronounced in Northern Europe, which is predominantly Protestant.

Moreover, the Church in the Netherlands in particular, but in Germany and Scandinavia as well, has become very much involved in the disarmament movement in Europe. I certainly did not intend an invidious distinction with respect to the Protestants. And in any case, I may have spoken too soon, because there have now been demonstrations in southern Europe as well.

Senator LEVIN. I think there may be more after your comment to prove that they can do it, too.

In any event, you do not see any religious or Soviet influence in the teach-ins in this country?

Mr. **Perle.** Well, there is certainly a religious moral influence in the——

Senator **Levin.** Well, particularly Protestant, you pinpointed the Protestant churches in Europe. Do you see that in this country in the teach-ins?

Mr. **Perle.** I just have not looked at the list of participants in the teach-ins. But the church has a long history of involvement in these affairs, and there has been a longstanding debate within the Protestant Church over the proper relationship between moral principles and the real and pragmatic political world. And I think we have probably lost ground since Reinhold Niebuhr in that regard, Senator.

Senator **Levin.** Can you foresee any circumstances in future strategic arms reduction talks under which we would bargain away the B–1 or the MX?

Mr. **Perle.** If the question is a practical one that goes to how far the Soviets would be prepared to go, I rather doubt that they would join us in a proposal sufficiently far reaching to enable us to do that.

Senator **Levin.** Let me ask you a question about bargaining chips. Would you agree the utility of a weapons system is a bargaining chip as related to its military utility? In other words, the more useful militarily that a weapons system is, the more value it has as a bargaining chip, and the less military utility, the less use it has as a bargaining chip?

Mr. **Perle.** That would seem a reasonable statement. An ineffective weapon would not be very persuasive to the Soviets.

Senator **Levin.** And a less effective weapon would be less persuasive than a more effective weapon?

Mr. **Perle.** I should think so.

Senator **Levin.** Let me ask you now about the B–52D's and the Titans. We have unilaterally disarmed them. We have not received anything in exchange for saying we are going to retire early the B–52D's or dismantle the Titans. We have received nothing in exchange for them. That is some of the administration's unilateral disarmament. There has not been much attention drawn to it yet.

But did your agency support that decision to make those unilateral actions?

Mr. **Perle.** Yes, indeed. Indeed, we did, on precisely the principle that I thought you were articulating a moment ago. Neither the Titans nor the older B–52's were very impressive to the Soviet Union. They were also costly to maintain.

In the case of the Titans, there were some safety concerns. And on balance, I think our posture is stronger.

Frankly, Senator, I believe we kept those Titans far after they should have been retired, in order to make the balance look better in the context of some previous agreements.

Senator **Levin.** Would you agree that they are worth something at the bargaining table?

Mr. **Perle.** I do not think they are worth very much, frankly, no.

Senator **Levin.** Would they be worth something at the bargaining table?

Mr. **Perle.** I rather doubt it.

Senator **Levin**. Were they dismantled for financial reasons, or is the proposal being made for financial reasons or for engineering reasons?

Mr. **Perle**. In the case of the Titan II, I believe it is for both financial and safety reasons.

Senator **Levin**. And how about the B-52D's?

Mr. **Perle**. I think there the principal concern is the operating costs.

Senator **Levin**. The costs. So that you would agree that in order to save the costs of the B-52D's, we were retiring them early, in essence?

Mr. **Perle**. That is right. I do not believe we ought to keep weapons that are not as militarily effective as available alternatives in a vain effort to impress the Soviets that we have more effective military power than we really have.

Senator **Levin**. I think General Davis who is the head of the Strategic Air Command, would disagree with you. And I think the Senate Appropriations Committee would disagree with you, too, because they have counseled against the retirement of the B-52D's. Do you oppose that action on the part of the Appropriations Committee of restoring the funds, at least in part? We are going to try to restore the rest of them today. Would you disagree with the Senate appropriations actions in restoring, in part, funds for the B-52D's so we do not retire them early?

Mr. **Perle**. I think the B-52D is of limited military effectiveness. But, Senator, I would like to know where the funds are coming from. If they are coming from a more effective military program, then I would certainly oppose that. If they are coming from an ineffective program outside of the defense area, then I would want to take a second look at it.

Senator **Levin**. But if they were just simply add-ons to the appropriation budget, then you would want to take a second look? You could not support that here?

Mr. **Perle**. I think if they are simply add-ons coming from other than the defense budget, it would be worth a second look. You put a budget together based on priorities, and the B-52D's fell out at the bottom of the list. But if the Senate Appropriations Committee, in its wisdom, wishes to revise or make the priority choices easier by adding money to the defense budget, then we would certainly want to take a second look at that.

Senator **Levin**. Why would you want to take a second look if they have no strategic value?

Mr. **Perle**. It is not a question of no strategic value; it is a question of whether they are worth the price that has to be paid in terms of alternative uses to which those funds could be put.

Senator **Levin**. So that the bottom line is you do concede they have some strategic value?

Mr. **Perle**. Yes, I think they have some value.

Senator **Levin**. Would you agree with the statement of General Davis to this committee last month that the net effect of the Reagan strategic package is to gradually reduce our capability in absolute numbers over the next 5 years?

Mr. PERLE. I am not familiar with the context of the statement, so I would rather not comment on that particular statement. But I believe the net effect of the President's proposal is to strengthen our capability.

Senator LEVIN. During the next 5 years?

Mr. PERLE. During the next 5 years. He must have been referring to the retirements that are going to take place before new systems come on line.

Senator LEVIN. Exactly. But you disagree with that?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, there is no way to get from here to there without an intervening period. And it seems to me the important question is the overall cohesion of the proposals. And I strongly support them.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Perle, this is the third major round of strategic negotiations in our country. We had SALT I. SALT II, presumably ended in failure. What motivations are behind the Soviets today that were not present at the time Ford started Vladivostok and Carter went through with his negotiations, absent the one we all recognize, the President's determination to match weapon for weapon unless we succeed?

Mr. PERLE. Senator Warner, I am not sure that current Soviet motivations are any different from the motivations of the past. We will not know that until we see how they are prepared to negotiate. I think it is terribly important not to confuse a willingness to negotiate with a willingness to accommodate. And thus far, we have no evidence of a willingness to accommodate.

Senator WARNER. So we have no new evidence that there is a strong motivation, like economic conditions in the Soviet Union, weakening of the Warsaw Pact, a failure of their foreign policy all the way from Afghanistan to Poland? These are not contributory factors, in your judgment?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is very hard to judge what goes on in the minds of the Soviet leaders. I do believe that the Soviets are capable of weighing and do in fact weigh alternatives. And to the extent to which they have become persuaded that this administration means to redress the military balance, they may find arms control alternatives to competition more appealing.

Senator WARNER. You made a statement, and I am going to try to quote it, that, "There is no prayer for hope in these particular negotiations until such time as deployment of our systems." And that is scheduled now 2 years from this month: that is, 1983. In other words, we had better inform the American public and Europe as a whole that while we may diligently pursue the negotiations, there will be, in your judgment, "no prayer" until 2 years from now?

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I did not mean to leave that impression. There is no prayer of success in these negotiations unless we continue with the program. I do not believe it is necessary actually to conclude the deployment.

Senator WARNER. You used the word "deployment," because I copied it down. But that is all right.

In other words, your suggestion is we continue to manufacture the weapons, build them up, and proceed with our deployment until such time as these negotiations succeed?

Mr. PERLE. I think that we should continue the program on its present schedule. And if by December 1983, when the first deployment is scheduled, we do not yet have an agreement, we should put those missiles in place and we should go on deploying them until such time as we complete our program or we get an agreement.

Senator WARNER. How serious a factor in these negotiations are the various peace movements that we have described here earlier?

Mr. PERLE. I think it is potentially a very important and very constructive factor. Until quite recently, the peace movement has been directed almost exclusively to opposition to the deployment on the Western side. With the President s proposal and with the negotiations now underway, I hope that that peace movement will devote itself to pressure on the Soviet side as well.

And in recognition of the fact that the Soviets alone possess these weapons, the peace movement would do well and could make a great contribution by taking its concern to Moscow.

Senator WARNER. Can we anticipate a stepped-up activity on the part of the Soviets to induce greater and more widespread peace movements in Europe?

Mr. PERLE. I think the Soviets will continue to try to exploit the peace movement for their own purposes. And if anyone doubted that they were doing that, the experience a few weeks ago in Denmark should be persuasive, where a Soviet diplomat was expelled from the country and a prominent Danish writer was arrested for espionage because the diplomat and the writer had been working together to finance peace demonstrations in Denmark.

And I understand that there may be a similar expulsion from Norway, because the predecessor to the Danish diplomat had gone on to Oslo, where it is believed he was engaged in the same sort of activity.

But I think the pattern of Soviet effort to manipulate well-meaning people who have legitimate fears and concerns has been pretty clearly established.

Senator WARNER. You indicated very forcefully that we have no fallback position in this country. Let us conjecture for a moment as to the future of these negotiations. If we continue to adhere to that policy and the Soviets likewise adhere to their ultimate goals, whatever they may be recognizing there is a stalemate what is the likelihood that they will use as an excuse that we cannot settle in this framework of the TNF negotiations the TNF issues until such time as we proceed with the perhaps larger and equally important global issues? In other words, should we expect them to use that as a back door technique to come out of these negotiations saying, "We cannot settle TNF until such time as we commence and begin to develop a framework for the global ICBM issue"?

Mr. PERLE. I believe it is entirely possible that they would use that line of argument. And I am hopeful that when the START talks get underway we will have proposals equally appealing to the proposals we have made in Geneva so that that propaganda path will become a cul de sac.

Senator WARNER. What is the timeframe for those START talks?

Mr. PERLE. Early next year. I think it is too soon to say when we will be ready. And I believe it is important that we prepare very carefully for these talks. We took some criticism, as you know, Senator, for the delay in opening the current negotiations.

And looking back on the work we had to do and the experience of that effort, I am convinced that we were right to take the time, and we would never have made this proposal if we had to go to the table even 3 months ago. We learned a lot in the course of studying this issue, and I think we have made better proposals as a result.

Senator **Warner**. We focused a great deal, and quite properly so, on the SS-20 missile in the context of these negotiations. Do we have reason to believe that the Soviets do not have on the drawing board or in production now a successor missile of some type that could perform the mission of the SS-20 and, as soon as we resolve this round, the issue of the SS-20 deployments, up pops that missile somewhere in the area behind the Urals or elsewhere and it has the same offensive capability?

Mr. **Perle**. Our proposal entails limitations on weapons of a certain range. So that successor missiles, if they have the same capability, would also be limited under the agreement. And it would make no sense to ban the SS-20 and permit a successor.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.

Mr. **Perle**. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Hart?

Senator **Hart**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, I was as interested in the first half of your statement as I was in the second. And that is that historic rehearsal of the circumstances of failures in arms control.

And what I would like to pursue is a line of questioning that seems to me to highlight a logical fallacy. And that is that somehow the 12-year history of arms control is the blame for the problems that we find ourselves in now. And I do not quite understand the logic behind that rehearsal.

You point out that 12 years ago the United States was ahead; now they are ahead of us in everything but warheads, that if the current trends continue as likely they will, they will surpass us. That was one of the arguments in favor of the SALT II Treaty.

You then go ahead and talk about our three major elements of our Triad were survivable and now they are not. And you go ahead and talk about Soviet air defenses.

I guess my question is: Did you believe or did anyone else believe that we would ever negotiate arms control limitations that were favorable to us or that locked in a situation where the Soviets were permanently inferior?

Mr. **Perle**. No, I certainly did not. But I am unhappy at the prospect of negotiations that lock us into a position of inferiority.

Senator **Hart**. I understand that. But I am talking about your review of the history, that you seemed to indicate here that the negotiations have failed for 12 years because they did not preserve our superiority. I am reading your rehearsal of what has gone on for the past 12 years.

Mr. **Perle**. No, I simply make the observation that we were superior when the talks began, we are not superior today. But beyond that, and perhaps more importantly, our forces were not vulnerable before, and they are increasingly vulnerable today.

I would have hoped that the talks would have produced agreements that would have stopped Soviet building short of the point where they could put our forces at risk. They clearly were not prepared to accept agreements that would have left each of us with a relatively invulnerable deterrent.

Senator HART. It seems to me vulnerability is the product of increased accuracy, among other things. How do you negotiate limitations on accuracy?

Mr. PERLE. Well, you can negotiate limitations on the other things, and the other things in this case are the numbers of accurate weapons that can be delivered. And I am sorry to say we failed to achieve limitations that would have stopped short of the number of accurate weapons necessary to destroy hardened missile silos on our side, and we do not have that capability with respect to the Soviets.

Senator HART. I think we are confusing apples and oranges. You are talking about numbers I am talking about accuracy.

At about the time that they began to catch up with us in numbers, the period of relative U.S. superiority to what you now perceive to be the period of relative Soviet superiority, they also were improving accuracy. It seems to me the vulnerability of our systems are the product of the latter rather than the former.

Mr. PERLE. Well, vulnerability is a product of both. Clearly, if the Soviets had accurate missiles but too few of them to cover all of our ICBM's, they would not have the capability to strike and destroy that force. Alternatively, if they had relatively inaccurate missiles but a very large number of them, they might be able to inflict the same degree of damage.

Senator HART. But that is not what worries our defense planners now. It is not the saturation; it is the fact that they are catching up or have caught up in terms of accuracy and can target our fixed launchers.

It seems to me that you would be faced with the same dilemma. If we had negotiated a treaty which permitted the Soviets to have the same number of missiles that we had and they had improved the accuracy of those missiles in the process, our forces would be vulnerable, as you now perceive them to be.

So what I am challenging is the assumption that if we somehow could have negotiated a treaty in those 12 years, it would have prevented them from developing that kind of accuracy that we in fact have had. When you say we did not have the capability of targeting their forces, we did, in fact, over much of that period of time. And it seems to me that if our forces are now vulnerable, it is a product of that improved accuracy, not just the numbers.

I have also found it curious that in your reiteration here, our land-based missiles become vulnerable and our bombers face increasingly formidable air defenses that raise serious questions about their ability to penetrate and reach their targets.

Did you envision some sort of arms control agreement in that period that would have prevented the Soviets from building air defenses?

Mr. PERLE. No, I did not. But then I have been rather skeptical about the utility of arms control in lightening our defense burden, Senator. I was really addressing those remarks to people who are rather more optimistic than I about the potential for arms control.

I am quite prepared to agree with you that it was not possible to achieve agreements that would have left us in a more comfortable position. I am surprised to hear you say that, however.

Senator HART. That is the quarrel I have with the first half of your statement, is that you build an historic record here that blames arms control for the dilemma that we are now in. I do not think that is fair.

Mr. PERLE. No, I did not mean to blame arms control for the dilemma we are now in. The dilemma we are now in is the result of the Soviets having invested resources at a very high level while the level of investment on our side was declining and a gag was permitted to develop.

My only point was that the Soviets find it quite easy to sit down at the negotiating table while building forces that are precisely those forces subject to negotiation.

Senator HART. That is because they were starting from a position of inferiority. I assume that we would have done the same thing had the roles been reversed.

Mr. PERLE. Well, the roles are now rather reversed with respect to theater nuclear forces in Europe, and yet some people say it is unfair to ask the Soviets to reduce those forces down to a level of equality.

Senator HART. Nevertheless, on strategic systems, at least, this administration's position is essentially what the Soviet position was 5, 10, or 12 years ago. And that is that we are not really going to negotiate strategic limitations until we have what we consider to be parity, but what they might consider to be superiority.

Mr. PERLE. I think the Soviets went on beyond the requirements of parity, Senator. We had this argument in the early 1970's. I can recall debates and even administration testimony in which it was suggested that the Soviet buildup represented nothing more than an effort to achieve parity.

And indeed, if one looks back at intelligence community estimates of the early 1970's about the probable size of the Soviet course in the mid to late 1970's those estimates showed a slackening in the Soviet program as they achieved parity.

So even our intelligence community made the assumption that parity was the Soviet goal. Unhappily, they were wrong, and the programs did not begin to slacken as the Soviets achieved parity. On the contrary, they continued and in some cases were even accelerated, with the result that today the Soviets have forces that go beyond parity, and for any reasonable military purpose seem to us far in excess of their needs. It is an unpleasant fact, but it is a fact that we have to face.

I do not blame arms control for that. I do not think arms control is responsible for that, but I do think that a recognition of that fact ought to be reflected in our arms control policies.

Senator HART. And also in our strategic force modernization policy, which has included all along a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system, a Trident submarine fleet, perhaps a B-1 bomber that is still very much on the agenda for the administration, and a whole variety of other programs.

The strong implication of the statement is that the United States has not been doing anything, including planning, for modernization of its forces, while the Soviets have been doing a whole lot of things.

I frankly think that the vulnerability that this country faces is not so much a product of numbers as it is improved accuracy and improved technology on the Soviet side. And focusing only on the numbers and us presuming that we can reach a situation where we can be perceived by them to be only catching up and leveling, off with all of this force modernization program that we have on the agenda, I think is probably unrealistic. Do you not think so?

Mr. PERLE. But, you know, the really difficult question to answer is why the Soviets, at very considerable expense, have made this investment in rocket forces that have this disturbing characteristic of being able to attack our deterrent, particularly since the Soviet Union is not a wealthy country by Western standards, it is a poor country, certainly in the consumer sector.

Senator HART. But we are doing the same thing.

Mr. PERLE. We have refrained for a very long time——

Senator HART. But we are not now.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. From attempting to acquire weapons of sufficient number and accuracy to threaten their deterrent. And indeed, had the Soviets accepted the notion of significant reductions earlier in the effort at arms control, it might have been possible to achieve levels that would have precluded those developments. But they have shown no interest in it. On the contrary, the Soviets seem quite determined to threaten our retaliatory capability.

Senator HART. Well, we are in the process of doing the same thing, too.

I have two other observations, and then my time is up.

One is, in your statement you state the Soviets have tried and succeeded in negotiating agreements that permit continued growth of their strategic forces. I think the key word there is "growth." We essentially have done the same thing. The Joint Chiefs testified on behalf of the SALT II Treaty largely on the basis that it would not prevent us from modernizing or in some cases expanding every one of our nuclear forces.

Second, you talk about the clever Soviets in the interim agreement, slipping that loophole past the Nixon administration as if our negotiators were completely asleep over there. I note also that Secretary Kissinger insisted when we have a MIRV superiority, as you know, in not negotiating limitations on MIRV's. And that more than anything else probably has caused the dilemma in which we presently find ourselves.

Mr. PERLE. I think for the historic record, Senator Hart, we did propose in SALT I limitations on MIRV's and would have been prepared to agree to banning MIRV's if the Soviets had been willing to enter into such an agreement with adequate verification. They were not willing to do so, however.

Senator COHEN [presiding]. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. Perle, I was interested in your statement about the zero option whereby verification becomes much easier. You said if we had a zero option, there would be no missiles, therefore plants would be shut down and there would be no tests. I question whether that is true or not. If you have an SS-20 such as you stated, it could be used as an ICBM, could it not? I think you indicated to Senator Jackson that if you just take two of the missiles, two of the warheads off the missile, that is, you would have an ICBM?

Mr. Perle. I said I thought that might be possible. It is on the margin.

Senator Cohen. But in any event, as long as you do not have a SALT II agreement that would limit ICBM warheads or launchers, well, you would not shut down the factories, you would still have the factories, still have the tests, and you would just say, "We are just testing out our ICBM force."

Mr. Perle. I think your observation is quite right. It persuades me that we have a lot to learn by coming up here, because I had not thought of that. But clearly, if the Soviets were to test the SS-20 in the guise of testing the SS-16, we would have to find some way to control that in order to improve verification.

Senator Cohen. I just raise it as a question, saying that the zero option does not give you much more in the way of verification. Simply saying there are no more missiles, no more factories, no more workers, no more tests does not seem to follow, at least from what I can see.

Second, Senator Tower opened this session by talking about the MX and its basing mode. You were very active during the whole discussion of SALT II, and there was a strong sentiment, if not a majority sentiment, on this committee that felt that the military decisions were being subordinated to the SALT II Treaty ambiguities; namely, the basing mode was being constantly restructured to accommodate different interpretations of what would be in compliance with the verification requirements of SALT II.

And there we went from the vertical MPS into the air-launched possibility down to the racetrack with a sun roof and the breakout and finally with a modified Carter plan, all of which were seen by a number of people as being a way in which to comply or being forced to comply with SALT II considerations.

The question I have now is: Are political considerations driving military decisions with respect to the MX decision basing mode now? And by that I mean what military justification is there for hardening silos, spending an incredible amount of money to harden silos to put these missiles in a fixed mode, if in fact survivability depends upon mobility? What is the military justification for pouring billions of dollars into a hole that can be easily attacked?

Mr. Perle. I believe, Senator, that in the long run, survivability will indeed depend on mobility or on active defenses or on some combination of the two. The program to harden a relatively small number of silos which would contain MX missiles is an interim measure. And it is not going to solve the survivability problem.

Senator Cohen. Let me ask you are there political considerations that have driven that particular decision, staying away from the domestic political decision in Utah, Nevada? Let us go to the international implications at this point. You spoke with some optimism about the degree of solidarity that exists with our allies to go forward with TNF. I must say that I am a little bit more skeptical than you are about the solidarity of our European allies.

But is that solidarity predicated upon a decision on the part of the United States to place the MX in a land-based mode?

Mr. Perle. I do not think so, Senator. I know the argument was made that if the United States did not deploy the MX on land, some Europeans who are critical of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on land in Europe would seize upon that as an agrument against the deployment. For the most part, the——

Senator COHEN. You disagree with that?

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. The people who found that argument attractive have a lot of other arguments to which they can and do resort. And I do not think it was an important consideration.

Senator COHEN. Let me be clear then. So in your judgment, if we were not to have the MX in a land-based mode but to have it in a sea-based mode, that would not in any way diminish your optimism about the allies' decision to go forward? So if those of us, for example, who are not particularly enthused about going forward with a hardened silo were to say, "Let us put it in a submarine," in your judgment, if that decision were to carry by the U.S. Senate and House, would that decision diminish European enthusiasm for TNF?

Mr. PERLE. I do not know that it would. But if I can respond more fully, I do think, Senator Cohen——

Senator COHEN. Let me tell you why I am asking.

Mr. PERLE [continuing]. Turning down the President's proposal at this point would have a seriously adverse effect on Europe, and that is entirely independent of what the issue is.

Senator COHEN. No, it is not turning down the President's decision, but the question is should we put the MX in a different type of mode, if there are people who disagree with the military justification.

You see, I am finding you can probably find a military justification for about any plan. We now have the curious situation that by hardening the silos, the Soviets will have to concentrate their missiles in order to take out that hardened silo; therefore, making it easier for us to shoot down their incoming missiles. Is that a military theory that you would find credible?

Mr. PERLE. I do not know the technical details on which it is based. But obviously, you need the defense in order to shoot the missile down, and we do not have one now.

Senator COHEN. But the rationale is by hardening the silos you force them to concentrate the incoming attack, thereby making it easier to shoot down their missiles coming in.

That is a very long way from where we were a year ago when the military advisers were saying you have to have mobility. So now we can have a static missile system and thereby even force the Soviets into a less optimal military judgment of their own.

Mr. PERLE. I think technically it may well be possible to have a silo-based system that could be heavily enough defended so that it would be survivable. The questions involved are questions of cost, schedule, and technical uncertainties.

Senator COHEN. The reason I ask you about the European reaction was because you did an interview with the New York Times on November 22. In response to sea-launched cruise missiles, you stated that the decision was to go to land-based cruise missiles in Europe, largely because missiles at sea did not represent the sharing of the burdens necessary for the expression of political solidarity.

Does not that same rationale apply to the United States as far as the Europeans are concerned?

Mr. PERLE. As you know, Senator, we have a very large number of land-based weapons at present.

Senator COHEN. I understand that.

Mr. PERLE. One is talking about a basing mode for 100 to 200 MX missiles, which would constitute a small fraction of the total number of weapons. So I do not think the cases are comparable.

Senator COHEN. But we are talking about perceptions, however. We have at risk currently the Minuteman III, the II, what remains of the Titan force. Our land is at risk. Frankly, I have been told by many conservative Europeans in Germany that they would have a much greater difficulty—that is, a much more difficult time—persuading their people to accept Pershing II's, if in fact, the MX were not in a land-based mode.

What I am asking you is this: Is that one of the factors in describing our decision to go to the hardened silo concept as an interim measure?

Mr. PERLE. I do not think it was a very important consideration. I cannot tell you how heavily it weighed in the President's mind.

Senator COHEN. Would this proposal for a zero option preclude the use of neutron weapons?

Mr. PERLE. No. The proposal is with respect to the delivery systems and not warheads, although we do not plan an enhanced radiation warhead on either the ground-based cruise missile or the Pershing II.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, I welcome you before this committee. We consider you to be an expert on all of these arms control matters, and I am delighted that you came here to share your thoughts with us. I would like to get into what your perspective is on arms control negotiations.

Suppose you were there in Geneva today and were carrying on these arms control talks that we all hope and pray will be fruitful. I suspect that basically this is a situation of give and take. It is a situation of what would you give up that you have in place or that you had planned on the basis of what changes I might make.

Do you agree with that general philosophy? If so, would you expand a little bit as to how you think we are going to be successful in getting from point A to point B?

Mr. PERLE. I agree, Senator, with the view that negotiation involves compromise. There are two ways one could approach the matter of compromise. One is by making a proposal that in itself entails a very significant compromise and then standing by that proposal.

Another is to make a proposal that does not represent compromise and then in the give and take of negotiation, alter that proposal until it does.

I believe the proposal that the President has made already entails a very fundamental compromise on the part of the United States because we are prepared to forgo the plans we now have and the programs that are now underway to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, if the Soviets will join us with zero on each side by dismantling theirs.

So we go to this negotiation with a position for which I believe we have a very strong case. Hopefully, this is a position that will have such broad appeal to the people most immediately affected—that is, our allies in Europe—that there will be sufficient political support for this proposal so the Soviets will find it irresistible. They have not found it irresistible yet, which is hardly surprising.

This is why I opened my remarks by suggesting that only if we are firmly resolved to stand by our position and to continue the program, that the Soviets must regard as the alternative, can we expect success in the negotiations.

Senator Exon. I suppose, though, Mr. Perle, that when you are negotiating with the Soviet Union—and we know how difficult they have been to negotiate with in the past—indeed, some believe that most of the negotiations have been beneficial to them.

Now, I do not care to get into that, except that I would like to ask you this question. I suppose, basically when you are negotiating with the Soviet Union, you have your basket full of ICBM proposals. And you would agree with me, would you not, that when the President gives a speech, which you describe as a historic offer to the Soviet Union, he was basically, not limiting the talks in the long range to just the relatively short-range missiles, he wants to go beyond that to the whole field of ICBM's, does he not?

Mr. Perle. Yes. Next year sometime, probably early in the year, we will go to Geneva with proposals on the limitation of strategic weapons.

Senator Exon. Now, that gets us to the point of strategic weapons that I have been very curious about. I have not seen this situation addressed. If the administration had a thoroughly thought-out policy of dealing with the Soviet Union on arms control, and I would assume that you would want as much in your basket to negotiate with as possible, why would the United States on October 1 announce unilaterally that they were doing away with their MPS basic system, which I thought would have been a feasible and reasonable bargaining tool with the Soviet Union on our upcoming arms talks?

Why on October 1 did the administration announce unilaterally that they were giving up the MPS basing mode in the western desert areas of the United States at the same time I would have thought they would have been planning the talk that the President gave the next month in November? That does not make sense to me.

Mr. Perle. Well, Senator, I think we concluded that the MPS basing mode was not the most effetcive way to cope with the problem of the vulnerability of our ICBM's. Had we given up the MX missile unilaterally, I think you would have a very strong point. But we have not given up the missile; we have simply opted for one basing mode rather than another.

Senator Exon. Were you consulted on the policy of giving up the MPS basing mode?

Mr. Perle. I was not very much involved in the basing mode decision.

Senator Exon. What was your position on the proper basing mode for the MX missile when you were a staff member on this committee on behalf of Senator Jackson?

Mr. Perle. Well, this committee did a superb job, for the time I was here, of deferring a final decision on basing mode. Everyone was anxious for the administration to produce a convincing basing mode. And I remember being quite anxious for that. But it never happened while I was here.

Senator **Exon**. Would you answer the question? What was your recommendation on a basing mode for the MX missile?

Mr. **Perle**. I frankly have found the basing mode issue over the years to be an extraordinarily complex technical judgment. I can recall at one time finding the trench system quite persuasive when the trench system was the preferred alternative of the Air Force. And then the Air Force concluded that the trench system would not have been effective and it would have been a disaster to have built it. And so we came up with a second basing mode. And we looked at air mobile.

You know the history as well as I. It has been a struggle to try to find a basing mode that people are comfortable with and that they have sufficient confidence in to want to commit the very substantial resources involved to building it.

I was not happy with some features of the racetrack system of the previous administration, which seemed to me to unnecessarily burden the system in the interests of SALT verification, despite the fact that the Soviets said it was not verifiable anyway even after those particular features were incorporated into the system.

I frankly have never been very comfortable with my own ability to judge these various basing modes, Senator.

Senator **Exon**. Well, Mr. Perle, I am going to press you on this a little bit further, because I started out by saying you are considered an expert, and you are now Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Are you testifying that when you worked with this committee that you had no firm thought in your own mind as to how we should base the MX?

Let me put it this way: When you worked for Senator Jackson and with this committee, were you of the notion at that time to say that we should go ahead and buy the MX and worry about its basing mode at some later date way off in the future?

Mr. **Perle**. I have thought for some time that we ought to go ahead and buy the MX. The issue that has been before the Senate and was certainly before the Senate when I was here was the question of R&D on basing modes. And when I was here the issue of a final deployment decision was not faced.

Senator **Exon**. Mr. Perle, were you ever in the Armed Services Committee in open or closed session when you heard people literally pound the table and say if the President of the United States, who was then Jimmy Carter, did not announce the basing mode for the MX missile, that we were going to "cave in to the Soviet Union," or words to that effect?

Mr. **Perle**. I do not recall that.

Senator **Exon**. You do not recall, then, the concern of some of the members of this committee, that the Carter administration was accused of delaying unnecessarily what the basing mode should be?

Mr. **Perle**. What I think was entailed there, Senator Exon, was a suspicion that the Carter administration did not intend to build the MX missile and was simply deferring the basing mode decision because it was not going to build the missile in any event.

Senator **Exon**. I see that my time is up. But once again I am going to try to ask you a question. When you worked for this committee, what was your recommendation to Senator Jackson or other members on the committee as to the basing mode for the MX?

Mr. **Perle**. I am trying to recall the point at which I may have been involved in that issue, Senator, and I frankly cannot recall a decision having to be made on more than research and development on a basing mode. I frankly found the dispute over one basing mode rather than another to have a large technical component that it was very difficult to judge in the absence of more evidence and more persuasive evidence than was then available.

I must confess to you that I was shaken by the complete reversal with respect to the trench system, which at one time, it was vigorously argued, was the preferred basing mode and not long thereafter was found to have a potentially fatal flaw. So I think one has to be very careful about these things. It was quite right to conduct extensive research and development.

Senator **Exon**. What basing mode do you think is the best basing mode right now if you had to make a decision?

Mr. **Perle**. I do not think we have come up yet with a basing mode whose costs and technical risks are such that it is wise to make a decision today.

Senator **Exon**. So then you would have to say that Jimmy Carter was correct in the delays, in the indecisive attitude that seemed to come out of that administration with regard to the basing mode of the MX?

Mr. **Perle**. I think if Jimmy Carter was unpersuaded about the options before him he was quite right to be skeptical. But in the end he did propose a basing mode, and I found that one unpersuasive.

Senator **Exon**. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator **Jepsen** [presiding]. Mr. Perle, I have heard the President's proposal described as an overall commonsense approach, as the first since the Eisenhower days. Would you tell me, how does the President's proposal throw the present Soviet modus operandi off balance? I have heard that it does that very cleverly. Just how does it do that?

Mr. **Perle**. The Soviets have been presenting themselves in Europe as champions of disarmament. Now they are faced with an American disarmament proposal, a proposal that we are prepared to table in Geneva in the form of a draft treaty that could be rapidly concluded if they are prepared to affix their signature.

So they now face a choice. They can either walk away from that proposal and raise in the minds of many Europeans considerable doubt about whether their earlier claims were disingenuous or they can accept that proposal, in which case we would all be better off. But in effect, we have called their bluff.

Senator **Jepsen**. One of the questions and comments that I have had with regard to this proposal is the ability to verify and how that is going to be done. In your opinion, is there anything that could really replace onsite verification?

Mr. **Perle**. It depends on what is meant by onsite verification. I can imagine some forms of onsite verification which would be extremely effective and others which would be less effective than some national technical means.

Let me give you an example of the former: A proposal in which the Soviets eliminated the SS–20. I think I have to qualify this in light of Senator Cohen's earlier observation, as one method by which the Soviets could circumvent that. But in any case, a proposal eliminating the SS–20, which entailed onsite inspection of the conversion of the factory producing SS–20's to the production of something else and perhaps periodic inspection to be sure that it had not been reconverted might be a very effective way of assuring ourselves that there was not clandestine production of the SS–20.

On the other hand, onsite visits to deployment areas probably would not reveal very much, because the weapons we are talking about can be moved around and by the time the inspection team gets there the thing you are looking for is gone.

So onsite inspection is potentially very helpful in some instances and in other instances would not be helpful at all. I hope that we will be successful in coming up with some innovative approaches to verification.

Senator **Jepsen**. As you know and as the article in this morning's Washington Post amplifies, the Soviet Union is maintaining that the balance of nuclear forces in Europe is essentially in equilibrium. I wonder if you would comment on the discrepancy between that statement and the Reagan administration's position that we are at about a 6 to 1 disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviets?

Mr. **Perle**. Yes, I would be glad to do that. The Soviet claim that there is now a balance is based on a construct of numbers on their part that we simply do not agree with, and I will explain why.

Let me begin by observing that the Soviets claimed there was a balance in these forces 2 years ago and since that time they have added 50 percent to the number of warheads in the relevant categories and we have not added anything. So if there was a balance 2 years ago there surely is not a balance today. And in fact there was not a balance even 2 years ago.

In order to make it look like a balance, the Soviets take their missiles and they count each missile as one, even though many of them have three warheads and even though many of the missile launchers have refire missiles, which they do not count at all.

They then count aircraft on the Western side, which are hardly comparable to ballistic missiles, and they count the strategic forces of our British and French allies. And they even count aircraft based on carriers which from time to time are on service in seas adjacent to the Soviet Union.

Now, they know very well that the capability of the aircraft they count, of many of the aircraft they count, to strike targets in the Soviet Union is extremely limited. In some cases it could only be accomplished on suicidal one-way missions. Nevertheless, each one of those aircraft, according to the Soviet calculations, is said to be equal to a launcher for an SS–20 which carries three ballistic reentry vehicles and which probably has a reload missile, so that the correct number even now is closer to six.

It is just a very tendentious comparison on their part.

Senator **Jepsen**. Would you provide, please, for the record, an explanation of the discrepancy which exists between the magnitude of the imbalance portrayed by your calculations and that calculated by the London International Institute of Strategic Sciences.

Mr. **Perle**. Yes, I would be glad to do that. In fact, what is striking is how much agreement there is between those two about the numbers of weapons on each side. The differences have to do with how they calculate what is included and what is not included.

[The information follows:]

MAGNITUDE OF IMBALANCE

In his speech on November 18, the President said that Soviet claims on the current balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces are wrong. The President stated that by any objective measure, the Soviet Union has an overwhelming advantage on the order of 6 to 1.

The 6 to 1 ratio that the President used is based on a comparison of those US systems often cited by the Soviets as "medium' range, as well as additional Soviet systems which have ranges equivalent to or greater than the listed US systems.

Of such systems, the US has a total of approximately 560 aircraft and no missiles, while the Soviet total numbers over 3,800 missiles and aircraft.

This calculation does not include Allied systems on either side. If such systems were included, the Soviet Union would still enjoy an overwhelming advantage in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

On the other hand, the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), in its table titled "Long-and-Medium-range Nuclear Systems for the European Theater," has provided totals for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not just for the US and the USSR.

The IISS also included certain additional systems along with those cited by the President. On the NATO side, US and German Pershing I launchers, US Poseidon warheads, and British and French systems have been included. On the Warsaw Pact side, certain short-range missiles and aircraft, which have not been included by the Soviets in their "medium" range claims, were added to the IISS totals. Consequently, the IISS arrived at a total of 1512 systems for NATO, and 4430 systems for the Warsaw Pact.

Senator JEPSEN. Are there inherent operational disadvantages or constraints on theater nuclear forces which rely on aircraft or submarines for their delivery systems, such as reliance on the vulnerable runways or command and control problems, which make these weapons systems significantly less a threat to the Soviets than are the medium-range missiles or systems currently deployed by the U.S.S.R. against the West?

Mr. PERLE. The answer to that is most definitely "Yes." The simple fact is the Soviets now have several hundred highly accurate missile warheads that can be delivered in a matter of minutes on virtually all of the high-value targets in NATO, and those targets include the airfields on which the aircraft that the Soviets say balance those missiles are presently based.

I think we presently are in a position where we have to assume that a significant fraction of those aircraft would have to be destroyed before they could perform a nuclear mission, not only because they are vulnerable on the ground but because they have a conventional role to play in the event of a conventional war in Europe. And if one believes that a conflict in Europe would begin with a conventional phase, then we have to assume that a significant fraction of those aircraft would be destroyed in a conventional phase of the war. So there is no sense in which a ballistic reentry vehicle, against which there is no defense in the West, can be compared to a vulnerable aircraft that has to surmount Soviet defenses in order to reach its target.

Senator JEPSEN. How do you feel about the start of the talks, the description of the two negotiators, our Mr. Nitze and the Russian negotiator being described as hawkish, as folks who are seasoned veterans and are hawkish? What do you anticipate in the first 3 months of these negotiations?

Mr. PERLE. I think the opening round of the negotiations will be marked by a Soviet effort to persuade the public that the proposal the President has made is somehow unfair and unreasonable. I think they understand that if it is regarded as fair and reasonable, as we think it is and as we think it will come to be regarded, they will be under significant pressure to accept it, and they clearly prefer an outcome in which they keep their SS–20's and simply regard our aircraft in Europe and British and French forces as constituting a fair and reasonable balance.

So they hope to stop the NATO program to deploy missiles in response to the SS–20 and essentially legitimize the current balance. I think that is the Soviet objective.

Senator JEPSEN. So that would be the opening round, you predict?

Mr. PERLE. I believe so.

If I might add, they may propose some minor reductions in the number of SS–20's or a relocation of SS–20's from bases west of the Urals to bases east of the Urals. With respect to the latter possible Soviet proposal, we simply would observe that even bases east of the Urals for SS–20's are close enough to strike a very large number of targets in Western Europe.

In any case, these weapons are so mobile that they can be quickly moved. So that is not acceptable.

With respect to minor reductions, I think it is important to note that the current number of Soviet weapons deployed is well in excess of their needs. They have many more weapons than there are targets in NATO of high value. Therefore, it should not surprise us if the Soviets do offer to make some modest reduction.

I would hope and I believe that we would not fall for a cosmetic agreement that would leave the military balance essentially unchanged, that would leave the Soviet threat to NATO undiminished, but would give the appearance that some great accomplishment had been made.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you.

Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Perle, I want to get back to the mobile basing mode once again. Did you agree or do you agree now with the President's decision to cancel the MPS basing mode for the MX in the western desert areas over the objections of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the members of that body, that is each Chief of Staff?

Mr. PERLE. Well, without commenting on the views of the Joint Chiefs, I agree with the President's decision not to proceed with the proposal that was made before him.

Senator EXON. So then, I can assume that you held that position before you joined this administration?

Mr. PERLE. I had grave doubts even in the R&D stage, Senator Exon, about many of the features of the racetrack MPS system as I understood it.

Senator EXON. Well, you said in response to my question that you would not speak for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Joint Chiefs. But you were here as a staff member of this committee and you heard all of those military experts testify strongly for the MPS system.

Mr. PERLE. I did.

Senator EXON. So you did not agree with them; is that right?

Mr. PERLE. But I also heard them testify for the trench system. If the question is, do I necessarily believe that the testimony of the Joint

Chiefs is reason enough for accepting their view, the answer is no, I do not. I never have. I did not when I was here and I do not now.

Senator EXON. Well then, whose judgment do we rely on? A brand-new President that had no previous experience in military affairs and a new Secretary of Defense, in whom I have the highest regard, but certainly he had no experience in defense matters either prior to a year ago right now?

Mr. PERLE. I think in the end we are probably better off relying on the collective judgment of the administration and, if I may say so, the Congress as well. I think that at the end of the day, the national decisions that are produced out of the process of Executive proposals and legislative actions are about as good as a democracy can hope to obtain.

Senator EXON. I have one final question, Mr. Chairman.

There has been some speculation in the press recently that the administration now is considering some new basing mode for the MX. Do you know whether or not that includes any kind of MPS basing mode?

Mr. PERLE. I believe, Senator, that as we explore the long-term solution to this basing mode problem, mobility will be included in the array of alternatives that are examined. And I personally am pleased at that. I believe mobility offers a number of potential advantages which ought to be explored. I hope, with a bit of luck and with the time we have left to come to a conclusion on this, we will come up with ideas that are persuasive.

I realize I did not give you an answer that you found satisfactory to your earlier question.

Senator EXON. I think that is an understatement. [Laughter.]

Mr. PERLE. When I sat here as a staff member, the issue that was before us was fundamentally involved with the R&D program. I found the technical disagreement on that issue were very difficult to comprehend. I just have to be frank and tell you that.

Senator EXON. Is there any possibility that the administration is still looking at some kind of an MPS system that would include the western areas of the United States, or is that taboo per se?

Mr. PERLE. I do not believe it is taboo. I am quite sure that the guidance does not exclude deployment in any area.

Senator EXON. You do not think it would be a political decision, then?

Mr. PERLE. I am quite sure that the research and development effort is not going to be constrained by political maneuvers.

Senator EXON. I am delighted to hear that.

I thank you, Mr. Perle. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEPSEN. Thank you, Mr. Perle. Do you have anything that you wish to add or to close with?

Mr. PERLE. No, Senator. I just want to thank you for the chance to appear before this committee

Senator JEPSEN. We thank you for appearing here today.

Let the record show that there may be questions with regard to today's hearing, the subject matter, submitted through the close of business tomorrow.

This hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

○